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JPRS-TAC-86-095

17 DECEMBER 1986

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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17 DECEMBER 1986

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET YOUTH PAPER ON JAPAN'S PARTICIPATION IN SDI

Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 Sep 86 p 3

[Article by A. Drozdov, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent: "A Step Toward the Precipice"]

[Text] At the beginning of September, the government of Japan adopted during a special session an official resolution about participating in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Regarding this, the number "18" has acquired a special and almost magical meaning in Japanese press commentaries. From the moment that Washington put forth the idea of the SDI, the Japanese needed this many months to say "yes." Tokyo would like to depict this year and a half as a time of agonizing searching, doubts and internal struggle that allegedly tested the Japanese leadership, when defining its attitude toward SDI. This had an effect on some people -- only a week before the mentioned session, a reporter from the (ASAKHI) newspaper inquired in all seriousness: "Will Japan support or not support 'star wars'?" It's as if her arm had been continuously twisted for all these 18 months, achieving agreement by force.

Japan's fundamental support for SDI was already evident from the statements by Prime Minister Nakasone about "understanding" the importance and goals of this program, which he made at a meeting of the leaders of the seven developed capitalist countries in Bonn in 1985. In order to prepare for the official resolution, however, the Japanese leaders selected the extremely pragmatic tactic of "a quiet and step-by-step creeping" into SDI. On the one hand, this permitted Japan to carefully define the potential benefit of its participation in the research work on the program and, on the other hand, to deflect the suspicions of the opposition for a year and a half with respect to the working out of an agreement with the Americans on SDI by allusions to a thorough study of the problem.

Tokyo's official point of view is that Japan's participation in the "star wars" program has a number of unquestioned advantages. To substantiate this thesis, the government has entered upon lengthy explanations. Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotoda has done this. As a start, let us discard Gotoda's allusion to Japan's

desire to assist in the "final elimination of nuclear weapons" through SDI as deliberately groundless. His statements that SDI will serve to create more stable relations between the East and the West can also not be evaluated as anything other than propaganda-- you see, the attitude of the USSR toward attempts to transform space into an arena of the arms race is well known to Tokyo.

Consequently, the 9 September resolution of the Japanese cabinet reflects the voluntary and completely deliberate intention of Tokyo to assist Reagan in his next attempt to bring the arms race to a new turn in accordance with earlier signed agreements with Washington, England, the FRG, and Israel. Japanese leaders cannot fail to understand that the American administration hopes to complicate the international and domestic economic situation of the USSR through SDI. Gotoda said right out in his speech that SDI will become an important element in the "strategy of deterrence" that the West is pursuing against the Soviet Union and its allies. In an article published in the latest edition of the influential journal JAPAN QUARTERLY, (Fusimi Kodzi), a member of the House of Councillors of the Japanese parliament, former president of Japan's scientific council and a prominent physicist, reveals the meaning of this thesis: "Judging from everything, the bodies, which are engaged in SDI, are interested in expanding the present system of nuclear weapons using this program for only one purpose -- to insure a one-sided military superiority over the Soviet Union."

Is it possible that Tokyo reckons on strengthening Japan's position in the political dialogue with the Soviet Union this way, as Japanese newspapers point out? It is evident that the Nakasone government's resolution to participate in SDI will not bring any dividends to Japanese diplomacy on the "Soviet avenue." However, possibly Tokyo is counting on real military strategic advantages in supporting the "star wars" program? Japanese scientists quite validly think that the United States will hardly come to Japan's help in the event of a global nuclear conflict -- for the simple reason that it will be concerned with the defense of its own territory.

Put briefly, the only military strategic "advantage", which Japan will receive from "star wars", is the fact that -- as a minimum -- it will be granted the right to share the fate of the United States in a global nuclear conflict and to "cover" Washington on the front line that the hands of the Pentagon strategists have drawn through the Japanese islands. Tokyo also hoped to achieve a lessening of the pressure from the United States on Japan in the trade and economic area by supporting SDI. This, however, is probably not fated to come true since the Reagan administration clearly intends to examine the trade and political aspects of Japanese-American relations separately.

Where can the resolution of the Japanese cabinet lead? Japanese political, public and scientific figures unanimously answer this question: to restoring the threat of a nuclear war beginning. Is this advantageous for Japan? No, it is not advantageous. Japanese leaders constantly say this over and over again. Why did the government of Japan move to official support for

this program despite the clear minuses of SDI for Japan? The conviction of the cabinet that Japan must advance in a united front with the West to defend "common democratic values and freedoms" as a "responsible member of the Western association," had important significance. In Tokyo, they understand alliance relations with the United States as simple ones for some reason: as consistent support for American initiatives including "strategic defense"... otherwise, they say, Japan cannot dream about playing the role of a world power. Let us now dot the "i". Japan is achieving this goal by supporting the from-a-position-of-strength policy. For the time being it is only supporting it since Japan's own military potential is still not great.

The key factor, however, which finally worked in favor of Japan's participation in SDI, was the unwillingness of the government to allow the United States to get ahead in the area of high technology. Therefore, SDI is becoming another area of Japanese-American contradictions-- and these are rather sharp ones. Local political observers have paid attention to Prime Minister Nakasone's statement during the recent seminar of ruling parties concerning Japan's need to develop its own long-range program for developing the technology which will become the "answer" to SDI. The idea is being formulated as a "program for moving to the limit of human capabilities" and provides for the limitless use of computers in human activity. It is no accident that the Japanese intend to continue studying those variants of the SDI agreement, which would more fully satisfy the interests of private Japanese companies who are the main suppliers of technology for "star wars." The Japanese government intends to control technological exchanges so that the American will not use Japanese knowledge for their own mercenary motives. You see, this is just what will happen if Japan and Western Europe permit Washington to monopolize the results of scientific research within the framework of the program. The representatives of the American administration do not conceal their unwillingness to share the results of the research allegedly for reasons of secrecy. Nevertheless, Japan is supporting the idea of "star wars", expecting that SDI will open a new page in the history of Japanese science and industry and raise them to a qualitatively new level. You see, that same (F. Kodzi) reasonably thinks, however, that it is not mandatory to use military programs in order to develop technology. He cautions: "Remember the Manhattan Project (the code name for the program to create an atomic weapon.-- ed.). It worked not for science but for an anti-Soviet strategy." However, alas, the Japanese government bodies and a portion of its business circles -- desiring not to fall behind the United States and to control, if they can manage it, the escape of technology from Japan, are counting on improving "dual purpose" technologies (that is, that technology which is used in the civilian and military branches at the same time). The more of these technologies that appear, the more energetically will Japan's own military-industrial complex take shape. By letting their imaginations run wild, some Japanese politicians are predicting that it will be a compact one and will begin to produce not weapons but ideas. This should now measure Japan's military potential. It is possible to imagine how this "intellectual military-industrial complex" would work if the Japanese actually managed to force their finger under the Pentagon's paw to the SDI control panel. It would be interesting to see what role Prime Minister Nakasone's

idea about "the limits of human capabilities" would play in this. Would it become an "answer" to SDI at some time or would it ring out with propaganda whispers to the tune of "star wars?"

This depends almost entirely on the Japanese public. Its attitude toward SDI has not been uniform until now. Democratic left-wing forces, who are united in pacifist organizations, oppose SDI. The leading opposition parties, especially the Communist party and the Socialist party, express their views in parliament. The country's religious figures are also criticizing the government's policy. Prominent Japanese scientists and military specialists are daring to express their doubts regarding SDI. However, besides the people, who are ready for an objective political evaluation of SDI, and the organized participants in the antiwar movement, there is also the man in the street who is in the majority. He sympathizes with the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he is indignant over the nuclear arms race, and he is even ready to call Reagan a "dangerous politician", but ... there is nothing he can do to influence the decision of the government. Now, when the ruling party has an overwhelming majority in parliament, it is, of course, difficult to influence it. If this is not done, however, then a time will come in Japan when an "antiwar sentiment" will become simply unseemly. For the present, the overwhelming majority of the population speaks about their objections to a military option for Japan. Every year, however, the conservatives manage to break off from these masses pieces -- hundredths of a percent of those who believe in the "Soviet military threat". Even those, who do not take it seriously, for some reason think that the Soviet Union is obliged to disarm unilaterally.

The 9 September resolution of the Japanese government has not changed the political climate in Japan. It has gone seemingly unnoticed-- "operationally". Everything has apparently remained unchanged in the life of the Japanese. However, it only seems so. On that September day, Japan made an exceptionally important and far from safe selection for itself. Any war, even a "star" one will divide the participants into winners and losers. Japan, of course, wants to be among the winners. Judging from everything, other versions are ruled out in Tokyo-- although, at the very least, it would make sense to consider them theoretically.

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CSO:5200/1025

USSR'S VINOGRADOV DISCUSSES JAPANESE DECISION TO PARTICIPATE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Sep p 3

[Article by V. Vinogradov, under the rubric "Observer's Comments": "Space Quartet"]

[Text] Japan has followed behind England, the FRG and Israel as a participant in the American "star wars" program.

Thus, the space trio of Washington's accomplices has been converted into a quartet. An important practical step in dragging the country of the rising sun into the very dangerous plans of the United States, which are aimed at creating offensive space weapons and transferring the arms race into space, has been taken.

A special session of Japan's government has adopted a resolution on this and M. Gotoda, chief cabinet secretary, has announced it. The statement maintained that participation in research on the "strategic defense initiative" program corresponds to the "fundamental policy of Japan, which is aimed at establishing more stable relations between the West and the East by means of a radical decrease and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons."

It was announced that negotiations between Tokyo and Washington on concluding an intergovernmental agreement on Japan's participation in SDI will begin in the very near future and that the agreement itself will be signed before the end of this year. In the American capital, they are clearly hurrying to fix on paper the resolution that was adopted by the Japanese side. You see, the White House has expended quite a bit of effort in order to make Japan an accomplice in the dangerous plans for the militarization of space. The signing of the agreement about transferring advanced Japanese technology to the United States was one of the first steps in this direction.

And this is no accident. The creators of offensive space weapons are especially interested in the latest Japanese achievements in the fields of fiber and optic electronics and computer and laser technology. The Pentagon is trying to secure Japanese equipment that is designed to detect missiles during flight, microcircuits for electronic computers, and components for the production of

lasers, for itself. As the (IOMIURI) newspaper points out, the Pentagon intends to use the communications systems, which are developed on the basis of Japanese work, to control space spy satellites and "killer satellites" which will be equipped with laser and beam weapons. In other words, the latest technology, which is developed in Japan, must -- according to the plans of American strategists -- serve as the basic "nerve system" of the future network of military space installations in orbit, with which Washington will tie together its adventuristic "star wars" plans.

Incidentally, it has recently turned out that several Japanese monopolies have been cooperating to the utmost with American companies within the SDI framework, without waiting for Tokyo's official decision. Thus, information that branch companies of the Japanese (Kiosera) Corporation are filling a large order for the manufacturing of ceramic plates for the print circuits used in the on-board computers of nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles, has been leaked to the press. The (Khitati) firm is producing magnetic elements used in American military lasers that will be mounted on "killer satellites". This list is still not great. There can be no doubts, however, that it will be filled in a short time with more and more Japanese firms which -- in the pursuit of profits -- would have no objection to snatching a piece of the American space pie.

It is striking that the resolution, which was adopted by the Japanese government, goes against its statements about its readiness to act for the purpose of strengthening peace and decreasing international tensions and to contribute to progress in the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space weapons. Moreover, Japan's participation in SDI is in no way linked with its officially proclaimed three non-nuclear principles, with parliament's resolutions about using space for peaceful purposes and banning the export of military equipment and technology, and also with the defensive concept of the country's military policy that has been declared by Tokyo. In addition, it objectively creates a qualitatively new channel for realizing the militaristic calculations of the United States about converting the Far East into an area of increased military opposition.

In this connection, it is necessary to point out that Washington is planning to use not only Japanese technology but also Japanese territory in SDI. The United States already has available a network of electronic tracking stations which gather information around the clock on the USSR and the military strategic situation in the Far East, on the islands of Hokkaido, Honshu and Okinawa. In the words of the (ASAKHI) newspaper that have been cited by S. Hersh, a well known American journalist, all of these installations must become the ground elements for the "star wars" program. Another Japanese newspaper -- (AKAKHATA)--has disclosed the Pentagon's plans to arm the American Air Forces F-15 fighter interceptors, which have been relocated to Kadena Air Base (on the island of Okinawa) with ASAT anti-satellite missiles. The appropriate equipment is already being delivered to Kadena for this.

Here is another reason why the decision, which was taken by Tokyo, has important significance for Washington. In the American capital, they assume that

it will give the United States a solid trump-card for recruiting new participants into SDI since they think there that if a country, which was the first victim of nuclear bombings -- a country whose people have been subjected to the "nuclear allergy" -- have decided to participate in the "star wars" program, then what doubts could other states have?

Tokyo's recent step was taken despite sharp protests by the public, opposition parties and wide scientific circles. Thus, several thousand Japanese scientists signed an appeal calling for the renunciation of participation in the plan to militarize space. (K. Fusimi), a well-known physicist, warned in the magazine JAPANESE QUARTERLY on the eve of the decision: "The carrying out of SDI will lead not only to the militarization of science but also to a dangerous disruption of the balance between East and West. This is a threat to the entire human community."

Nevertheless, Tokyo answered Washington's rein. Its agreement to plug Japan's economic, scientific and technical potential into the American "star wars" program cannot be viewed as anything other than a witness of Japan's further involvement in the military and strategic plans of the United States. As the statement of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this matter has pointed out, such a step cannot, of course, fail to have a negative effect on Soviet-Japanese relations. The Japanese government will bear complete responsibility for the possible consequences of this policy.

The space quartet, directed by an American coachman, is on a very dangerous path.

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CSO: 5200/1025

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR'S VELIKHOV INTERVIEWED BY DIE ZEIT ON SDI, ABM TREATY

DW201421 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 21 Nov 86 p 5

[Interview with Yuriy Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, by correspondents Christoph Bertram and Christian Schmidt-Haeuer; date and place not given]

[Text] DIE ZEIT: What is the real concern of the Soviet Union about SDI?

Velikhov: First: We have no fear of SDI. However, we have serious apprehensions. Nuclear weapons have not become less dangerous -- to the contrary. Therefore, if we had the opportunity to build an effective defense system against missiles, we could renounce it anyway, because it would lead to a new arms race in offensive weapons. We are not religiously motivated against any defense. We defend, for example, our missile silos. However, we differentiate between means leading to a stabilization of nuclear parity and those leading to destabilization and an increase in tension.

DIE ZEIT: You gave us a very general answer to a very precise question. Does it mean that SDI basically does not seem to be a very dangerous development for you -- unpleasant, but not dangerous?

Velikhov: We do not consider SDI just a military program with a very far-reaching goal that will absorb many U.S. resources and that even finds support among U.S. allies. It is in fact a program for a new round in the arms race. Instead of disarmament we get a program for more armament, for global armament, and for global confrontation.

DIE ZEIT: Could you give a few examples?

Velikhov: Computers are being developed, infrared technology, radar technology, informatics, accuracy, miniaturization -- all developments leading to the creation of new compact warheads and higher accuracy of weapons systems. The new weapons could be deployed in orbits 100 km over the Soviet Union. We must consider that from such a platform the United States could make a conventional, non-nuclear first strike against the strategic weapons systems of the Soviet Union.

When the U.S. President says that SDI must work even with no nuclear weapons, it means a global system capable of hitting any object in the air, at sea, on land, or in space.

DIE ZEIT: How would you stop that development? What is the Soviet position on the necessary limitations of the U.S. SDI program? Several statements have been made: It was said in Reykjavik that only laboratory tests would be permitted. In the meantime, we hear from Soviet experts that only testing in space would be prohibited.

Velikhov: In order to understand the Soviet position, one must read the ABM Treaty on missile defense. Our conflict with the Americans arises from the fact that the U.S. side maintains that the treaty prohibits only the testing of space defense parts and systems that existed at the time the treaty was signed. We maintain -- together with American jurists, the negotiations of both sides, and the deputies who ratified the treaty at that time -- that the ban involves the whole technology: what was developed to that time and that which could still be developed.

DIE ZEIT: However, the treaty does not say that testing is permitted in the laboratory only. Are you not demanding stronger limitations than currently envisaged in the ABM Treaty?

Velikhov: No, to the contrary. We are prepared to define what laboratory research is. At one time our position was -- and it was correct in doing justice to the spirit of the treaty -- to renounce the entire development of missile defense in space. However, we realize now that it is difficult to convince our American partners of that. Therefore, we have been obliging them.

DIE ZEIT: Are you prepared to permit more than just laboratory tests? Can you foresee an agreement in which tests in the atmosphere will be permitted within limits?

Velikhov: We must sit down and stipulate two things: First, in what fields, in what spheres, and with what means tests can be made. Second, it must be defined what are parts of systems according to the ABM Treaty. We are prepared to negotiate on any kind of system.

Experts at the U.S. research laboratories themselves say that there is 10 years of laboratory work to do. Actually, there are no problems there. Therefore, I believe that the U.S. President did not have a reason in Reykjavik -- for technical or military reasons -- to reject our proposal. The proposals fully permit him to do what he actually wants to do.

DIE ZEIT: Professor Velikhov, what connection do your efforts to limit SDI tests in the framework of the ABM Treaty have with your proposal to halt nuclear tests?

Velikhov: There are certain things that overlap, yet they are two different things. First of all, the Soviet proposal is not aimed at a moratorium. For more than a year, we have had a unilateral moratorium. In Reykjavik we suggested to the United States immediately to resume negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. We also agree to provisional steps. However, we are not asking the United States now to agree to an immediate test ban because we understand that it is not now possible for the administration. However, we did request that negotiations be resumed on discontinuing nuclear tests. Of course, we understand that to a certain extent that will also have an effect on SDI, to the extent that nuclear defense technology is involved. The U.S. Administration is contradicting itself to say on the one hand that SDI is a purely non-nuclear initiative, but on the other that it is also a nuclear initiative.

DIE ZEIT: The Soviet Union has committed itself unilaterally to observe the test moratorium until 31 December 1986. Do you consider it probable that this period will be extended?

Velikhov: That depends on many international factors. Of course, I cannot speak on behalf of the government. As a scientist I would think that the moratorium should probably be continued. We have noted that public opinion in the West is not yet ready. But you must understand that it is no easy decision.

DIE ZEIT: One of the Soviet leadership's principle programs is to push the country's computerization. Is SDI not also a welcome challenge for the Soviet Union to make intensified efforts at computerization and modernization?

Velikhov: We are a planning society. When we have a clear goal, we do not have to scratch our left ear with our right hand. We prefer the direct way. If we need computerization, we effect it. I must also tell you that the argument that the development of modern technology in the West is only possible through highly sophisticated weapons is wrong.

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CSO: 5200/1106

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG DEFENSE MINISTER EXPLAINS SUPPORT FOR SDI

DW160715 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1915 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Interview with Defense Minister Manfred Woerner by correspondent Volker Bechtold on 14 October in Bonn on "ZDF Magazin" program — recorded]

[Text][Bechtold] What are the reasons, Mr Minister, that make the Federal Government continue its support for the U.S. President's SDI project, although leading SPD politicians term the Reykjavik meeting — which failed precisely because of SDI — a black day in the history of mankind?

[Woerner] That is a very shortsighted view and is typical of the SPD. Obviously, it is not able to assess the great historical process that has been initiated. It is giving a first impression. The Reykjavik meeting did not fail at all. It has produced remarkable progress, remarkable rapprochement on important disarmament issues. I am quite sure that if the West keeps its head now, if it sticks together, further progress and even agreements will be possible. I would even like to predict that it will happen in the not too far in the future.

What has induced us to support the U.S. initiative politically? There are several reasons. First, there is the political reason, which is simply that the Soviets have been doing the same for many years — for more than a decade. And the second reason: There is a good idea behind SDI — the attempt to cease basing the security of mankind on offensive weapons, on the destruction of the other, but to base security and stability on defensive weapons, which would facilitate a higher degree of stability, of balance, and of protection; a very different mixture.

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I believe that is the fundamental idea behind it. We must wait and see whether it is at all possible. Research is still in the initial stage. Finally, there is a very simple moral reason — to avoid mutual destruction. It is better to destroy missiles directed at people — it is better to shoot at missiles than at men. Moreover, offensive weapons are nuclear while defensive weapons are conventional. That is another way of looking at it.

All that has induced us to support the U.S. President's initiative and the Federal Government is sticking to that course. SDI is no obstacle to disarmament. SDI has brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table. Obviously, SDI means so much to them that they are ready to pay something for it. That means we are in a good negotiation position. It goes without saying that it would be foolish to give that up unilaterally and at the very stage of a great negotiating process that has a good chance of success.

[Bechtold] What do you know about Soviet space activities?

[Woerner] To begin with, the Soviet Union is the superpower that has already built a functioning antiballistic missile defense system around Moscow, which is even being modernized at present. The Soviet Union is doing research and testing in that field. It is the first and only power so far to have developed a functioning killer satellite system in space. The existence of other installations, for instance the radar installation in Krasnoyarsk, shows that the Soviet Union is deliberately working on a comprehensive strategic defense system. That has been going on for at least 10 years and that is, as I said before, one of the reasons why the Americans said: We can not admit that the Soviets are working in that field and we ourselves do not.

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG: SPD'S BAHR DISCUSSES SDI WITH USSR'S FALIN

LD112320 Hamburg DPA in German 1642 GMT 11 Nov 86

[Text] Hamburg, 11 Nov — Egon Bahr, head of the Hamburg Research Institute, believes that world security can only be achieved if the superpowers cooperate. Joint security could not permit one side to have superiority either in nuclear or conventional weapons, the SPD politician said in Hamburg Town Hall today during a discussion with former Soviet Ambassador to Bonn Valentin Falin and U.S. international relations expert Helmut Sonnenfeld. The idea of common security presupposes common thinking and action, Bahr said. Reykjavik had shown that this was possible. Agreement had been methodically reached on the goal that no side should have advantages and that the security of the one must not be at the cost of the other. This does not apply to the SDI program, however, which creates unilateral advantages for the United States.

While Falin agreed with Bahr on most points, Sonnenfeld said that words alone were not enough. Equal security has to be the result of negotiations. What was allowed and what was not had to be set out quite specifically in treaties.

Falin believes that common security is achievable. He said he could also envisage a world without nuclear weapons. What was necessary was new thinking and not new weapons. Falin warned against SDI, which in his opinion brought qualitatively new technologies. It would make all states prisoners of machines and robots. Whereas at present those responsible had 4 to 6 minutes time in case of war, after implementation of the SDI program it would be only 30 seconds.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: 'STUDIO 9' PROGRAM ON POST-REYKJAVIK, MORATORIUM, SDI

OW151111 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0630 GMT 15 Nov 86

["Studio 9" program presented by Professor Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of Soviet Television and Radio, with Academician Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, director of the United States of American and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Academician Roald Zinnurovich Sagdeyev, director of the Space Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] [Zorin] Hello comrades, we are meeting with you in Studio 9 of the Ostankino Television Center in order to discuss current world political problems. At the Studio 9 table today are leading Soviet scientists, Academician Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Academician Roald Zinnurovich Sagdeyev, Director of the Space Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The importance of some political events becomes bigger instead of smaller with the passing of time. That is what is happening with the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik. Since Reykjavik, it has become evident that the world political agenda has practically changed, it is different now, with different points of reference and different criteria, as a result of what happened in the Icelandic capital and, at the same time, it becomes apparent that, on the other side, they are trying not to notice this, conducting affairs in the old way, moving along the old rut. It has been discovered that Washington not only tries to distort what was discussed in Reykjavik, but also tries, in the most substantial way, to distance itself from agreements reached here and to dismantle those agreements.

This became particularly manifest recently during the meeting between Comrade Shevardnadze, Soviet minister of foreign affairs, and Secretary of State Shultz in Vienna. In recent history, there have not been many precedents for a great power trying so quickly and so substantially to reject its own words and obligations. Georgiy Arkadyevich, why do you think this has happened.

[Arbatov] You know, I would begin with the simplest and most obvious things. In any business, like in this business -- that is the arms race -- some make a profit, and others a loss. But, as things stand in America, those who lose do not have much of a say. They can vote once every 2 years in the Congressional elections, and once every 4 years in the Presidential elections. Now those who profit, the military-industrial complex, -- there is no need to simplify matters, there are other things besides profits, like position in society and power -- depend directly on the arms race; their prosperity depends on little, or rather large, amounts of money from the taxpayers being used for the arms race.

I would say that this section of the U.S. ruling class has a Mafia-style organization; it has some kind of Mafia style. There, more than in any other section of U.S. business -- which has never been known for its high morals and manners -- we have bribery, intimidation, political blackmail, and so forth. But these are the first and most obvious things.

Then there are other things. You see, in Reykjavik the door was opened slightly and revealed a different world, a nuclear-free world. I am certain that this picture aroused a sigh of relief and raised high hopes among the majority of people on earth.

But there were people, politicians -- and I am disinclined to suspect all of them of very selfish and evil intentions -- with whom it may just be the inertia of thought, that very old way of thinking under which they simply cannot visualize any different life. They have grown as used to conditions as to some of their own birthmarks or warts. This frightened them. All of a sudden, we saw how the very same people who, theoretically, seemed to be in favor of a nuclear-free world and so forth, start retreating all of a sudden -- not only in America, but in Europe too.

[Sagdeyev] I have just returned from the United States, where I had an opportunity to observe the process of discussion after Reykjavik; to talk to many scientists and political leaders, and I have to say that many representatives of the U.S. community -- business circles, and political leaders, including those who are realistically minded with respect to the need for the detente and disarmament process -- strongly criticize the entire concept and all the preparations conducted by the Reagan team before Reykjavik. In conclusion, they think that Reykjavik has exposed, to a considerable extent, the adventurism of the present administration.

[Arbatov interrupts] The story most probably comes from the version: An old man with a weak memory, who makes mistakes, and who does not always grasp everything all at once went [to Reykjavik], and the insidious Russians took advantage of this. They used some of his slips of the tongue and mistakes, and attributed a version to him, and almost enticed him, dragged him into very nearly the trap which slammed shut. I have also heard this.

I have to tell you, I was told by a prominent American recently -- he did give me his name, and I did not ask for his name -- but one of the U.S. foreign policy officials who stayed at home said, on learning about the outcome of Reykjavik: Thank God that he -- that is the President -- did not sign anything. That was the reaction of a number of people. But it is simply not possible to accept this version. I already had to talk about this in one of the previous Studio 9 programs. REF OW151111 Moscow Television Service Russian 150630///Studio 9 programs

[Arbatov continues] That is incorrect. The Americans did not have the right and should not have come unprepared. There should have been no surprises for them. What the Soviet Union spoke about, what was contained in the three-page proposals, and what was later the subject of discussion between Comrade Gorbachev and President Reagan was a direct continuation and the logical development of everything the Soviet Union had said in all channels -- in public, in correspondence with Reagan, at the level of foreign ministers, and at the talks during the entire past year, beginning with Comrade Gorbachev's January statement on the complete elimination of nuclear arms by the end of the current century. So it is absolute nonsense. They should have known what to expect and they should have been prepared. Nevertheless, I cannot exclude the possibility they were not prepared. And here arises the question: Why?

[Sagdeyev] I think that they have convinced themselves that everything we do is propaganda. And this is how they started with our moratorium on nuclear tests...

[Arbatov interrupts] That is correct.

[Sagdeyev] Later they understood that the moratorium was a serious proposal. And I remember that they even had a very interesting article about the moratorium apparently being a serious proposal. That means that things are bad for us.

[Arbatov interrupts] That was the article's headline, right?

[Sagdeyev] Yes.

[Arbatov] You know, I think there could be a second element. They could also have convinced themselves of something else. They started inventing the story that we have such domestic problems, such different views among the leadership, and they simply deceived themselves, convinced themselves that the Soviet Union could not come up with some kind of serious, far-reaching proposals on arms limitation.

Well, one has to pay for such miscalculations. After all, both the President and Shultz were of sound mind. And you know, speaking frankly, I feel somewhat sorry for Shultz. He is a respectable, elderly man. I first met him when Nixon was in power. He has a great biography, with great achievements in the business world and some achievements in politics.

I remember Shultz at his press conference immediately after Reykjavik. That was a tragic picture. It was evident that this man spoke with great pain about achievement being so close and then later turning out to be unattainable. It was an entirely different Shultz at his press conference after Vienna. It was no longer Shultz. He spoke there like Charles Wick, the chief of the United States propaganda agency, with cunning moves, efforts to confuse the agenda, to make the main item human rights -- although we are ready to discuss them too, and are ready to discuss more deeply than the U.S. is apparently ready to do now. Frankly I was offended at the way Reykjavik and the position of the Soviet Union was presented.

[Zorin] Georgiy Arkadyevich, what is the matter, why are they trying to dismantle the agreements reached in Reykjavik on the issues it was possible to agree on? Are they too unexpected and new and the United States is not ready for them, or are powerful forces in Washington, for which no agreements are suitable, responsible?

[Arbatov] I think that both causes are important. First there is the military-industrial complex, which is a very powerful section of the ruling class. So far, it knows how to defend its interests, forcing others to listen even when what it advocates is contrary to the interests of the entire ruling class. I would not be afraid to say that. You see, when we submitted our proposals in Reykjavik and earlier, when we first made proposals, we were not naive people. We understood that there would not be any agreement if what we propose is contrary to the interests of the United States -- the United States as it is now, not some future or ideal United States, but the United States with its ruling class, its system, all that we consider a reality -- and that meets the interests of the U.S. ruling class and without doubt meets the interests of U.S. society. Now that section, that very powerful section -- despite the

fact that it is not the majority -- is today especially influential with the present administration. And here Comrade Gorbachev has called the administration a prisoner of the military-industrial complex, and that is correct. On the other hand, this administration is very close to the military-industrial complex ideologically and spiritually. And even geographically. The President comes from a region where these interests are very strong.

[Zorin] Reagan's political base is California, and 47 percent of military contracts for the 1983 to 1986 period have gone precisely to the military corporations in California. Apparently, much of what is happening in Washington now in attempting to retreat from Reykjavik, and that has become apparent in Vienna, can be traced to this.

[Arbatov] If you look around and study the various ties, this undoubtedly plays a large part, not precluding the President, a man with position, from either rising above this or not. To rise to the level of this position and to become a leader. This has happened on many occasions, and this is why we are very seriously talking with Reagan. This man must represent the American people and their interests. He is under pressure, and here lies the difficulty of politics.

[Zorin] I think the idea that the interests of the military-industrial complex are not necessarily the interests of the whole ruling class is a serious idea.

[Sagdeyev] I feel that we are simply observing this and witnessing this struggle between two trends within the ruling group -- between the military-industrial complex and those circles aspiring particularly to the development of trade relations with us. Recently, I visited a large organization in New York, which unites business circles, politicians, and scientists. I have in mind the New York Council.

[Arbatov] Of Foreign Relations.

[Sagdeyev] ... of Foreign Relations.

[Arbatov] One could say that this is the foreign relations elite of the U.S. East Coast.

[Sagdeyev] I was asked to speak about SDI and about our attitude to SDI, and then I was asked a question about the peaceful use of space, about joint flights and, in particular, about a manned flight to Mars. I said that the flight was expensive and it is doubtful that it could be realized in the near future, and someone who participated in this meeting, one of the American participants, made a caustic joke: What a pity! We would have offered Richard Perle to you for transportation to Mars. There was friendly laughter.

[Zorin] I would like to enlighten those viewers to whom the name Richard Perle means little. He is one of the superhawks in Washington, Weinberger's right-hand man, one of the inspirers of the Pentagon's hardest lines, and one of the most hawkishly inclined figures in Washington.

Gregoriy Arkadyevich, could it be that among those who have now spoken out against the radical decisions reached by the Soviet and American leaders in Reykjavik, are not only those who are ill-meaning people, but also those who are honestly mistaken? That among them are those who are quite sincerely frightened that these radical measures might cause harm to security, since it breaks the stereotype of the political thinking which has formed over the past 40 years.

[Arbatov] Certainly, people like that do exist. They certainly do exist because, really, over the past decade many in the West thought, and this belief was, and is being, artificially supported, that good or bad, we have lived for 40 years without a war because of the fear of a nuclear catastrophe. How then can we reject nuclear weapons?

First, I would say, I have doubts that we have lived for 40 years without a war because of nuclear weapons. Perhaps, Lady Luck can claim most of the credit for this. On many occasions, we approached the very edge of the abyss. Secondly, how would you react to the following conclusion?

An old man says to you: I have lived for 70 years and have not died once! That means that I will live for the next 70 years. You would answer: What about old age, decrepitude, and illness? But the processes that are taking place here are no less dangerous.

The very logic of the arms race is leading us to the brink, beyond which everything becomes uncontrollable, where catastrophe becomes quite feasible. These arms race dynamics, all those tendencies which are now acting in the world, could make the catastrophe inevitable. SDI is a shining example of this.

[Zorin] The following argument is often heard. Nuclear weapons would be liquidated, but conventional arms would remain, and then a war with conventional weapons would become more probable and perhaps even unavoidable.

[Arbatov] Well, first of all NATO, even now in the presence of nuclear weapons realizing that its use is suicidal, is already increasing its stake on so-called conventional arms. Now, an incomparably greater part of the funds is being spent, not on nuclear arms, but on those types of arms. Secondly, there is practically the same fear for conventional war as there is for nuclear war, and this is best understood in Europe. Therefore, the deterrent effect here for people who more or less understand what is happening, is the same. This is correct. I am not even speaking of the fact that the destructiveness of conventional weapons is becoming such that the difference between them and nuclear weapons is disappearing.

[Zorin interrupts] Conventional is just a conditional term.

[Arbatov] Yes, they are quite unconventional. There is however, another matter. Take Europe, for example. There are 150 nuclear reactors in Europe, or perhaps slightly more, similar to the one at Chernobyl. Just imagine that this reactor becomes a target for a conventional bombardment or artillery shelling. We, who have lived through the Chernobyl tragedy, and our neighbors who were startled by it, understand what this means. In a word, these are the facts.

It is precisely because of this, I feel, that it is very important to keep in mind that our policy is not concerned with merely obtaining the liquidation of nuclear arms and thereby sweeping the arms race onto another plane, but with making the liquidation of nuclear arms the first big, I would say enormous, step on the path of liquidating war, to affirming a universal system of international security. This can be seen from our proposals. We are fully aware of this tie and this logic. Our proposals are on the table and we are waiting for a reply from the West.

[Zorin] I would like to draw attention to another negative situation of the post-Reykjavik period. This is a great deal of talk, including at the highest levels in Washington, that the policy of strength is precisely the best way to deal with the Soviet Union. In particular, the administration considers the Star Wars program, the SDI, as the concentrated expression of this policy. And Washington asserts that this policy forces the Soviet Union to the negotiating table, to put forward their constructive proposals, and so forth. What do you think, Georgiy Arkadyevich, what can be said in regard to this?

[Arbatov] Well, what could be said in regard to this? It is hogwash, as is much in the dealings of this administration. I would put it like this.

The administration is forced to speak differently at different times of the year. Now that the main military budget debates have passed, it can speak about its position of strength. After several months, the military budget debates will resume, and the administration will say that the Russians have superiority. The Americans are simply lying when they assert that we were supposedly almost dragged to the negotiating table, under the SDI threat, so to speak.

Admittedly, they occasionally speculate on the events of 1983 and 1984, when we, in response to the deployment of U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe, left the talks and then returned to the negotiating table. I would not be inclined to argue that either of these steps was done with irreproachable elegance. But they simply had nothing to do with U.S. strength and the SDI. The balance of power did not change during the year in which there were no talks. In fact, it did not change throughout all the years of the Reagan administration. They managed to spend more than a trillion dollars -- a trillion and a quarter -- to increase the state debt, but the balance of power did not change.

We are holding talks not because we are scared of the SDI or of U.S. power, but because we realize how dangerous are the tendencies that are working in the world. Our flexibility is not due to fear of U.S. power, but because we wish to find a solution to the problem. This is due to an understanding of the true realities of the contemporary world, from the fact that we truly fear these tendencies that are dragging us to great misfortune. And by the way, these tendencies are just as dangerous to the Americans as they are to us, and they should avoid them as well.

It has already become very difficult to reach agreement, and Comrade Gorbachev has repeatedly said this. But with each month, not to mention each year, it is becoming more and more difficult. The development of military technology and the changes in the world situation are pushing us inexorably, if we continue to drag these talks, to that brink beyond which agreement will perhaps become impossible. That is why we are seeking outcomes. Certainly not because of the SDI, which remains a fantasy, the fruit of a sick imagination, and which, at best, exists only in some form on the drawing board.

[Zorin] Now, I would like to continue our discussion precisely from this point, Georgiy Arkadyevich. SDI could, to some extent, now be in fact called an axis, or one of the main axes...

[Arbatov interrupts] Stumbling block, I would say.

[Zorin] Yes, both an axis of U.S. foreign policy and a stumbling block. Now, insofar as we have Roald Zinnurovich with us at the table, I would like to ask you, the director of the Space Research Institute, Roald Zinnurovich: Is the idea underlying this Star Wars program, what they call the Strategic Defense Initiative, realistic?

[Sagdeyev] Well, I would like to say that, in fact, there are several programs, not one program. Now, if we discuss the very first one, President Reagan's dream, which he expressed in 1983, of creating an ideal, impenetrable shield which would completely eliminate the nuclear threat, then, of course, this is a totally irrational dream and absolutely unrealistic.

[Zorin] Why?

[Sagdeyev] Even if the opposing side did nothing at all, if it froze everything as is, the probability of 100 percent interception is simply ruled out. If we are talking about the opposing side beginning deployment of offensive systems in a spirit of competition between both defensive and offensive systems, it was precisely this danger that led to both sides sitting down amicably in 1972 and signing the antimissile defense limitation treaty.

[Arbatov] At the time, however, it was the Americans who urged us: Understand that offensive arms cannot be reduced or limited if you are vague about defensive arms. They managed to persuade us easily and quickly. We understood this.

[Sagdeyev] As a matter of fact, they now appeal to us -- these are different Americans, these are SDI advocates -- and say: How is it that you have forgotten the wonderful ideas with which your leaders came to the United States -- it was near the end of 1967 -- that defense is humanitarian and moral? This occurred in a television dispute with one of the ideologues of Star Wars, General Daniel Graham, and I had to say: You are depicting us Marxists as dogmatists. Now, who in fact is a dogmatist in this particular case?

Now, why do we nevertheless consider that SDI represents a great danger? It is because SDI, besides this unrealizable dream, contains a whole collection of the most diverse components, new technical innovations. Besides, there is a mass approach to it.

[Arbatov interrupts] It does not contain this yet, but may contain it (? if work continues).

[Sagdeyev] It may contain this and may serve as a conduit to a great variety of spheres of military technology. If we say: Let us sit down and sign an agreement eliminating nuclear arms, while, in response, we get proposals to transfer the arms race, the technological and political arms race at the same time to some new dimension, then, of course, this is unacceptable, not only to us, but to any person who takes a sober look at how mankind can enter into a new and secure world.

[Arbatov] If I have understood you correctly, Roald Zinnurovich, if we translate this into political language, then one can say that, currently, we are at a kind of crossroads. Currently, a path is being proposed and we have made progress along this path in Reykjavik. We have taken a glance into the future, to where this path leads, and this is a path to disarmament. Now, a nuclear-free world is only a beginning, but we also have in mind conventional and chemical arms, and we understand that these things are interrelated.

Now, instead of this, we are offered a new spiral in the arms race: We shall simply get rid of weapons that are obsolete or will become obsolete soon, so to speak, and enter a new spiral in the arms race connected with SDI, which is completely full of unknown and unpredictable dangers, and which is extremely unstable and fraught with great shocks and catastrophes. This...

[Sagdeyev interrupts] It sounds something like this. Instead of beating swords into plowshares, let us beat swords into some kind of new type of weapon. [ZORIN] Roald Zinnurovich, you, a prominent scientist and specialist, say that the idea the White House boss cherishes is unrealistic from a scientific and technical point of view. Many of your very prominent colleagues in the United States are saying the same thing.

So, the question arises: Why does this idea exist, and not only exist, but is being implemented? Is not the world of the specialist in this case of sufficient gravity for the political leaders?

[Sagdeyev] I recall that, some time ago, a group of specialists, scientists, and industrial specialists sat down and, on the instructions of a major international organization -- I mean the Papal Academy of Sciences in the Vatican -- was to draw up a memorandum, an assessment of the danger of, and the prospects of, SDI. Many arguments were proposed. As an addendum to the argument about the scientific and technical impracticability of the ideal version, versions of an economic nature were proposed. They noted that SDI, in its pure form, in confrontation with offensive arms lost out economically to the order of 20 to 30 times. And at this moment...

[Arbatov interrupts] In other words, to overcome SDI, 20 to 30 times less needs to be spent.

[Sagdeyev] Yes, in order to overcome SDI with the aid of asymmetrical measures, with the aid of further development and perfection of offensive arms, in order to overcome this potential defense in space, it will be sufficient to spend only a percentage of the funds that will have to be spent for deploying SDI. And at that moment, as one of the conference participants, the vice president of a fairly large U.S. corporation working on defense department contracts, said: As soon as you Russians begin to work on the same thing -- SDI -- all of these economic arguments will immediately lose their value.

[Arbatov] That is another SDI that many Americans also have on their minds. SDI as a tool with which they want to undermine the economy of the Soviet Union, to destroy us economically, so to speak, by imposing on us this new spiral of the arms race.

[Zorin interrupts] It is perfectly clear that it is not all that easy for the U.S. economy to do as somebody wishes. Well

[Arbatov interrupts] Concerning the cost of SDI -- Roald Zinnurovich will correct me if I am wrong -- the minimal estimate I have seen is \$700 billion. Another estimate is \$3 trillion.

[Sagdeyev] All these estimates, minimum and maximum, have been made on the assumption that the potential enemy will simply sleep and wait. If the matter goes to the development of counter-measures, to the asymmetrical approach, then the upper limit will no longer exist. It will go to infinity because SDI will simply become impossible.

[Arbatov] That means that you can ruin anybody.

[Zorin] Roald Zinnurovich, you have spoken about asymmetric measures that are kept in mind. Is it possible to understand that we are not at all inclined and must not build the same kind of umbrella and follow the path that the supporters of the idea of Star Wars in its present form would like us to follow?

[Sagdeyev] I would say that to follow the same path, an asymmetric path, is a path not only connected with huge economic and material expenditures. It is also a path that is dangerous from the point of view of maintaining strategic stability. The new type of strategic balance, in which elements of both offensive and defensive weapons will coexist simultaneously, is very unstable.

One of the options -- a scenario that could develop, a catastrophic scenario -- is that one of the sides can and has in principle the technical capability to knock out its opposite, its double in space -- the defensive system of the opposite side -- with a sudden sneak strike and thus retain a more favorable strategic position for itself.

But there are also other options, an option where SDI would turn out to be completely unnecessary. In this option all strategic nuclear arms would be completely eliminated. Even in the minimal form on which the current administration has been insisting during the last few weeks, even in the option calling for the reduction of only strategic ballistic missiles, SDI becomes senseless...

[Arbatov interrupts] It is all the more unnecessary as it is intended against ballistic missiles only.

[Sagdeyev] Of course, yes. SDI becomes...

[Arbatov interrupts] It is useless against both cruise missiles and aircraft.

[Sagdeyev] And the arguments being used by the current administration in order to defend SDI in this case too, I would say, they are simply curious.

[Zorin] I would like to come to the same question from another angle, and formulate it as follows: Among the arguments used by Star Wars program advocates there is this one: The Soviet Union is coming out so insistently against SDI because it is not in a position to counter this program with something adequate. It cannot compete with the United States on an equal footing, particularly in the scientific and technological fields. What would you say to this, Roald Zinnurovich?

[Sagdeyev] I think that if there will be a need for countermeasures, if the situation with the development of the SDI program takes an irreversible character, our response has already been given by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. The response will be asymmetrical. And I think...

[Arbatov interrupts] The answer will not be our own SDI, not a mirror image, but countermeasures.

[Sagdeyev] Not our own SDI, but countermeasures. There is a firmly large number of possible countermeasures. There are countermeasures for every SDI option. It is early to go into details today because ...

[Arbatov interrupts] And there is no need to. What for? So that they can take them into consideration? and they are all considerably cheaper, and technologically simpler, as far as I understand.

[Sagdeyev] Absolutely.

[Arbatov] Summing up our discussion on SDI, it can be said that SDI is an illusion, and speaking plainly it is a sham defense, claiming the form of an invulnerable shield against a nuclear strike. Yet SDI is dangerous for two reasons. First, it hinders agreement on a radical reduction of nuclear arms.

That means that it is a torpedo launched against the entire process of arms limitations and talks. Secondly, the SDI is a new spiral, it is the concentration of unprecedented funds on the development of military technology that will signify a new development of various kinds of arms, a new spiral in the arms race. Am I correct?

[Sagdeyev] Yes. I think that I can only add to this that the assent stated by the U.S. Administration in Reykjavik to switch over to a 100 percent reduction of nuclear arms, the elimination of strategic nuclear missiles, makes the SDI simply unnecessary. It is absurd to have such a shield, a shield against whom? Even if you examine some concrete nuances of the SDI and its separate components, it becomes clear that the desire to preserve as some kind of guarantee an SDI option that provides for the use of nuclear-pumped x-ray lasers signifies a direct violation of this potential agreement on the exclusion of strategic nuclear missiles.

What is the x-ray laser component of SDI? It is submarines carrying special missiles with very short acceleration times. These missiles, on receipt of signals coming, let us say, from the early warning system, could be launched to an altitude of about 1,000 km and deploy an x-ray laser unit pumped by a nuclear explosion. That means that a warhead is needed. Thus it turns out that nuclear missiles, nuclear warheads...

[Arbatov] Identical to strategic ones.

[Sagdeyev] Yes... will be the guarantee against any of the sides violating the agreement on the complete elimination of strategic nuclear missiles. Moreover, they are even more dangerous because in the technical aspect they have a short acceleration time. They can be directed to practically any point, and exploded not only in space for pumping the x-ray lasers but also on land, on the territory of a potential enemy.

[Arbatov] Roald Zinnurovich, excuse me. I would like to ask you a question as a specialist. The very idea of this pop up, as it is called in English, these missiles that leap out and the explosions, what is the life of such a laser? It explodes and powers the laser. So what is its duration?

[Sagdeyev] It is a momentary action. It literally lasts a millionth of a second, and it is supposed that during this one millionth of a second the laser must momentarily fire and hit a missile in its launch phase.

[Arbatov] And if the missiles come with some small interval? Apparently this is also a very doubtful weapon.

[Sagdeyev] There are many methods for countering this option. Nevertheless, this SDI option, the beloved brainchild of Edward Teller, is making intensive headway. And we know from publications that several hundred million dollars have been spent on this SDI option alone.

[Zorin] Apparently feeling the weakness of his position in this regard and the potential danger concerning public opinion in this respect, President Reagan, during the electoral campaign that has just closed in the United States, tried to make the 4 November election look like a kind of referendum on U.S. foreign policy, in particular on the SDI issue. Speaking in the White House on 5 November, the day after the elections, the President said that he views the outcome of the elections as support for his military policy and, as he said, especially for SDI.

[Arbatov] Well, I would say of course, that it is a risky statement. First of all, in U.S. history the midterm elections have practically never focused around some foreign policy problem. They are elections for congressmen and one-third of the senators. They focus on local issues and the struggle over the personalities of the candidates. For this reason it was very unusual, it was a kind of violation of tradition for the President to try to make the foreign policy issue the key topic in the elections. The voters were far more concerned with the disastrous position of the farmers, unemployment, and in general with the economic difficulties, connected with a worsening of social problems, than with SDI, considerably more so.

Another point is that most of the problems that really concerned the voters are nonetheless in one way or another connected to foreign policy and especially with huge military spending; this is now being understood in the United States. I think that this is a very important point in these elections. So in this respect there may actually have been some kind of plebiscite. And it ended not at all in favor of the arms race and not in favor of SDI.

I have the impression that the Americans are now listening. They are monitoring the first underground tremors. Not all of them even know that the United States has become a debtor nation, that by 1990 its national debt to foreigners alone, not to mention the domestic debt, will rise to the fantastic sum of \$500 billion. They feel and sense the alarm and begin to understand that this feigned optimism of the administration, when it speaks about the economy and other matters, contains a lot of false, hypocritical, and dishonest things. They feel that they are being deceived. And they are being deceived skillfully -- this cannot be denied -- and successfully in some things. Take SDI, for example. Many people in America really hope and believe in it. People want to believe; in the face of such horror as that of nuclear war, they want to believe in something.

[Zorin interrupts] To believe that it is possible to find shelter.

[Arbatov] To believe that it is possible to find shelter. By the way, they are not being told the truth. The government is deceiving them, deceiving them about it being in a position to protect them from a nuclear strike; that SDI will produce some kind of great attainments in the scientific and technical field; or that the only possibility for protecting oneself from a nuclear strike is the elimination of nuclear arms. And in the scientific and technical field, SDI leads not to progress but, on the contrary, to difficulties and stagnation.

[Sagdeyev] Just now in the United States, we asked the question of where is the so-called spinoff, the beginning of applications in the civilian industry? I was given two examples. One example is connected with the use of a very small battery in heart pacemaker units being implanted into the human body. In the process of improving this small battery, in the process of manufacturing smaller and smaller miniature versions, it turns out that the Maxwell Laboratories company had to build huge capacitors, capacitor batteries for accelerating a projectile with the aid of a so-called rain gun.

I know this company well, I know how it was founded many years ago. I have many colleagues working there, and I know that these jobs had no relation at all to the SDI program. They were started considerably earlier. I think that only a completely illiterate simpleton can be convinced that gigantic capacitor batteries are needed in order to be able to implant a microscopic low-power battery into a human body.

[Arbatov] Roald Zinnurovich, you must have heard more frequently than I from American specialists the conclusion that research in the military field and especially in the SDI field has gone into such spheres that a return for the civilian economy cannot be expected for at least a few decades. On the contrary, great harm is now being done to both the civilian economy and science because of the massive brain drain. A drain of the best brains, research capabilities, and research potentials from constructive spheres is going into areas connected with SDI, which are fruitless for society.

The results of this militarization of U.S. science are already evident. The United States is very proud of its scientific and technical level, and I would say justly so. The Americans have made many achievements. But look at what has been happening in the last few years. A separate analysis has been made in the United States of the trade in high technology goods, including computers, instruments, communications equipment, aerospace industry products -- the very apex of science. It turns out that in 1980 Americans sold \$27 billion more of these products than they bought. Last year it was only \$4 billion more than they bought. And this year they will sell \$2 billion less than they will purchase abroad.

That means that they are being beaten by competitors in this field, and they are being beaten primarily because the United States has carried out such a bloodletting of its scientific and technical potential to military fields, including SDI. This did not go unpunished and now it has to be paid for. And by the way, this is the reason Americans are so insistently pulling their competitors into SDI.

[Arbatov continues] In England, for example, I was told that there are about 100 people there, the most intelligent and promising people, who are receiving salaries simply so that they can run around universities and various companies and purchase at the source. We are talking about the most advanced areas of scientific and technical progress: computers, lasers, new materials, optics -- all of these spheres. In Japan they are totally convinced that the SDI was invented not so much as a threat against the Soviet Union, but as a way to dispose of the Japanese high technology industry once and for all.

[Zorin] If we return to the elections so as to end this topic, I wish to say that I agree that economic -- including not only immediate ones but future ones too, about which you spoke -- have played a decisive role. Nevertheless, it is a fact that a whole series of people personally close to Reagan, who are known as ardent supporters of the Star Wars program, have suffered defeat at these elections, even those candidates who received direct support from the President. Paula Hawkins, for example, in Florida. He spoke there on several occasions, and supported here as an advocate of Star Wars. She lost to a person known as an opponent of Star Wars. So then is situation also ...

[Arbatov interrupts] At the very least this speaks of the fact that Star Wars did not become a trump card . . .

[Zorin interrupts] A trump card.

[Arbatov] A trump card, and it did not bring in extra votes. This is at the very least. I want to note that Americans, as a rule, have no ideas what the Star Wars program is. Nevertheless the administration succeeded in fooling the average American. Among scientists the situation is different. What do they think at the American Academy of Sciences.

[Sagdeyev] Well, I can say that recently a very curious opinion poll of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences was taken. Several hundred scientists were polled, 540 of these agreed to participate in the poll and answered all the questions. Only 20 people, that is 4 percent of the scientists, said that perhaps SDI is possible.

[Arbatov] Well, you see. It is unfortunate that today there is a difference between the opinions of the educated people and those who take all their knowledge from the mass information media which give the official version.

[Zorin] I wish to touch on another problem in direct relation to our talk today. The U.S. press reports that the United States is about to commission the 131st B-52 bomber armed with cruise missiles. This means an open and direct violation of the SALT-II Treaty, since it exceeds the levels allowed by this treaty. In this way Washington is throwing away one of the most important agreements of the postwar period, an agreement that somehow regulated the process of the arms race and held this process in check. And what is particularly noteworthy and significant is that it is taking place just a few weeks after President Reagan at Reykjavik gave his consent to far-reaching steps directed at ending the nuclear arms race and liquidating nuclear arsenals. How can this be reconciled?

[Arbatov] It cannot be reconciled. It just does not work. But at the same time I think it is a very significant and revealing page of current political life. You see, on the one hand, the fact that it is possible to reduce weapons, all strategic weapons, by 50 percent is not even being argued in the United States. There are only questions of details. How to take into account cruise missiles on submarines and some other details, but in principle there is no argument. Behind this, of course, among other things is the understanding that a huge amount of weapons has been stockpiled, that such quantities are even in some way superfluous, not only for a rational goal -- a rational nuclear goal is impossible -- but even for a rational goal they are not needed.

Nevertheless, they wish to exceed the elementary quantitative level. Why? In my opinion this is very significant. It is not just the bomber armed with 20 cruise missiles that is important. What is important is to break the SALT-II Treaty itself. By the way, this speaks of the uncertainty of the people who are presently in power in the United States. They want to use Reagan's personal prestige and his popularity, his closeness to the military-industrial complex and the fact that he cannot resist the temptation to speed up the arms race, to now break all existing treaties. First the SALT-II treaty, then the antimissile treaty; following which -- if there will be this nuclear pumped [laser] -- the treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in space -- a treaty like this also exists.

This also includes, of you like, relations with international organizations and international law. These people do not want any constraints. They now want, they set the following aims: these are cynical people. Their aim is to leave scorched earth after themselves, a desert, in the sense of limiting the arms race, in the sense, even, if you wish, of international law, some form of order, some elementary guarantees of security, so that they have a completely free hand to do whatever they want on a global scale.

[Zorin] And to tie the next administration, no matter what it is, to what will be done now.

[Arbatov] Yes, it is easier to dismantle than to build.

[Zorin] In conclusion, a question on how you imagine the development, under present conditions, considering what we have been saying, of the political process for the forthcoming period.

[Sagdeyev] Reykjavik has shown completely new prospects, new possibilities. Only a year ago it would have been hard to imagine that there would have been anyone in the U.S. Administration who would have agreed to specifically discuss a program of such meaningful reductions, even the total liquidation of strategic nuclear arms. It would have been even more difficult to imagine such specific talks, such specific discussions 4 years ago, when our country was declared the center of evil. And these new strategic configurations -- in the initial stages this is a 50 percent reduction and in the future, the gradual abandonment of various components of nuclear weapons up to their complete liquidation -- are very new and important food for thought and for analyses at various scientific organizations, in the circles of so-called concerned scientists, and by military strategists.

I think that all these processes will have their place and the pace will pick up, and finally, I think that politicians will have to react to this, including politicians on Capitol Hill, and politicians in the present and perhaps future U.S. Administrations.

[Arbatov] Since you have touched on the United States, I would be inclined to say that we are now standing at the threshold of very interesting developments in the political life of this country, developments connected with that unusual situation -- which has happened before, but is nevertheless unusual -- when both houses of the Congress have an opposition majority. I think that these years will bring about a series of interesting changes and new phenomena in the American economy and in American relations with its allies. So this struggle which will continue around Reykjavik, is now very important. Efforts are now being made to pull back, even though we managed with difficulty to climb to this peak, to Reykjavik. And efforts are being made to pull things back to the starting point. Now the struggle is centered around preventing this; on the contrary, to ensure the possibility of a forward movement to ever loftier heights, and to implement what was discussed in Reykjavik.

Strictly speaking, in Geneva we proposed specific negotiable positions that precisely and strictly set out concrete proposals on which agreement was reached in Reykjavik. I would add even more. It follows that in the proposals that were tabled in Geneva, attempts are made to find some sort of keys to open the last doors that were closed in Reykjavik on the path to agreement.

Besides, I wish to say, that we have by necessity paid a great deal of attention to Soviet-U.S. relations. But if we speak of the future, and even about today, it is very important for us to understand that the world is more than the United States and that our foreign relations are not reduced to Soviet-American relations. We have many other, no less important tasks. Recently, a very important meeting of the leaders of the communist and workers parties of socialist countries came to an end. This was a most important meeting for our foreign policies and very important decisions were made there. Many new actions and initiatives are in the works, both in the Asian direction of our foreign policy and in the European direction, and we will undoubtedly hear about them soon. This long overdue period, of very important and very fruitful diplomatic activity of the Soviet Union, which distinguished the last year and a half, will, I am certain, continue.

[Zorin] Well, our time on the air has elapsed. It remains for me to thank you for participating in our talk today and to thank our television viewers for their attention. And so, until we meet again here in our Studio 9, all the best.

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CSO: 5200/1103

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

KOHL TO SEND SUMMIT 'SUGGESTIONS' TO REAGAN

DW021040 Bonn DIE WELT in German 2 Oct 86 p 5

[Report by "CO": "Reagan Asks Chancellor for Suggestions"]

[Text] Bonn — The Federal Government is interested in concrete disarmament progress being achieved at the Reykjavik "preparatory summit" on intermediate-range missiles. Chancellor Helmut Kohl will point that out in the next few days in a letter to President Ronald Reagan.

Reagan informed Kohl Monday night about the planned meeting with party chief Mikhail Gorbachev on 11 and 12 October, asking for suggestions for the meeting. The Chancellor's Office considers that a special gesture of friendly relations. According to available information, Kohl wants to stress the following three points to the President:

1. Progress in reducing intermediate-range missiles;
2. Agreement as soon as possible on a worldwide ban of chemical weapons;
3. Concrete agreements on verification as a means to achieve progress in other fields.

For the negotiations on intermediate-range missiles, the chancellor will pass to the President the request that the intention immediately to continue negotiations on shorter-range missiles be anchored in an interim agreement.

This concept was outlined Tuesday by Kohl, Foreign Minister

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and Defense Minister Manfred Woerner. CDU/CSU group chairman Alfred Dregger agreed to it expressly in a "position paper" yesterday. It must also be Bonn's aim to reduce the number of intermediate-range systems in the 150-500 km range to a lower level, with equal ceilings for both sides.

CSU chief Franz Josef Strauss termed the Reykjavik summit a confirmation of the "correctness of our — and my — foreign policy concepts." It is in the supreme German interest "to make it clear to the Soviets that the basis of their German policy is wrong, and that their continuous rejection of Germany's right to national self-determination, allegedly as a consequence of World War II, is a grave historical mistake." However, we have probably not advanced far enough to deal with that issue thoroughly.

Hans Buechler, German policy spokesman of the SPD Bundestag group, asked Kohl, to "represent special German interests energetically and in a self-confident way" to Reagan. Most of all, Moscow must be urged to be more obliging about intra-German problems. According to the assessment of experts, however, that issue will not be on the agenda of the Reykjavik summit. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said that an improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations and progress in disarmament would "naturally bring positive influence to bear on intra-German relations."

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CSO: 5200/2456

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG DEFENSE MINISTER COMMENTS ON REYKJAVIK SUMMIT

DW092217 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 2045 GMT 9 Oct 86

[Interview with Defense Minister Manfred Woerner by moderator Peter Voss on 9 October on the "Heute-Journal" program — recorded]

[Excerpt] [Voss] Mr Woerner, everyone is anticipating the Iceland summit. Expectations are high. What does the FRG defense minister expect?

[Woerner] Three things. First, a rapprochement regarding disarmament, in particular of intermediate-range missiles. Second, a discussion on human rights, including the problem of exit permits for ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union. Third, an improvement in East-West relations in general, which of course also means an improvement in the situation of divided Germany.

[Voss] Let us continue with your department — defense and security. Whenever the two superpowers talk, the smaller states not only have hopes but also suspicions. Do you think it is possible for the U.S. President to agree with Gorbachev on an arms deal at the expense of the European allies?

[Woerner] No. We are a very important alliance partner. We have made our contribution. The Bundeswehr is one of the strongest conventional armies in Europe. We also have shown that we are reliable. Reagan takes the federal chancellor very

seriously and has asked his advice. We were consulted and stated our interests. I have no reason at all to believe or assume that the Americans or President Reagan would ignore European or German interests. On the contrary. I believe our interests are well represented by them.

[Voss] The interests that were stated also include Bonn's wish that Reagan and Gorbachev not only discuss intermediate-range weapons but also short-range nuclear weapons which may pose a larger threat to us than the intermediate-range missiles. That wish by Bonn has allegedly led to irritation in Washington.

[Woerner] Irritation is absolutely out of the question. I wonder who is the source of such a rumor. The Americans are aware that not only the Germans, but other Europeans, have an interest in the issue. In their proposal on an interim agreement they have taken into account certain limitations of short-range intermediate-range missiles of between 500 and 1,000 km. They certainly do not feel that the wish to include a concrete obligation to continue negotiations on weapons with a range of between 150 and 500 km is an unreasonable demand, but will consider it to be an expression of our national interests as well as an expression of European interests. By the way, it is logical to try to achieve reductions in that category of weapons on both sides with equal ceilings because that is in the interest of all citizens. [passage omitted]

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

REACTION OF FRG LEADERS TO REYKJAVIK MEETING

Chancellor's Adviser Comments

LD131109 Hamburg DPA in German 1032 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Text] Cologne, 13 Oct (DPA) — Despite the lack of results from the summit meeting in Reykjavik, there is according to Horst Teltschik, foreign policy adviser to Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, "still the chance that disarmament agreements can be reached." It is premature to speak of the foundering of a summit. Teltschik said on Deutschlandfunk (Cologne) today that in essential fields, such as strategic arms, medium-range missiles, and the nuclear test ban, there were clear rapprochements. In the controversy over the planned U.S. space-based missile defense system (SDI) on which concrete agreements between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev foundered, the experts at Geneva now have to clarify the questions in detail. This has been agreed.

According to Teltschik, the two leading politicians could "only give guidelines and make basic decisions". They could not sort out the difficult disputed details, whether for example an SDI research program in or outside of the laboratory is in accord with the ABM Treaty on the limitation of strategic arms systems. Teltschik also pointed out that the meeting in Reykjavik was not supposed to replace the proper summit agreed upon in Geneva. A likelihood for this in the current year or at the beginning of next year is still possible.

Teltschik went on to say that as long as the world powers are meeting, and as long as there are negotiations, there are chances. Both sides said emphatically in Reykjavik that they want to continue talks. He expressed conviction that there will be disarmament results.

Government Spokesman's Views

LD131530 Hamburg DPA in German 1420 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Text] Bonn, 13 Oct (DPA) — Following the unsuccessful super-power summit in Reykjavik, the main outcome for the Federal Government is that in some cases a considerable convergence of views has been "gratifyingly" achieved. This assessment, which was made by government spokesman Friedhelm Ost to the press today, applied both to comprehensive disarmament as well as to human rights and bilateral relations.

The Federal Government will do its utmost to enable efforts for disarmament and arms control to be continued. Ost stressed that there was no link between SDI and other disarmament questions, and that one could therefore continue to count on agreements being reached. In any case, the meeting in Reykjavik "had in no way slammed the door shut on a further summit." The Federal Government also regarded the fact that the exchange of views in Iceland had made many issues clearer as being a positive development.

Genscher Interview

LD140836 Hamburg DPA in German 0739 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] Cologne, 14 Oct (DPA) -- Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) has appealed to the Warsaw Pact member-states to set a positive signal following the unsuccessful Reykjavik meeting. The pact foreign ministers will meet today in the Romanian capital, Bucharest.

Genscher, in an interview with Deutschlandfunk, said that every opportunity for negotiations now has to be used in order to expand the rapprochement achieved between the superpowers in Iceland. In this connection the federal foreign minister referred to the forthcoming CSCE review conference in Vienna.

As likely areas of arms control agreements, Genscher mentioned the medium-range missiles in Europe and conventional arms. He said that the Reykjavik meeting had been important since both sides had changed their attitudes toward many of the issues. The objective now is not to give up but to be more active.

Genscher on Avoiding Setback

LD131153 Hamburg DPA in German 1047 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Text] Saarbruecken, 13 Oct (DPA) -- A setback in East-West relations, in the view of Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), can only be avoided after the Reykjavik summit by means of intensive political efforts. In an interview with Saarländischer Rundfunk (Saarbruecken), Genscher stressed today that after the great efforts of both sides at Reykjavik "a great deal of statesmanship and great responsibility" is now required in order to avoid a "long-term" setback. The precondition for this is that a rapprochement of positions must be reached at the ongoing negotiations in Geneva, Genscher stated.

The foreign minister went on to say that the Federal Government will now continue its consultations in the alliance. He announced that he will be traveling next week to the United States for talks with the U.S. leadership together with Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Defense Minister Manfred Woerner (both CDU).

Brandt Says Chance Missed

LD141223 Hamburg DPA in German 1045 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] Essen, 14 Oct (DPA) -- SPD Chairman Willy Brandt, following the unsuccessful superpowers' meeting in Reykjavik, has called on Europeans to begin their own disarmament initiatives. Addressing delegates at the 14th Printing and Paper Trades Union Conference, in Essen today, Brandt said, "We must at last seriously ensure that chemical weapons of the superpowers are removed from Europe."

Brandt also said that even if the two superpowers intend to remain in touch, he fears that a "great chance" has been missed. He agreed with the U.S. senator who had said "Reagan had a dove in the hand but decided in favor of the sparrow." The summit had failed because of "fantasies linked to the concept of SDI."

SPD's Vogel Comments

LD131424 Hamburg DPA in German 1317 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Text] Berlin, 13 Oct (DPA) — Hans-Jochen Vogel, the SPD group leader in the Bundestag, blames U.S. President Ronald Reagan for the fact that his talks with Soviet party Leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the weekend in Reykjavik did not lead to a decisive breakthrough. Vogel told the *German Press Agency* (DPA) on Monday in Berlin that "the President of the United States has thus taken on a great responsibility."

A "breakthrough of historical proportions" was evidently within reach, Vogel judged. It was, however, excluded because Reagan had insisted on "developing the SDI project beyond laboratory confines within the next 10 years, and test it in space, thus transgressing the bounds laid down in the ABM Treaty."

THE SPD politician pointed out the "numerous serious reservations" which have been expressed even in the United States itself against SDI. The feasibility of this defense initiative is giving rise to more and more emphatic doubts. "It is all the more depressing that such a project should stand in the way of mankind's liberation from the nightmare of self-annihilation," Vogel said.

Vogel accused the Federal Government of at first celebrating the meeting at Reykjavik as the consequence of a policy of strength. Now "helpless utterances" are being heard from (?that) side. Furthermore, the coalition has "taken on political coresponsibility for SDI needlessly." Now "their hands are tied," the Bonn opposition leader said. The SPD would on the other hand be strengthening its opposition to SDI and doing everything to enable an understanding to be reached yet between the superpowers.

SPD Issues Statement

LD141250 Hamburg DPA in German 1119 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] Berlin, 14 Oct (DPA) — The failure of the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik gives cause for concern, in the view of the SPD. A statement issued by the SPD executive in Berlin today notes that this is all the more true as for the first time "disarmament steps, some of them sensational," had been "within reach". The Social Democrats emphasize that the Soviet Union was prepared for the total elimination of medium-range missiles. Halving strategic missiles would be more than hoped for, and on the question of a nuclear test ban there had been remarkable rapprochement.

The SPD notes that the U.S. side had taken on grave responsibility when placing its SDI program higher than agreements "which would realistically have opened up to the world the way to more security and cooperation." The Federal Government, together with its European allies, should now work to ensure that the start made in Reykjavik be continued. The failure of the meeting over the SDI program was a strain on and a challenge to Europe. European initiatives are now more necessary than ever, the SPD executive said.

This topic was also the subject of the deliberations of the SPD Bundestag group, which met in the Berlin Reichstag building today. Like the Bonn government coalition, the Social Democrats have also demanded time for questions in the Bundestag on the failure of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations. The SPD pointed out that the Federal Government had not been prepared to comment on this in parliament in a government statement.

Various Parties Officials Comment

LD130001 Hamburg DPA in German 2306 GMT 12 Oct 86

[Text] Hamburg, 12 Oct (DPA) — The Federal Government believes that the outcome of the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik should not lead to discouragement. Foreign Ministry Minister of State Lutz Stavenhagen (CDU) said that while no concrete achievements had developed, convergence on a series of issues, unthinkable to many people a short while ago, had emerged. It was now a matter of purposefully continuing on the basis of the converging views, especially with regard to the arms control negotiations in Geneva.

The deputy SPD group chairman in the Bundestag, Horst Ehmke, fears that the day of the failed summit meeting (?will turn out to be) "a black day for mankind," and that [words indistinct] Ehmke said on First German Television [ARD] on Sunday evening: "One can only hope that we will not return to the cold war but a that a real attempt will be made to (?achieve) some sort of (?agreement)."

One must now assume that the arms race will continue at a faster pace and that "the only genuine arms control agreement, namely the ABM Treaty is in danger...." Never before had he so fervently hoped that the SPD would turn out to be wrong in its prediction that the SDI harbored these very dangers. Ehmke accused the Bonn government of supporting this development.

The deputy CDU/CSU group chairman in the Bundestag, Volker Ruehe, said he is disappointed but he is convinced that the disarmament negotiations will continue. Ruehe said on German television that it is now important to hold onto issues in which views had moved closer together. This went for the fact that a 50-percent reduction in long-range missiles had been mentioned and it also went for the ABM Treaty and that U.S. proposal for making it binding for 10 years. The Soviet Union also had stated its support for balanced disarmament.

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CSO: 5200/2456

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER INTERVIEWED ON REYKJAVIK

DW161331 Cologne ARD Television Network in German 2100 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Interview with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by correspondent Rolf Schmidt-Holtz on the "Brennpunkt" program in ARD's Bonn studio on 15 October — recorded]

[Text] [Schmidt-Holtz] Good evening, Mr Minister. How were you informed about the outcome of the summit on Sunday evening?

[Genscher] We were informed about the interim results during the day, but it was on Monday morning that we were informed about the actual course of the summit and its results — and I found it very prompt — by the U.S. secretary of state in the NATO council, where he immediately informed the allies.

[Schmidt-Holtz] Mr Genscher, be honest, were you disappointed or does the foreign minister no longer have such feelings?

[Genscher] Of course, a foreign minister must be able to have feelings like hope or disappointment. I will not speak of a summit failure. I was glad it took place, and I still see it that way. What happened in Reykjavik was more than atmospheric, which was the case during the first meeting in Geneva. Both sides — the U.S. President and the Soviet general secretary — in fact went out of their way on some important issues. They had an understanding about possible ways to solve some important issues. They developed structures that were previously considered impossible.

[Schmidt-Holtz] In a sincere and serious way?

[Genscher] I believe both were absolutely serious in what they did. And that strengthens my confidence that negotiations will continue. I said on Monday morning that now is the time for further negotiations based on what was established there. If one step is not enough, then several steps must be taken.

[Schmidt-Holtz] Mr Genscher, if you had been in the Hofli in Reykjavik on Sunday evening at 2030 — suppose, Mr Reagan had come out, had seen you and had asked you: This is as far I have gone — shall I do it? Or should I let it be wrecked by SDI? What would you have told him?

[Genscher] It actually did not fail because of SDI, so an answer to your question is impossible. I would have said the same that I

said the morning after, as did all the European allies who followed me — the complicated issue of the relationship between strategic offensive weapons and defensive weapons must be further negotiated as must other issues. For heaven's sake, having come so far as they did in Reykjavik, we must not throw in the towel and say that no more is possible. On the contrary, we must say: Let us get started.

[Schmidt-Holtz] Then you might have said: Mr President, then you should go on negotiating anyway. You might have been successful.

[Genscher] I think both sides used the opportunities that were available.

[Schmidt-Holtz] Mr Genscher, today you talked with the Soviet chief negotiator to Geneva Victor Karpov for 2 hours. What did he say?

[Genscher] Mr Karpov came on behalf of the general secretary in order to inform the Federal Government about the Soviet view of the summit talk in Reykjavik. He reported on the negotiations and on the relationship of SDI to strategic weapons. Those are two issues that are closely connected to each other. On that there is no difference of opinion. Both the President and the general secretary realize that essential link. What is especially interesting to us is the negotiations on medium-range missiles — whether the negotiations can go on or not or whether they depend on SDI. He said no, that the negotiations can continue based on what was discussed in Reykjavik. There was agreement on a worldwide upper limit of 100 warheads for each side, with the Soviet ones being stockpiled in the Asian part of the USSR and the U.S. ones in the United States. That would have meant no U.S. or Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. We have worked towards that goal for a long time. We must continue our work.

[Schmidt-Holtz] You just said — and it is very important — that there is no package deal, that there is no connection between the negotiations on medium-range missiles and SDI. That means that SDI is not obstructing the negotiations, which are very important to Europeans.

[Genscher] Learning that was the most important thing for us today. Mr Karpov said that he thinks that the negotiations can

continue based on the Reykjavik negotiations. That means that those things are not linked.

[Schmidt-Holtz] We have discussed medium-range missiles, but there are other weapons. There are chemical weapons. There is the problem of the conventional troop reduction negotiations in Vienna. There is an immediate link, depending on the increasing or decreasing significance of nuclear weapons.

[Genscher] Let me just say a word about chemical weapons. They were not discussed at Reykjavik. But in Reykjavik there was progress made on the verification issue. That must now be applied to the negotiations on an international ban on chemical weapons. Chemical weapons are a terrible scourge of mankind. We must make progress on that issue at the Geneva negotiating table — we are among those negotiating there. That is also the Soviet view. What is particularly important is conventional forces between the Atlantic and the Urals. That becomes even more important if it comes to nuclear disarmament, because in the conventional sector there is a superiority by the Eastern side that must be reduced. Each side should — in conventional terms — be only strong enough to defend itself, but not be able to mount an attack. The strategy of deterrence must be maintained, and during the November meeting of the Vienna CSCE follow-up conference we will talk about how that topic can be negotiated. That is of direct importance to us.

[Schmidt-Holtz] That means, as you have been saying for a long time, that there must be further negotiations?

[Genscher] You cannot make progress without negotiations.

[Schmidt-Holtz] I do not want to say that is banal, because I agree with you. But I would like to know what else we can do, how we can introduce more German and European interests into that dialogue, instead of — and the impression becomes quite obvious — constantly asking and begging?

[Genscher] We have done more. Look, the proposal to eliminate medium-range missiles on both sides, which was dealt with in Reykjavik, in fact came from us. The dual-track decision was developed here, including the details of the negotiations, including details of stockpiling. We were criticized for that. People said there would be no more negotiations. But now it is evident our government was right. There are negotiations. That was clearly a German proposal. We have also long advocated negotiations on conventional weapons. Now we are getting them. The European conference on disarmament and confidence-building measures that was just successfully concluded in Stockholm was a German-French proposal that became reality. Those are concrete steps toward progress in disarmament. And let me tell you that he who believes he can do everything in one day will fail. Step by step — that is what we are doing as well.

[Schmidt-Holtz] Despite everything, Hans-Dietrich Genscher has always been a person who has been skeptical, for example toward SDI, because — and you said it — he feared the negative implications on the disarmament negotiations. Now you say the summit has not failed. Is that faith-healing?

[Genscher] No. I say that there must also be further negotiations on the link between defensive and offensive weapons. That is the

opinion of the FRG Government as well, which we have said repeatedly. Progress in strategic weapons disarmament must influence the necessity and the scope of defensive systems. I objected strongly to rash judgments on SDI before the research phase had really ended.

[Schmidt-Holtz] Mr Minister, how do you explain to our viewers why SDI is still needed at all, if nuclear weapons are being negotiated away?

[Genscher] You know that the U.S. — as has been said in one of the reports shown on this program — thinks that defensive systems are needed on both sides to prevent other countries from possibly breaching the agreements. I think now is the time to see to it that we really achieve nuclear disarmament. Only then will such issues arise.

[Schmidt-Holtz] There was much hope among Germans for the Reykjavik negotiations. Now there is disappointment. Considering that, should you define the FRG Government's position more clearly than you have so far?

[Genscher] I cannot be disappointed at the rapprochement achieved in Reykjavik over eliminating medium-range missiles on both sides. Many people considered it impossible, but now it is possible. So let us go on working on it. [passage indistinct] I really believe there was progress in Reykjavik and we would be mistaken — we really would seriously harm our interests — if we gave up now. On the contrary — I feel encouraged.

[Schmidt-Holtz] One more question to the minister. There will be election campaigning in our country shortly. You like being characterized as the personification of continuity of German foreign policy. Not all your coalition colleagues have the same view of your detente course. You know there is some criticism in that respect. How will you succeed in your course until January?

[Genscher] I think that this policy, which is so successful and which is not my private business — the chancellor and I are pursuing the policy — surely must reduce critics to silence, if there are any.

[Schmidt-Holtz] What is your conclusion 3 days after Reykjavik?

[Genscher] Reykjavik produced greater results than many people thought. It did not come up to everyone's expectations, but it forms a sound foundation to go on negotiating and that is what we will do.

[Schmidt-Holtz] Permit me just another question on Gorbachev and Reagan. You know both of them, and it is almost alarming how important it may become to find out whether they get along, whether they are on the same wavelength. Do you think that the two politicians want to bring about a breakthrough at the next summit?

[Genscher] I think they want that. Whether they bring about a breakthrough at the next summit — no one can foresee that. But I proceed from the assumption that both will do everything possible today and at the negotiating tables in German and Vienna. And that is what we want, too.

[Schmidt-Holtz] Many thanks, Mr Minister.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG CHANCELLOR KOHL CITES 'PROGRESS' AT REYKJAVIK

DW171159 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 2110 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Interview with FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl by correspondents Klaus Bresser and Wolfgang Herles in the Mainz ZDF TV studio — recorded — DW]

[Excerpt][passage omitted][Bresser] You are going to Washington on Monday. Will you tell President Reagan that you expected more from the Reykjavik meeting?

[Kohl] No, because in fact I did not expect more. I am a realistic person. It was a great mistake that in the runup to the Reykjavik meeting there were excessive expectations in Washington, in Moscow, as well as in Europe. The meeting was unable to measure up to those expectations. The original position was quite good and reasonable — so was the outcome. It was said that an interim meeting should be held. I had always advocated that. Together with my European colleagues, I encouraged the President to contribute to bringing an interim meeting about. It was obvious that the Geneva negotiations had come to a halt — no more was possible in Geneva. Thus it was proper to bring the two chiefs together so that they could talk about what might be done. However, you cannot solve such difficult problems in 1½ days, during night sessions lasting 11 or 12 hours. Now the process is again well on its way. Both sides have declared that the door is not closed. There are now proposals on the table that must be made into agreements. If such proposals had been on the table 2 years ago, even 6 months ago, we would not have thought them possible. Reykjavik has brought progress, and I am grateful for it. I will tell the President, in full agreement with Margaret Thatcher, Francois Mitterrand and French policy, that we advocate further negotiations — promptly, but not rushed. As Moscow said, all in good time.

[Herles] Mr Chancellor, there are Americans — for example, former Geneva negotiator Warnke — who say Reagan has maneuvered himself into a corner by sticking to SDI, because SDI and disarmament depend on one another. Why do you continue to support SDI?

[Kohl] I do not think Mr Warnke is right. I believe two incidents or two decisions contributed to the fact that the USSR came to the negotiating table, not just to this meeting, but also to the Geneva Reagan-Gorbachev meeting. To begin with, in 1983 we in the FRG ensured that the NATO dual-track decision, which was decided on by NATO and which Helmut Schmidt contri-

buted to bringing about, was enforced. At that time nobody believed we could do that. It was the FRG that in Autumn 1983 decided on and carried out the deployment. Our European partners and friends did the same. You know all about that. That was one important point. Then the discussion about SDI began, the decision about SDI, and the research. Because of that it became apparent that the USSR had been doing similar research for 15 years. That was said very clearly in Reykjavik. If the president had made concessions — the whole thing is sort of a poker game — the USSR would not have had any reason at all to give in in any way. I am absolutely sure that there will be a solution on that problem too. For the rest, the Soviets changed their argumentation. Even some months ago, SDI was not considered part of a package.

[Bresser] It may be a game, and in the end the two mightiest men in the world were stalemated because they did not trust each other. You know both of them. Do you think that trust can still be achieved?

[Kohl] I do not think your thesis is right. I cannot be sure, but I do not think one can say that the two men have no confidence. It is an exceptionally difficult and complex topic, the whole topic of disarmament and detente, the verification procedures and all the other things involved. It is not a matter of simply trusting each other, but there must be facts, one has to agree. To my knowledge, your supposition is wrong. I want to express myself conservatively, but considering what I know about both sides, I proceed from the supposition that there is a chance for talks if it can be judged by the two men's personal behavior. I do not mean to say that the two men get on well with each other but I would assert that to say the two cannot get along with each other would be wrong.

[Herles] Do you think Gorbachev will renew his offer some day?

[Kohl] the offer is on the table. I do not understand your question.

[Herles] The offer he made in Reykjavik for far-reaching...

[Kohl, interrupting] Of course, the USSR spokesmen here in Bonn declared that all that has been said is on the table. They said we must go on negotiating. There must be further negotiations. Permit me one other remark, which may not be altogether unimportant. I do not believe conferences are successful when the leaders have to deal with the details. A conference is

successful if there are very careful preparations and if, in the end, four or five items are decided upon, and if it is negotiated that one side will give in on one point, and the other side on the other. During my 4-year term of office as federal chancellor I have seen many times, for example the EC summit, that it is very bad, does not facilitate work, and at the same time renders decisions much more difficult when many things are piled up and steamrolled through during several sessions lasting 12 to 14 hours, decisions that many times will prove wrong because they were insufficiently thought out in a bad situation. I advocate preparing thoroughly, working very carefully, then crystalizing the essential points. After that decisions must be made.

[Bresser] Was Reykjavik not well prepared?

[Kohl] Reykjavik was never thought to be a place of decision-making. As I said before, the original plan for the meeting — and the plan remains legitimate — was to move things that had come to a halt, to move on after an intermediate stop. That will be the case. It is my firm conviction that we will have a summit in the foreseeable future in which clear declarations and decisions will be made. Now the experts, the foreign ministers, and the special ministries have to talk with one another. I repeat, I have reason not to be boundlessly optimistic, but to be optimistic that we will advance by small steps on the right path. [passage omitted]

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG'S GENSCHER, U.S. GENEVA NEGOTIATOR DISCUSS REYKJAVIK

LD161840 Hamburg DPA in German 1422 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Excerpt] Bonn, 16 Oct (DPA) — The Federal Government attaches value to the narrowest possible interpretation of the 1972 USSR-U.S. ABM Treaty. The Foreign Ministry noted this today after Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher received Max Kampelman, chief U.S. delegate at the Geneva disarmament talks. In a meeting lasting almost 2 hours Kampelman gave detailed information regarding the course of the Reykjavik meeting. Genscher agreed that the "far-reaching areas of convergence in arms control questions" achieved in Reykjavik must now be realized.

Genscher stressed "the particular significance" of a restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty also applies to space-based defense systems. The United States wants to interpret it generously, so that the development and testing of prototypes will be allowed. However, the Soviet Union is willing to agree, at most, to laboratory experiments. In Reykjavik there was failure to reach agreement on this demand for the time being. [passage omitted]

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG'S GENSCHER, FRANCE'S RAIMOND DISCUSS REYKJAVIK

LD171308 Hamburg DPA in German 1147 GMT 17 Oct 86

[Text] Bonn, 17 Oct (DPA) — Moscow's condition that without agreement on the U.S. SDI project there cannot be any other disarmament agreement was the central topic of an intensive exchange of views between the French and Federal German foreign ministers today. Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond, who is having long-postponed consultations in Bonn, called the problem "fundamental".

At the same time, the Soviet Embassy in Bonn circulated a letter rejecting "incorrect accounts" in the German press, according to which Soviet chief negotiator Viktor Karpov allegedly gave an assurance of the continuing possibility of separate negotiations in Bonn yesterday. The embassy wanted now to "draw attention to the fact that the Soviet proposals in Reykjavik represent a complete package." Although there could be no doubt about Karpov's statements to a large number of Bonn journalists, the embassy has obviously had to pass off as a correction a decision taken later by Moscow.

The Soviet circular has finally destroyed hopes of a chance of being able to exclude the SDI problem and make progress with agreements such as the zero solution for intermediate missiles.

Both foreign ministers stressed in Bonn their intention of bringing coordinated German-French positions into the East-West dialogue. Genscher and Raimond intend to publish their joint stance on the European security conference on 4 November in Vienna in a joint communique in the next couple of weeks.

According to diplomatic sources in Bonn, the Soviet linkage means that the Soviet leaders will not at present sign any other disarmament agreement without a solution to the SDI problem, but that they are prepared to continue to negotiate on the other areas of arms. This could presumably [word indistinct] in Geneva up to readiness for signing.

There is still lack of clarity about the Soviet motives and the prospects for continuation of the negotiation. Federal Foreign Minister Genscher's hopes are based largely on the drawing together of positions in Reykjavik. His appeals to make use of this will probably depend considerably on the readiness to compromise of the two superpowers. Diplomats today considered it axiomatic that Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher and Defense Minister Woerner, who will accompany him on his visit to Washington next week, will explain the Federal Republic's interest in movement in the SDI stance.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG'S GENSCHER SEES U.S.-USSR AGREEMENT 'POSSIBLE'

LD181412 Hamburg DPA in German 1349 GMT 18 Oct 86

[Text] Bonn, 18 Oct (DPA) — Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher considers a "settlement satisfactory to both sides", between the United States and the Soviet Union on the missile defense system in space (SDI), to be possible. Genscher, who travels to Washington with Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl on Monday, said on West German Radio (WDR) on Saturday that the two superpowers agreed as early as January 1985 to prevent the arms race in space and to end it on earth. They also agreed that, besides the intercontinental missiles, a solution for defensive systems, such as SDI, has to be achieved. The U.S. adherence to SDI led to the failure of the talks between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and party chief Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik.

According to Genscher, the course of the Reykjavik meeting changes nothing in the fact that the West must conduct a policy of preventing war in future as well. In this regard, the aim of eliminating the medium-range missiles on both sides remained unchanged. Alongside nuclear disarmament, efforts to disarm in conventional weapons and to reduce the eastern superiority have to be made at the same time in the interests of Europe. If a conventional war were to be conducted in Europe today, it would be "a thousand times more terrible than World War II," Genscher stressed.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

INTERVIEW WITH FRG'S GENSCHER ON U.S.-SOVIET TALKS

DW201300 Cologne Westdeutscher Rundfunk Network in German 1100 GMT 18 Oct 86

["Excerpts" from interview with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by correspondent Kepper; date and place not given — recorded]

[Excerpt][passage omitted][Kepper] What chances are there for an agreement on intermediate-range missiles? After Reykjavik, the Soviet Union says that there is a linkage and a package, that there will be no agreement on intermediate-range weapons unless the United States makes concessions on SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative]. Can that linkage be abolished?

[Genscher] The linkage is not logical, because intermediate-range missiles have nothing to do with strategic offensive and defensive systems. Negotiations are possible, and if they lead to a result. I cannot imagine one side saying we have reached agreement but we will not sign. We, the West, would be ready. I also believe that the Soviet Union will redefine its interests, and changes in other fields are possible as well. We want to develop political, economic, and technological cooperation between East and West. That will stabilize East-West relations, which is extremely important now. We want to achieve a ban on chemical weapons worldwide. That is an important goal. I think that if progress on intermediate-range missiles is possible now, energetic negotiations should be conducted, and at the end of the nego-

tiations the Soviet Union should be asked again whether it really insists on such linkage.

[Kepper] Nonetheless, for the moment at any rate, it all depends on SDI. We all know that the U.S. President is very clear and very tough in that respect. He wants to retain SDI, which he says constitutes an insurance policy. What do you think about SDI?

[Genscher] The United States and the Soviet Union agreed in January 1985 that they wanted to prevent an arms race in space and halt it on earth. They also agreed that the intercontinental strategic missiles and the defensive systems — that is SDI, among other things — should be discussed and resolved. We continue to be interested in that. The Federal Government has repeatedly said that in our view the extent of the reduction of offensive strategic weapons should also have an influence on the number and necessity of defensive systems. I am explaining our position. We are sticking to that just as we are sticking to the promise the U.S. Government made a year ago at the NATO council that it will continue to interpret the ABM treaty restrictively. Thus it should be possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to achieve a solution satisfactory to both sides under the ABM treaty, a solution that takes both sides' security interests into account.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG'S GENSCHER MEETS SOVIET ENVOY, REJECTS MISSILE DEAL

LD301752 Hamburg DPA in German 1708 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] Bonn, 30 Oct (DPA) — In a talk with the Soviet ambassador in Bonn, Yuliy Kvitsinskiy, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has once again rejected a Soviet package deal on the missiles question. The Foreign Ministry made it known afterward that Genscher opposed the link made by Moscow between an agreement on medium-range missiles and the U.S. space defense project SDI, because questions that are not connected must not be linked together.

The talk in the Foreign Ministry was to prepare for Genscher's meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on the sidelines of the third CSCE follow-up conference, which starts on Tuesday in Vienna. All 35 foreign ministers of the participating states are expected to be present at the opening ceremony of the European security conference in Vienna.

In his talks with the Soviet ambassador, Genscher also called once again for a continuation of the superpower talks on the basis of the Reykjavik meeting. He stressed the particular significance of negotiations on conventional disarmament in all of Europe. Following the Iceland summit, the CSCE conference is of even greater importance for East-West relations, Genscher said.

In an interview today, Genscher answered the question whether the Soviet Union could refuse to sign a fully prepared treaty on medium-range missiles by saying that neither of the two superpowers can go back on "what was achieved in Reykjavik."

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG CHANCELLOR KOHL ON CSCE, EAST-WEST TALKS

DW031411 Bonn DIE WELT in German 3 Nov 86 p 8

[Interview with Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl by DIE WELT Editor-in-Chief Manfred Schell; date and place not given]

[Excerpt] DIE WELT: Mr Federal Chancellor, the Vienna follow-up CSCE conference will open tomorrow. How do you assess the CSCE process?

Kohl: The CSCE process, initiated 11 years ago with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, is gaining increasingly greater importance. That applies in particular to us Europeans, in the West and in the East. The CSCE Final Act created a basis upon which East-West relations could be constructively developed. The past 6 years have proven that on that basis the difficult moments in East-West relations could be surmounted.

Let me give you an example: In 1983, at the height of the heated debate about the NATO two-track decision, the Soviet Union left the Geneva disarmament negotiations, protesting against the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles. We Europeans, in particular we Germans, urged that the Madrid follow-up CSCE conference could be concluded successfully. Why? Because then the Stockholm conference could be opened in January 1984. And that was important, because it gave the two superpowers the opportunity to resume the dialogue after the Geneva failure. That occurred with the meeting between the U.S. Secretary of State Shultz and the then Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Moreover, the conference concluded 2 months ago with impressive results.

Die Welt: Nevertheless, Mr Federal Chancellor, sometimes it seemed as if the superpowers considered the CSCE process more or less a kind of playground for Europeans.

Kohl: That assumption is not completely wrong. However, it is not always easy and comfortable to reach agreements among 35 participating nations. Talks and negotiations between two parties — as they are taking place in Geneva and Reykjavik — are not substantively simpler, but certainly less complicated procedurally. However, at the bilateral U.S.-USSR negotiations, the superpowers' interests are in the foreground of the discussions. The CSCE conferences center primarily on European interests, including the neutral and nonaligned European countries. That is the forum where the two superpowers have to negotiate with the East and West European countries and have to come to a joint understanding. That is important and cannot be renounced. It

generates a reciprocity between President Reagan's and General Secretary Gorbachev's summit talks and the negotiations at the CSCE follow-up conferences.

Die Welt: What kind of reciprocity do you see between the results of the Reykjavik summit talks between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev and the Vienna CSCE conference?

Kohl: The reciprocity that I mentioned will be most evident in Vienna. If you, Mr Schell, analyze the sum of all the results of Reykjavik, you will find that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have talked about very comprehensive and far-reaching disarmament proposals that would immediately affect the security of Western Europe were they to become reality.

That applies in particular to the reduction in the number of nuclear weapons. Look, the NATO defense strategy of flexible response is based on the existence of nuclear systems. The more the systems are reduced, the less effective that strategy will become. Simultaneously, measures had to be taken and negotiations held between East and West in order to create a tolerable balance for Western Europeans in the conventional sector, too. That is what is to be discussed in Vienna now. All 35 member-nations are to decide on a joint directive stating at which negotiating forum and with what goals conventional weapons controls are to be discussed and results achieved. There, too, the goal is more security with fewer weapons.

Die Welt: Some 3 weeks after the sensational summit meeting in Reykjavik, how do you assess the results, particularly after your talks with President Reagan in Washington?

Kohl: I feel now more than ever that it was correct that the Federal Government pressed for summit diplomacy from the very beginning, from October 1982, when it took over. It forced the two superpowers to give some thought to the results they wanted to achieve. We have now achieved a degree of rapprochement in arms control issues between East and West that

no one considered possible 1 year ago. Negotiations between experts are important. However, experience teaches us that decisions can be implemented only by the respective top echelons. That process must be continued. Reykjavik has proved that important disarmament progress can be achieved now.

In my opinion four agreements can be achieved in the near future: first, on dismantling all longer range intermediate-range weapons in central Europe and on their reduction in Soviet Asia. In addition there must be a commitment to negotiate on shorter range intermediate-range systems to reduce their numbers and achieve similar ceilings.

Second, the number of strategic nuclear weapons could be reduced by 50 percent. Third, an international ban on chemical weapons would be achievable now. Fourth, it could be agreed that nuclear testing will be gradually reduced corresponding to the dismantling of nuclear weapons. That would be important progress for which all of mankind is waiting.

Die Welt: General Secretary Gorbachev stated in Reykjavik that he is prepared to accept only a package solution. Therefore, is your hope for individual agreements in vain?

Kohl: I hope that was not the Soviet general secretary's last word. Negotiations have not been concluded yet. In other significant matters, such as SDI and the pertinent research work, the two superpowers have approached each other with greater flexibility. I am certain that an everything or nothing position would not help us to move ahead. On the contrary, I am convinced that every agreement possible should be concluded now. It will further strengthen mutual confidence, thus contributing to achieving further progress on the considerably more complicated issues.

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CSO: 5200/2456

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG: SPD'S BAHR INTERVIEWED ON BRIEFING BY KARPOV

DW161500 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0615 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Interview with SPD disarmament expert Egon Bahr by reporter F. Schwarz; date and place not given — recorded]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Schwarz] You talked to Viktor Karpov yesterday. Did he confirm that the Russians feel that SDI could have left the U.S. research laboratories long ago?

[Bahr] No, he did not confirm that, and he cannot confirm it. He only said that the Soviet Union will by no means accept a race with the United States on SDI. The Soviet Union considers it unrealistic and hopeless to move into space with such technology and is considering doing something simpler, less expensive, and very effective with known technology, so as to reduce any SDI weapons system in space to zero. [as heard] That means of course that the Soviets are considering, among other things, increasing the number of intercontinental missiles. It also means that you cannot reduce intercontinental missiles and have an SDI option.

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CSO: 5200/2456

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG PRESS DISCUSSES REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING

DW011116 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0605 GMT 1 Oct 86

[From the Press Review]

[Excerpts] Today's topic is the announcement of the next meeting between U.S. President Reagan and Soviet party chief Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland.

Frankfurter Allgemeine writes: About 1 year ago Reagan and Gorbachev met in Geneva. They were sizing each other up on that occasion, as did Kennedy and Khrushchev in Vienna, only the outcome this time was better for the Americans than the last time. The President and the general secretary want to achieve an acceptable agreement prior to a new meeting. Reagan is under pressure from Congress and public opinion to pursue detente with the Soviet Union. Gorbachev is under no such pressure. Because of his domestic political agenda, however, he seeks relief from outside, which is evidenced by his efforts toward China. He must also produce evidence to the Politburo that negotiations with the United States will produce something for the Soviet Union. Now, however, a meeting in Reykjavik is to precede the Washington summit. Why? It is possible that Reagan and Gorbachev fear that the great meeting could fail and therefore they want to achieve certainty about the chances of success at a smaller meeting.

Sueddeutsche Zeitung notes: In thinking it over why Reagan and Gorbachev will meet now, the following scenario unfolds: Bilateral relations have passed through a crisis as a consequence of the Zakharov-Daniloff affair, while on the other hand chances are not bad for an agreement in certain arms control fields. Time is pressing, but before the mid-term elections in the United States in early November a summit meeting in Washington is ruled out, and only thereafter will it be seen how the mood develops further. It will depend on the mood whether a visit of the party chief to the United States, which he is avoiding now, will be at all thinkable in the near future. However, Reagan and Gorbachev do not want to let contacts lapse. They will meet halfway, in Iceland — not to sign an agreement, but to let reason prevail.

Luebecker Nachrichten is of the following opinion: Reagan's preparedness to fly to Iceland is obviously an American concession. It is possibly the price Reagan had to pay to have the U.S. journalist, Daniloff, who was held in Moscow, return home in an acceptable way. Gorbachev has never made it a secret that he would like to hold the next meeting on neutral territory. Reagan wants to receive the Soviet leader in the United States this year, if possible. Both are to take place now. As welcome as every talk of the two leading men may be, the Reykjavik enterprise looks as if it were a bit too hastily arranged. It can hardly be expected that great things will take place in Iceland next week. Disappointment, however, could take the momentum out of the costly dialogue before the main event has taken place. Therefore, the Reykjavik meeting is not without risk. [passage omitted]

Duesseldorf *Rheinische Post* notes: The meeting will mainly serve to prepare the planned official meeting of the two men in the United States. Therefore, one can properly speak of a preparatory summit. This should dampen expectations from the very beginning about concrete disarmament steps in Reykjavik. Such a reserved point of view is supported by the fact that Reagan has asked Chancellor Kohl, among others, for suggestions for the forthcoming meeting. They will be introduced in the Reykjavik talks and possibly change one or another approach of U.S. ideas.

Die Welt writes: Realism instead of peace dreams and steadfastness instead of unpredictability regarding alliance policy have facilitated the Reykjavik meeting. Without overrating the German contribution, one can say that the Federal Government's implementing NATO's two-track decision has quickened Moscow's preparedness for talks. The Reagan-Gorbachev meeting is also indirectly an endorsement of Chancellor Kohl, who has been in office 4 years now.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG PRESS ON REYKJAVIK TALKS, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

DW101040 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0605 GMT 10 Oct 86

[From the Press Review]

[Text] One of today's topics is the forthcoming U.S.-Soviet meeting in Reykjavik.

Neue Osnabruecker Zeitung writes the following: Reagan and Gorbachev have tangibly improved the climate of the meeting between the superpowers through clear gestures. That is a prerequisite for success, but not yet a guarantee. The spirit of Geneva was almost enthusiastically praised after the first summit meeting, but it did not turn out to be fruitful. Much would be won if there were success in creating concrete conditions and establishing a framework for progress in the arms limitation talks and solving regional conflicts like Afghanistan. It will be decisive for success or failure how far the two statesmen are prepared to keep insoluble problems out and concentrate on those points where there are chances for agreement. Yesterday, Moscow proclaimed Reykjavik the hour of truth. For the people of the world, however, it will remain the hour of hope.

Braunschweiger Zeitung notes: There is no shortage of good advice to President Reagan on the way to the preparatory summit in Iceland. For good reason the Federal Government has pointed out to him the German concern about the intermediate-range Warsaw Pact missiles threatening us. First, even after a possible interim agreement on intermediate-range missiles, this category of weapons would continue to be a lasting threat without a counterweight. Second, the FRG as a loyal ally — in contrast to some other NATO members — has a right to see that its concerns will not be ignored in the possible attempt of the big powers to negotiate among themselves their own understandings on their own interests.

The Essen *Neue Ruhr-Zeitung* sees the meeting differently.

When the two most powerful men in the world meet for a preparatory summit in Reykjavik, Western Europe will again be condemned to be an onlooker. It is also an indication that the EC, despite its significance as a trade and economic giant, is not even a small actor on the world political stage. In such a situation the directly elected European Parliament is right in expressing the EC's opinion. In a resolution, it clearly demanded the creation of nuclear and chemical weapons-free zones in Europe. No doubt a surprising decision of a parliament whose majority is represented by the bourgeois-conservative camp. Did the German Christian Democrats or the British Conservatives all of a sudden really decide differently from their governments in Bonn or London? In such a case the European Parliament would have made a sensational decision. However, it was not so. Most deputies were absent when the motion by the communist faction was discussed yesterday. A poor sign for the European deputies. How seriously do they take their business, how seriously their one political weight? In this way they will lose the toilsomely achieved legitimation by voters as the parliamentary voice of Europe. The impression is awful, internally and externally: There is no such thing as voice of the Europe.

Hannoversche Allgemeine notes: Gorbachev can be happy. A few hours before the beginning of the East-West summit in Reykjavik, the allies of his U.S. discussion partner supply arguments to him free of charge. The appeal by the European Parliament to the big powers on some points and formulations follows Moscow's course in arms control talks. In a decisive moment of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue, which has been resumed after a long ice age, the elected representatives of 12 EC states stab their U.S. alliance partner in the back with arguments. This blow below the belt by the Strasbourg Parliament does not look any better because of the shameful fact that the communists' ballot victory was possible only because of a blunder.

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CSO: 5200/2456

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG PRESS DISCUSSES OUTCOME OF REYKJAVIK MEETING

13 October Press Review

DWL131308 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0605 GMT 13 Oct 86

[From the Press Review]

[Text] Editorial writers today deal in particular with the results of the Reagan-Gorbachev talks in Iceland's capital Reykjavik.

Frankfurter Allgemeine writes on the meeting between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet party leader Gorbachev: The world rightly did not hold its breath because of Reykjavik. Even clever dramatic effects like the extension of the two world leaders' talks do not mean that there has been a marked rapprochement when they were taking stock of the international situation. It will become clear later whether all that positive optimism was lastingly justified — at the negotiation tables in Geneva and Vienna and in practical politics of those concerned which not lastly is determined by the power of their opponents at home. At any rate, the superpowers' basic accords and political directives for negotiations do not automatically also mean that the negotiators dealing with the issues will reach agreement as well.

Neue Osnabruecker Zeitung has this to say: The East and West have a great hope less. Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev will not sit at a table again very soon to discuss agreement on the limitation of arms arsenals. The two statesmen parted with the bitter admission that they do not at present see an opportunity of understanding. The dialogue came to a disappointing and alarming end. There is something tragic about the failure of the second meeting. But the sound bases for concrete accords failed, because Reagan refused to negotiate on his defense initiative SDI which Gorbachev wanted to make a condition for a deal with the United States.

The *Braunschweiger Zeitung* commentator expresses the following view: Those who are disappointed with the presummit or struggle in Reykjavik expected too much. After all, the meeting opened up prospects for possible reductions of nuclear arsenals. However, the Soviets find it hard to give them up because their loss means the abolition of capabilities of political threat which have been piled up with tremendous efforts. SDI, the antimissile defense system that exists at present only as a rudimentary development, is already creating large dynamism in that very

direction. Therefore, Gorbachev tried once again to kill it. Even though Reykjavik seems to represent a delay in disarmament, future meetings will agree on missile reductions all the more rapidly, not despite but because of SDI.

The Essen *Westdeutsche Allgemeine* says in an editorial: After Reykjavik, the world does not have much more than a chance of disarmament. It is a long way yet to an agreement. Regarding in particular the U.S. space defense system and the reduction of long-range missiles, only a very cautious rapprochement can be noted. The goals of the Reykjavik meeting justly were relatively modest. The Geneva negotiators were to be given fresh impulses. That was done, the newspaper stresses.

Sueddeutsche Zeitung comments: What matters to the two superpowers is their self-image and their power positions. To defend both and yet put an end to the second cold war, Reagan and Gorbachev went to Reykjavik. In Iceland they took a large step in the direction of new detente. The statement Reagan made at the conclusion of the Geneva summit 1 year ago also holds true today: Much is left to be done.

14 October Press Review

DW141215 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German
0605 GMT 14 Oct 86

[From the Press Review]

[Excerpt] Again Reykjavik dominates FRG press headlines today. [passage omitted]

Sueddeutsche Zeitung writes: Gorbachev's insistence on deactivation of SDI shows the Russians' profound concern at being overtaken by the Americans in the scientific-technological arena and of being militarily degraded to a lower status. The chief of the Kremlin said in Reykjavik that he would be crazy to agree to that, and now a point of no return has been reached. That may apply specifically to him. He will have a difficult time maneuvering between his promises and the military's expectations. Large parts of the international public will preobably view Gorbachev as a man who is more serious about disarmament than Reagan. However, the political gain is imponderable and will disappear in the course of time.

We read in *Die Welt*: Why did Reagan not give in? The rest of the world is asking. The German opposition is speaking of a black Sunday for mankind. The Federal Government states that negotiations will continue — to quote the Chancellor's Office — and that statesmanship should now avoid setbacks — to quote the Foreign Ministry. The issue, SDI, is a delicate subject in the Western world, including the FRG. Reagan wants a revolution. Defensive weapons are supposed to replace, not just reduce the number of offensive weapons. Gorbachev cannot accept that strategic revolution. The military, the Politburo, and he personally consider such a revolution a form of disarmament. We could ask whether Gorbachev only used SDI as a pretext to allow him to retain his missiles — the only thing the Soviet Union has in large enough quantity. The FRG opposition and government are not asking that legitimate question. In view of the frustrated hopes, the citizens will hear from politicians only incomplete or emotional statements for a while, *Die Welt* remarks.

Frankfurter Allgemeine stresses: Soviet diplomacy has traditionally had the advantage of a sensation at the beginning of serious negotiations. Stalin was a master at that game. In reality, something useful has been begun regarding disarmament agreements. However, the road is stony and long. After Reykjavik, the chances for the superpowers to recognize the practical usefulness of negotiations on disarmament steps are no worse than they were previously following the differences over intermediate-range counterarmament. The areas of agreement are greater than they were a year ago. Now there will be an interruption, but no ice age, believes *Frankfurter Allgemeine*.

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CSO: 5200/2456

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

REAGAN, GORBACHEV SPEECHES ELICIT COMMENTS BY FRG PRESS

DW151205 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0605 GMT 15 Oct 86

[From the Press Review]

[Text] The topics discussed by editorial writers today include the speeches given by U.S. President Reagan and Soviet general Secretary Gorbachev on disarmament.

We read in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* editorial: In the near future we will probably have to expect a time of silence. On the one hand, Gorbachev will wait and see whether the U.S. Congress restrains Reagan's SDI plans financially. On the other hand, the Soviet propaganda machinery will use the time to hammer into Western Europeans that the Reykjavik failure is attributable only to the fact that Reagan is doggedly adhering to SDI. The productive continuation of negotiations in Geneva or elsewhere will depend on whether Western public allows itself to be intimidated by such an offensive. The reactions, which so far have been relatively calm, give reason for hope, states *Frankfurter Allgemeine*.

Berliner Morgenpost stresses: It would have been a great gain if Reykjavik had contributed toward an improvement of the climate between the two superpowers. President Reagan's speech was marked by pointed soberness, and yesterday the chief of the Kremlin also exerted rhetorical restraint. That practice should be continued. Immoderate Soviet propaganda attacks have poisoned the climate all too often. It is up to Moscow to bring about

a change, which would, however, have to be lasting.

Westfälische Nachrichten published in Muenster writes: The failure of Reykjavik cannot be denied or played down. The detente politicians landed on the hard ground of reality. Nonetheless, the summiteers fall was not permanent. Two days after the failure of the meeting, the U.S. side yesterday was clearly trying to limit the damage and sort out the shambles. Reagan self-confidently repeated his invitation to Gorbachev to visit the United States for another summit meeting. The door is open, but can and will the chief of the Kremlin go through it? What Gorbachev said about that on Soviet television yesterday at least does not rule out that possibility, *Westfaelische Nachrichten* comments.

Braunschweiger Zeitung states: Reagan and Gorbachev are trying not to reduce their flexibility by defiant attitudes. The U.S. President avoided putting the blame on anyone and used markedly moderate language, thereby keeping the door open for a visit by his Soviet discussion partner to the United States. In his television speech, the communist leader also did not slam the door and he avoided verbal attacks. The hint given by Soviet Chief negotiator Karpov that the USSR did not create a linkage between missile disarmament and missile defense, SDI, is even more significant. And why should it — in view of the fact that SDI is not the cause of the accumulated nuclear offensive arsenals, but the response?

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CSO: 5200/2456

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG'S DIE ZEIT BLAMES REAGAN FOR REYKJAVIK 'FIASCO'

DW171141 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 17 Oct 86 p 1

[Christoph Bertram commentary: "The Bitter Truth About the Summit"]

[Text] Fog is clouding the reality of Reykjavik. Even though both superpowers have suffered defeat, each side is pretending it was successful. President Reagan stated boisterously that the United States and the Soviet Union were nearer to an agreement "than ever before." However, he thwarted it at the last minute. General Secretary Gorbachev is a remarkable political winner on points. However, he has not come closer to his goal of curbing arms expenditures so as to relieve the ailing Soviet economy. Western European governments, in particular the FRG Government, are pretending that everything is all right and the goal now is to define the Reykjavik concessions at the Geneva negotiating table.

However, nobody should be mistaken. The chance of the century to agree in a sweeping move on the most comprehensive disarmament package of the nuclear age has been missed. Anything seemed possible in Iceland over the weekend — a drastic and almost complete reduction of intermediate-range weapons, a radical cutback of intercontinental missiles, and a new comprehensive disarmament schedule. It looked too good to be true. It was a unique chance that will never come again.

It is Ronald Reagan who is chiefly to blame for the fiasco. Certainly Mikhail Gorbachev was also not without fault. Before the meeting in Iceland he had led the world to believe that the Soviet Union would be ready to sign a separate agreement on medium-range weapons. Now he has also made that agreement conditional on the U.S. giving in on space defense. In Reykjavik, Gorbachev bet everything on one card. He wanted to change the President's mind by means of generous offers on offensive weapons. But it did not work.

When Reagan, late Sunday afternoon, irritated and tired, closed the folder in front of him and said there was no use arguing about SDI, the general secretary had no alternative at hand. Now the hawks in the Kremlin, who have been feeling uncomfortable for a long time over the imaginative initiatives submitted by their dynamic boss, will insist even more that their beautiful, shiny nuclear weapons will only be scrapped if America gives in formally on space weapons. Because he risked so much the general secretary has now lost flexibility.

However, it is the U.S. President who is responsible for the decisive historical failure. He had the chance to go down in history as a great statesman. Now he looks like many of his critics have always seen him, even though his long streak of luck made them doubt their judgment time and again — a politician from the boondocks, whose simple recipes may be good for the administration of the State of California, but not for the leadership of a superpower and the Western alliance. The big deal at Reykjavik failed because he did not want to give up the simplistic idea of antimissile defense in space, which miraculously is supposed to free mankind from the threat of nuclear weapons.

However, it only surprised those who in the past had not believed Ronald Reagan. Many wishful thinkers in Europe, the United States, and even in the Kremlin thought Reagan was a clever pragmatist who would bring in the harvest in due time and would thus go down in history as a great president of peace. He was praised for having brought "the Soviets back to the negotiating table" with SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative]. But now, there he is "with empty hands and empty pockets," as Gorbachev said in his press conference. He bluffed not the Soviets, but those who believed in his statesmanship. When the moment of truth came, statesman Reagan was not present.

Already the appeasers are trying to find excuses, saying that the President just cannot antagonize his rightist followers, that nobody can expect that 3 weeks prior to the congressional elections. Mikhail Gorbachev even saw Reagan in the hands of the "military-industrial complex." Really? Could the conservative militant anticommunists really have cornered the most popular and the most powerful U.S. President — at least as far as the media — is concerned this president, of all presidents, even though he could have come back from Iceland with a tremendous success?

If the President had only wanted to achieve that, he would have had the support of all Americans, including even the military, who for a long time have observed with mixed emotions the expensive SDI project absorbing the limited funds in the weapons budget earmarked for research and development.

Reagan could have dropped SDI, but did not want to. That is the bitter truth. Shortly after his famous "star wars" speech in 1983, one of his closest aides said: "That came from his heart." Those

who still did not believe it heard it from Reagan personally last Tuesday night when, in an attempt to justify the failure of Iceland, he praised SDI, stating that it was "America's life insurance," the "key to a world without nuclear weapons," and a "guarantee of our security." So everything else just had to take second place — a disarmament agreement that would have given Reagan almost everything he had ever hoped for, as well as consideration for the allies, who had at least expected a limitation of intermediate-range weapons in Reykjavik.

There is hardly any reason to believe that there could be a fresh start before Reagan must leave the White House. It is true, the Europeans are trying to encourage themselves: Did Gorbachev and Reagan not jointly stress that the dialogue would be continued? They say with defiant optimism that the proposals are now on the Geneva negotiating table. Are the negotiators who depend on instructions now supposed to straighten things out?

At best they could succeed in doing so if the President were to qualify his "no" at Reykjavik. However, there is no reason to hope for that. Even if the Soviets win a propaganda victory, even if the U.S. elections were to weaken Reagan, and even if the European governments, who so far have shown understanding and regard for the pet idea of the old man in the White House, were now to ask him to consider their interests, this president will not change his mind anymore. Ronald Reagan is totally committed to SDI.

Therefore, the hope for common sense cannot be based on the West's optimism. It must instead be based on something reliable — the fact that technology is not available to an unlimited extent to fulfill all of Reagan's visions, and the fact that the backward Soviet Union and even the rich United States have financial limits. This much is certain: Reagan's space plans will not grow indefinitely.

The crucial problem for the future therefore is: When the Soviets realize that some day, will Mikhail Gorbachev still be able to stand by the offers he presented so temptingly in Reykjavik? The chance of Iceland will never come again. However, beyond all hopes and disappointments, realities urge both superpowers to halt the arms race. When Reagan's time is over, perhaps the realists will be able to salvage part of what was so unnecessarily buried in Reykjavik.

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CSO: 5200/2456

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

INDIANS SEE DANGER OF LIMITING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT

Madras THE HINDU in English 31 Oct 86 p 8

[Editorial]

EVEN AS THE U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative proved to be the stumbling block on the road to initialling an arms control accord at the Reykjavik mini-summit, the clear impression emerged at the end of the meeting that both the United States and the Soviet Union would work towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons within the next ten years. Ever since the conclusion of the Iceland meeting between Mr. Ronald Reagan and Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, top officials of the Soviet Union went to considerable lengths to dispel the notion that the broad understanding reached by the two leaders was confined to scrapping ballistic missiles only—rather it included long-range bombers, cruise missiles, submarine based weapons and other smaller weaponry. Apparently the need for the clarification from Moscow's standpoint was the perception of an effort in some quarters in the United States to force Mr. Reagan into limiting the focus of negotiations. The Reagan administration has proceeded with its qualification on the types of nuclear weapons to be eliminated. Under the latest set of directives on future arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, Washington seeks to do away with 'ballistic' missiles within the next decade and also the medium range weapons in Europe—implying that it wants to retain in its arsenal a large stockpile of cruise missiles, nuclear bombs and nuclear-tipped shells. In setting this limited agenda, Mr. Reagan seems to have caved in to intense pressure from the hawks within his administration, the hardliners in the American Congress and conservative allies overseas who have been arguing that the United States should not go through with this total elimination route without first taking into account the realities of the conventional fighting capabi-

lity. The crux of the argument is that Washington has not paid enough attention to the conventional abilities as it has been relying too much on nuclear deterrence all these years.

The decision to emphasise ballistic missiles in the process of eliminating nuclear weapons will not only raise the question amongst allies and adversaries alike of the seriousness of the United States in coming to a realistic accord on arms control but would undoubtedly bring about a stiff response from the Soviet Union. Disconcerting as it is, the U.S. move also comes at a time when political relations with Moscow have taken a turn for the worse with the mass expulsions of diplomats. In the realm of arms control, if it is indeed the intention of the hardliners in Washington to start a fresh debate on what constitutes "elimination" of nuclear weapons with a view to delaying or wrecking the chances of an agreement on this vital issue, such a strategy should come as no major surprise. It is precisely this group of officials and legislators who would like to see nothing more than the United States pushing for military superiority. The argument quite often advanced to this effect is that apart from the fact that the Soviet Union cannot be trusted, Moscow would not initial any accord that is not to its advantage. Although at the end of the Iceland summit it was clear that Mr. Gorbachev was looking for a comprehensive package—one that would include long-range, medium-range and space based weapons—statements from the officials of the Reagan administration over the last two weeks still seem to indicate that American hopes of a piecemeal solution to the issue (by way of an agreement on intermediate-range weapons) are very much alive. With Moscow quite insistent on confining the SDI to the laboratory stage as well as finding ways to strengthen the 1972 ABM treaty, any attempts to limit the area of agreement would not only set the clock back on the arms control issue but also undermine what little confidence-building mechanisms that have been meticulously built up thus far in bilateral relations.

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CSO: 5250/0007

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

BRIEFS

FRG SUMMIT SUGGESTIONS--The Federal Government in Bonn is drawing up its own proposals for the superpower summit meeting in Reykjavik at the weekend. State Secretary Ost said that the suggestions would be sent to Washington and Moscow within the next few days. Ost confirmed that Soviet party leader Gorbachev, too, had briefed Federal Chancellor Kohl personally on his motives and thoughts in connection with the meeting in Iceland. [Text] [Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 2000 GMT 6 Oct 86 LD] /9274

CSO: 5200/2456

SALT/START ISSUES

TASS: U.S. DEPLOYMENT OF 131ST B-52 'VIOLATED' SALT II

TASS Report

LD181956 Moscow TASS in English 1944 GMT 18 Nov 86

[Text] Washington November 18 TASS -- The TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin reports:

The Reagan administration, having firmly taken the road of abandoning the most important treaty obligations in the sphere of nuclear arms control, has already violated the basic provisions of the Soviet-U.S. SALT-2 treaty.

Washington has been accused of this by deputy director of the influential public organization, Arms Control Association, James Rubin. He said in Washington today that the 131st B-52 strategic bomber equipped with cruise missiles with nuclear warheads left the hangers of the auxiliary air base in San Antonio, Texas, and that this shows that the USA has already gone beyond the limits of the SALT-2 treaty.

The bomber was re-equipped as a nuclear missile carrier and deployed at the air base on November 12. The SALT-2 treaty, as is known, envisages the limit of 1,320 units for the number of mirrored strategic missiles and bombers with cruise missiles.

The newspaper WASHINGTON POST writes today that a number of high representatives of the administration who asked that their names should not be given also hold that the treaty has already been abandoned since a modified bomber cannot be registered by Soviet technical means of monitoring. The newspaper notes that under the provisions of the treaty, missiles and bombers with cruise missiles must be registered after they leave shops, plants or other facilities.

Speakes Confirms Deployment

LD182123 Moscow TASS in English 2103 GMT 18 Nov 86

[Text] Washington November 18 TASS -- The Reagan administration has firmly embarked on the road of torpedoing the crucial treaty commitments in the field of nuclear arms control and does not intend further to adhere to the critical provisions of the Soviet-U.S. SALT-2 treaty.

Larry Speakes, White House deputy press secretary, told a briefing here today that since the SALT-2 treaty was not ratified, it did not exist. He recalled the U.S. President's statement to the effect that the United States would not any longer observe those agreements.

Speakes confirmed that the 131st B-52 bomber equipped with cruise-missiles would be fielded late this year.

SALT/START ISSUES

TASS: PERLE'S CALL FOR ABOLISHING ICBM'S ANALYZED

LD202013 Moscow TASS in English 1932 GMT 20 Nov 86

["Vain Hopes, Mr Perle"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow November 20 TASS -- TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle is now fiercely advocating the idea that the USSR and the USA should abolish ballistic missiles (ground- and submarine-launched ICBM's) while preserving the third component of the strategic triad, heavy bombers and cruise missiles carried by them. We would tell Mr. Perle right away: This approach cannot be considered even by way of discussion and he is just wasting breath. I must explain why the answer is so unequivocal.

To begin with, Mr. Perle's fuss is a component of Washington's current campaign directed at cancelling the positive achievements of Reykjavik, namely, the accord on the elimination of strategic offensive weapons and even nuclear arms as a whole, endorsed by the U.S. President.

Why is the Pentagon official then advocating the abolition of ballistic missiles? Hasn't that figure, known all over the world for his far from peaceable views, changed his spots? Far from it. He merely hopes that in this way the United States will achieve military-strategic superiority.

First, while there is parity between the strategic forces of the USSR and the USA, the United States has substantial superiority in heavy bombers (517 versus 156) due to differences between the Soviet and American triads. U.S. Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle has admitted that if both sides abolish their ballistic missiles, the United States will be left in a slightly better situation than the USSR.

Having obliterated the backbone of its strategic potential, intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Soviet Union would have to build a large number of new heavy bombers to catch up with the United States and restore parity.

Second, Soviet territory is facing the additional threat of 560 nuclear-capable planes based on 14 U.S. aircraft carriers, and also of hundreds of U.S. planes with nuclear weapons deployed in the immediate proximity of the borders of the USSR and its allies. It is that threat that Mr. Perle would like to preserve.

Third -- and Mr. Perle is quite frank about it -- the Pentagon hopes that new technology will enable planes and missiles to penetrate the Soviet ABM defenses.

The Soviet Union will never foresake its security interests and all the hopes of Mr. Perle and his like in this respect are absolutely futile. As for the assistant defense secretary himself, he is merely displaying to the world anew his true goals and showing that he is one of those who are still dreaming about U.S. military superiority and relying on nuclear arms.

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CSO: 5200/1111

SALT/START ISSUES

MOSCOW TV DISCUSSES STEALTH, B-1 BOMBERS

LD201856 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1545 GMT 20 Nov 86

[From "The World Today" program presented by Igor Kudrin]

[Text] Militarism, which draws off funds from the social development of mankind, has become the biggest scandal of our times. This was said by John Kenneth Galbraith, the eminent American economist, honorary professor Harvard University, the other day at a press conference at the UN headquarters. He was addressing a special parliamentary forum that was being held at the United Nations. The participants in the forum did not have to go far for examples. The United States today is simply unthinkable without militarism and the arms race.

Here you see one of the 19 latest strategic B-1 bombers, which are taking turns in carrying out combat duty at bases in Texas and California. They call this aircraft the most complex and most expensive of all that have been developed. [video shows U.S. television film of this aircraft in flight] According to the plans of the Pentagon strategists, it is designed to strike deep into Soviet territory. Do you know how much each such combat aircraft costs the U.S. taxpayer? -- \$265 million.

However, the first hundred bombers that were ordered had hardly even been equipped with arms than someone in the military department started to express dissatisfaction regarding their tactical-technical data. What had suddenly happened? The fact is that the Northrop Corporation, a rival of the Rockwell International company which produces the B-1, is working on developing the latest Stealth ultra-secret strategic bomber, and wants to get hold of it. The best way of getting the construction program of the 132 stealth aircraft is to sow doubts about the type of bomber that had previously been developed. [video shows the B-1 in flight, its instrument panel and radar, of B-1 in hangar, and also still photograph]

The U.S. Air Force is interested in creating the impression that it is the Stealth bomber, and not the B-1, that they urgently need. That is, by all accounts, they are requiring further billions of dollars from Congress for the development of the latest strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems.

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CSO: 5200/1108

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

UK PAPER ASSESSES THATCHER'S NUCLEAR-ARMS TALKS IN U.S.

London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 17 Nov 86 p 16

[Editorial]

MRS THATCHER has returned from Camp David with the assurances she sought over Trident. The communiqué issued after her talks with President Reagan at the weekend reaffirmed that the Americans would supply the missile system with which Britain plans to arm its new generation of nuclear submarines in the 1990s. It also recognised that any cuts in nuclear weapons would need to be balanced by a reduction in Soviet conventional forces.

The Prime Minister's mission was not an easy one. Following Mr Gorbachev's initiative at the Reykjavik summit in October, disarmament talks between the superpowers had moved into a completely different gear. Washington's readiness to contemplate a deal with the Russians which would scrap all ballistic missiles had put the future of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent in doubt. Mrs Thatcher had to make the case for the old system of defence at a time when the tantalising prospect of something new has been placed before the Americans.

That she has laid these fears to rest, at least temporarily, is witness both to the force of her personality and a continuing special relationship with the President. She was the Western leader best placed to express western European misgivings about the implications of Reykjavik. Britain's Nato allies should not lose sight of their interests in its eagerness to reach an historic deal with the Russians. In a period which may be the run-up to the next British General Election, Mrs Thatcher's party will also be thankful. With the delivery of Trident II in doubt, the Conservative case against Labour's decision to dispense with the American nuclear umbrella could have been made to look ridiculous. Nevertheless, two question marks hang over Mrs Thatcher's American visit. The first is whether Washington's commitment to Trident will survive President Reagan's departure in 1988. The second is the Prime Minister's wisdom in going along with American negotiations with Iran, which, as we have argued in these columns, could encourage further hostage-taking by extremists.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRENCH DEFENSE MINISTER ON NEUTRON BOMB

PM201150 Paris LE MONDE in French 13 Nov 86 p 12

[Jacques Isnard report: "Mr Giraud Makes Cryptic Remarks on Manufacture of Neutron Bomb"]

[Text] The decision to manufacture the enhanced radiation weapon (otherwise known as the neutron bomb) rests with the Defense Commission and the conclusions reached by that body, chaired by the head of state, may be kept secret. This is what Defense Minister Andre Giraud said in cryptic terms to deputies from the defense commission who were questioning him on the future of such a weapon within the French panoply of pre-strategic deterrent weapons.

This clearly amounts to saying: If the decision to manufacture the neutron bomb has already been made or if it still has to be made the cabinet does not have to discuss it nor does parliament, not even in the forthcoming debate on the military programming law. The decision, whatever it may be, does not have to be announced.

Since France experimented with and completed the development of the neutron bomb under Valery Giscard d'Estaing's presidency, the debate on the value of this weapon has continued. As is known, the enhanced radiation weapon is a thermonuclear weapon specially designed for use on the battlefield to release high-energy neutrons produced by the explosion preferentially over the thermal radiation (heat effect) and the shock wave (blast effect) produced by any nuclear reaction on the ground.

French governments have explained several times in the recent past that the scientists know how to produce this weapon and that the only initiative which still needed to be taken was a decision on the manufacture of an operational weapon, not necessarily in large numbers.

Addressing the National Assembly Defense Commission, Mr Giraud made statements which were, to say the least, enigmatic on three points. First he reaffirmed that the enhanced radiation weapon is a munition and not a weapon system. Second, he stressed that the cost of the neutron munition does not affect the cost of the weapon system which is equipped with it. Finally, he said that the decision to manufacture it rests with the defense council, whose decisions may be kept secret.

When they were in opposition, Jacques Chirac and Andre Giraud made no secret of the fact that they were in favor of France adopting the neutron bomb. Although he has made qualified statements on this subject, the head of state has always linked the future of this weapon in the French panoply with developments in East-West relations in the arms sphere.

When he was appointed defense minister after the March elections, Mr Giraud appointed as general delegate for armaments Jacques Chevallier, former director of the military applications section of the Atomic Energy Commission, who is not only a resolute supporter of the neutron bomb but who also helped to develop it in Mururoa. Mr Chevallier compared the invention of the neutron bomb to combat tanks with the invention of the machine gun to combat infantry troops.

Addressing the Higher National Defense Studies Institute on 12 September, the prime minister mentioned the need for France to have "diversified" prestrategic weapons (which implies a range of nuclear munitions) to halt the impetus of an aggression (which presupposes weapons which have a specific military effect on the battlefield, as the neutron weapons does by nature). This reference to nuclear weapons having "their own military efficacy," in addition to the deterrent effect of the threat to use them, is included in black and white in the annex to the 1987-1991 draft military programming law.

It is known that the general staffs proposed to arm the army's new Hades surface-to-surface prestrategic missile with the neutron weapon. If that happened, the Hades missiles would not just be equipped with neutron bombs, but could carry other classes of nuclear weapon already in service.

Addressing the Defense Commission deputies, Mr Giraud said that in addition to providing an aggressor with a final warning before the use of strategic weapons, the Hades missile ought to be capable of inflicting "significant damage" on an enemy through the military efficacy of its warheads. The first Hades regiment is to be ready in 1992. The minister's deliberately cryptic remarks seem to be intended to accustom public opinion to the prospect of France manufacturing the neutron bomb.

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CSO: 5200/2454

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

KOHL STATEMENT ON FRENCH-BRITISH NUCLEAR ARMS

DW291133 Hamburg ARD Television Network in German 1450 GMT 28 Oct 86

[Excerpt from statement by Chancellor Helmut Kohl at 28 October news conference in Frankfurt — recorded]

[Text] France is a nuclear power — we are not. That must always be considered in all disarmament talks. It serves not only the interests of France, but — I stress it explicitly — also the interests of the FRG, that in discussions between the two world powers — between Reagan and Gorbachev — the British and French systems are not considered. Naturally, that problem is a French one; I have nothing to say about it. The French position is absolutely clear and I support that position. I am very pleased that the issue did not play a role in Reykjavik at all. We support that position — I want to say it again — explicitly.

The basic idea in these disarmament talks can be condensed into two lines: First, European security must not be decoupled from the security of the United States. Second, it must be made impossible to wage war in the future.

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CSO: 5200/2455

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

KOHL ADVISER ON USSR-U.S. MISSILE STANCES

LD211718 Hamburg DPA in German 1448 GMT 21 Nov 86

[Text] Bonn, 21 Nov (DPA) — The elimination of all intermediate-range missiles in Europe, known as the zero option, must and will also contain an agreement on the Soviet missiles with a range of between 500 and 1,000 km. The two superpowers are already agreed on this, Horst Teltschik, adviser to the chancellor, explained in an interview on Bremen Radio today. The departmental head responsible for foreign policy stressed that there cannot be any talk of a linkage — a compulsory condition for the conclusion of the treaty — because Washington and Moscow have reached agreement on this inclusion.

Teltschik explained further that the next category of short-range missiles with the smallest range, between 150 and 500 km, was in no way, not even as a condition, a part of the zero option on intermediate-range missiles. There are to be further negotiations on these after the conclusion of an agreement on intermediate-range missiles with the aim of "reduction and equal upper limits." Washington and Moscow are also in agreement on this, Teltschik said.

In the view of the chancellor's adviser, there are connections, but no conditions, on the issue of the zero solution. The positions of the Federal Government and of the U.S. Government are "happily, now fully identical." There are about 140 missiles with a range between 500 and 1,000 km which are to be a part of the zero solution for intermediate-range missiles, on the Soviet side. But the demands of the United States and the USSR on this point are far apart. Moscow, according to Teltschik, demands the freezing of this position. Washington demands a reduction and equal upper limits on both sides.

The Soviets possess about 600 missiles of the shortest range between 150 and 500 km. The West does not possess any such missiles.

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CSO: 5200/2455

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG'S GENSCHER REAFFIRMS STANCE ON INTERMEDIATE MISSILES

.LD181647 Hamburg DPA in German 1553 GMT 18 Nov 86

[Text] Bonn, 18 Nov (DPA) — Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has reaffirmed his demand for the full withdrawal of the intermediate-range missiles from Western and Eastern Europe. At a meeting in Bonn today with the U.S. negotiators at the Geneva disarmament talks, Maynard Glitman, Ronald Lehman, and Henry Cooper, he again rejected, in contrast to recent statements by Defense Minister Mafred Woerner in Washington, the linking of an agreement on intermediate-range missiles with "irrelevant conditions." Woerner had spoken in favor of simultaneous agreements for both intermediate-range and short-range weapons.

For the first time the American negotiators also included the inspector general of the Bundeswehr, Admiral Dieter Wellershoff, in their Bonn briefing. Following a talk at the Hardthoehe [headquarters the Defense Ministry], Wellershoff stressed Woerner's statement that for the foreseeable future there is no alternative to NATO's nuclear strategy.

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CSO: 5200/2455

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG DEFENSE MINISTER CONFIRMS PRESENCE OF CRUISE MISSILES

LD092030 Hamburg DPA in German 1912 GMT 9 Oct 86

[The following item was released to DPA in "edited form"]

[Text] Mainz/Bonn, 9 Oct (DPA)--Federal Defense Minister Manfred Woerner has confirmed that some of the 96 cruise missiles are already in the Federal Republic. Two days before the planned peace demonstration at the cruise missile site at Hasselbach in the Hunsrueck, Woerner said in a radio interview that the cruise missiles were not yet at their base in Hasselbach. When asked whether the weapons were already in the Hunsrueck, Woerner did not reply.

Woerner said he understood the worries of the population about the weapons system. However, he saw no danger of an accident, possibly with nuclear consequences. The cruise mi-siles and their nuclear warheads would not be "driven around" outside their deployment sites. The cruise missiles are to be deployed in the Federal Republic as a result of the NATO counter-arming decision.

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CSO: 5200/2455

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

CONDITIONS FOR 'ZERO SOLUTION' GIVEN BY FRG DEFENSE MINISTER

LD161907 Hamburg DPA in German 1753 GMT 16 Nov 86

[Text] Hamburg, 16 Nov --- In the words of Federal Defense Minister Manfred Woerner (CDU), the Federal Government will accept a "zero solution" for intermediate-range missiles in Europe if a limitation or reduction of shorter-range missiles can be achieved. In an interview with the national daily newspaper *Die Welt* (Monday's edition), Woerner, who has flown to Washington on a 3-day visit, said that the Warsaw Pact had an intolerably high superiority of 10 to 1 here. "It makes no difference to us whether we are threatened by an SS-20, SS-22 or SS-23.... They can all reach our territory."

Woerner underlined that our security and our strategy did not depend on any one weapons system. Aircraft such as the U.S. F-111 and sea- and land-based missiles were also capable of maintaining risks to the Soviet Union. "There is no doubt that given the Soviet Union's conventional superiority, a strategy of preventing war --- which is after all the whole point --- must continue to rely on nuclear weapons. The Federal Government's foremost motto is that it must never again be possible to conduct war. This could be the case if the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority was fully brought to bear without the influence of nuclear deterrence in preventing wars."

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CSO: 5200/2455

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG'S WOERNER COMMENTS ON ZERO OPTION, ROGERS REMARKS

DW240755 Cologne ARD Television Network in German 2130 GMT 21 Nov 86

[Interview with Defense Minister Manfred Woerner by reporter Dirk-Ludwig Schaaf on the "Bericht Aus Bonn" program; place and date not given — recorded]

[Text][Woerner] Federal Chancellor Kohl and the Federal Government have made it clear that they support the zero option. However, we expect — and it must be regarded as a commitment in future negotiations — that as a next step the shorter range intermediate-range weapons have to have lower equal limits.

[Schaaf] But Rogers has taken a different position and has undermined the credibility of the West. Should he not be called to order sharply?

[Woerner] I do not see that at all. A general with that responsibility must have the opportunity to express his opinion. That is not disloyalty. As long as it is clear that the politicians make the decisions, it is not risky. Undermining the negotiating position is not in question. If the politicians decide — and they have made their decision in the United States, as well as in the FRG and in other NATO countries — to accept that, it is irrelevant what the general says.

[Schaaf] You do not consider it a problem of credibility?

[Woerner] Not at all.

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CSO; 5200/2455

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG: FDP SPOKESMAN ON UNDERMINING OF 'ZERO SOLUTION'

LD182133 Hamburg DPA in German 1949 GMT 18 Nov 86

[Text] Bonn, 18 Nov — The foreign policy spokesman of the FDP parliamentary party, Helmut Schaefer, has warned the CSU and some parts of the CDU against undermining the disarmament policy of the Kohl-Genscher government. He was referring to CDU//CSU demands to make the so-called zero solution, that is aimed toward intermediate-range in Europe, dependent on a simultaneous agreement on short-range weapons.

Schaefer said in Bonn that anyone who adheres to such a belief was pursuing a fruitless "all-or-nothing" policy. Anyone who today questioned the "zero solution" for intermediate-range weapons was open to the charge of hindering real disarmament progress. The FDP was adhering to the policy of signing achievable agreements and at the same time making progress toward further disarmament agreements.

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CSO: 5200/2455

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG: CDU, SPD OFFICIALS COMMENT ON ZERO OPTION

LD231325 Hamburg DPA in German 1108 GMT 23 Nov 86

[Excerpt] Hamburg, 23 Nov (DPA) — A scrapping of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe is not tenable in the estimation of leading CDU/CSU politicians so long as the Soviet Union is in a superior position in conventional arms and short-range missiles. The scrapping of Soviet short-range missiles must be included in a zero-option for intermediate-range missiles, CSU Chairman Franz Josef Strauss said at a CSU election conference in Munich on Saturday.

The disarmament spokesman for the CDU/CSU Bundestag group, Juergen Todenhoefer (CDU), also expressed reservations. In the event of such a zero option, the Eastern superiority in shorter-range missiles and in conventional arms would be of even greater significance, he warned. The West must consider whether a zero solution in the intermediate-range area will really make peace and the freedom of Western Europe more secure, Todenhoefer said on Saturday in Boeblingen at a conference of the Baden-Wuerttemberg CDU on security questions.

Defense Minister Manfred Woerner (CDU) described the scrapping of intermediate-range missiles in Europe as "tenable in security terms" if "as a result" an attempt is made to reduce the shorter-range medium-range weapons and to lay down equal maximum levels. However, Woerner said in an interview with the *Welt Am Sonntag* that so long as a conventional balance did not exist "we cannot do without nuclear weapons."

SPD Chairman Willy Brandt sharply criticised the West's attitude. It is a "bad situation" if the west first of all calls for a zero-option on intermediate-range nuclear missiles and then, when the east acceded to this, backed off again. "This could lead to a terrible loss of trust", Brandt said in a radio interview.

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CSO: 5200/2455

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG: CSU'S TODENHOEFER ON GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALKS

DW021215 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1915 GMT 1 Oct 86

[Interview with CDU disarmament expert Dr Juergen Todenhoefer by unidentified correspondent in Geneva on 1 October on the "ZDF Magazin" program — recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] You spoke with the Soviet ambassador. What is your impression? Is there anything new?

[Todenhoefer] Yes. Compared with the state of affairs 2 or 3 years ago, there is something new. The Soviets are ready to reduce their SS-20's from 270 to 33 on the European part of their territory. There has obviously been some movement in that they no longer insist on including French and British weapons, and in that they are ready to concede to the Americans equal rights and equal upper limits worldwide, as well as in Europe.

[Correspondent] Does the Soviet offer contain any weak points?

[Todenhoefer] Well, I wanted to list the positive points first. Of course there are quite a few points where the Soviets still have to change and improve their position. The first point is the fact that the Soviet Union wants to retain its 171 SS-20's deployed in the Asian part of its territory, because they constitute a mobile missile task force that can be used against Western Europe at any time. In addition, the Soviet Union does not want the West to have ballistic missiles to counterbalance the remaining SS-20's — a small number of Pershing missiles. The Soviet Union only wants to allow the West to have cruise missiles. The Soviet Union is also not ready to discuss at Geneva the shorter-range intermediate-range missiles — the SS-22's, the SS-23's, and the Scud-B's. All of them are missiles with a range of 150-1,000 kilometers and can reach the FRG. The Soviet Union has a superiority in that type of weapon of almost 10 to 1, 700 to 72. In that respect the Soviet Union will also have to move, because it makes no difference to us whether we are attacked, threatened, or disarmed by Soviet SS-20's or by Soviet SS-22's or SS-23's.

[Correspondent] SPD disarmament expert Egon Bahr recommended that the Soviet proposals be accepted. Does he have any

additional information?

[Todenhoefer] Since the Soviets and the Americans submitted their proposals here in Geneva only 3 days ago, I think my information which I received 2 weeks ago is still very accurate and up to date. Do not think we should listen to advice of the SPD. If we had listened to that party's recommendations during the discussion on counterarmament, we would have had to agree to the SPD demand not to deploy western missiles if the Soviet Union was ready drastically to reduce its SS-20's. At the time it would have meant that the SPD was ready to live with a 300 or 400 to zero superiority in the field of long-range intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Despite the shortcomings I listed earlier, we now have a Soviet offer envisaging a solution of 100 to 100 for Europe. That means that the West was right to agree to continue negotiating calmly. That caused the Soviet Union to move further. It will be necessary for the West to show strength, cohesion, and calm so as to allow the Soviet Union to make concessions on the three critical points I mentioned, so that results are achieved considering the Soviet Union's and Western Europe's security interests.

[Correspondent] Can there be disarmament at all in a world that is full of tension?

[Todenhoefer] There can be disarmament. The only question is to what extent such disarmament is possible. Many people wrongly believe that there is tension because there are weapons. The contrary is correct. There are too many weapons in the world because the East-West relationship is strained. The main reason for that is the Soviet Union's expansionist policy in the Third World. Do not forget about Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Soviet Union refuses to grant the right of self-determination to European nations, including the GDR. In addition, it refuses to grant human rights in its own sphere of influence. All that is connected with the Soviet goal of introducing that system into Western Europe. In other words, we will have to attach a higher priority to resolving the causes of the East-West conflict. That will also substantially help us advance in disarmament.

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CSO: 5200/2455

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG: CDU'S BUEHE CLARIFIES STANCE ON STRATEGIC MISSILES

WA211817 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 18 Nov 86 p 1

[Text] CDU foreign affairs expert Ruehe responded on Monday to the impression that he had differences of opinion with the defense minister in assessing the consequences for NATO strategy of a possible U.S.-USSR agreement. The elimination of all ballistic missiles within 10 years, put forth as a goal at Reykjavik, would have substantial consequences for the strategic balance between East and West and for "the alliance strategy which has been successful for some 2 decades," said Ruehe. Europeans would have to take the lead in the discussion concerning our security" instead of limping along behind or being obliged "simply to put up with it." A "zero solution" for intermediate-range missiles, though desirable, should not be allowed to reinforce the East's superiority in short-range missiles and conventional weapons. With a phased reduction in nuclear weapons, Ruehe stated, the conventional balance would become more important, justifying his demand for negotiations which would result in reducing the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional weapons. In the course of this, he said, the invasion capabilities of Warsaw Pact forces, determined by their armament, equipment, and structure, would have to be eliminated.

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CSO: 5200/2455

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

'DRASTIC' MISSILE REDUCTION FAVORED--Cologne, 9 Oct (DPA)--In the run-up to the U.S.-USSR meeting this weekend at Reykjavik the Federal Government has stressed once again its interest in a drastic reduction of medium-range missiles in Europe. Wolfgang Schaeuble, minister in the Chancellor's Office, said in a Deutschlandfunk interview today that this is the precondition for more disarmament steps. According to the radio station, he emphasized the need for also reducing other systems and conventional weapons, as well as achieving a global ban on chemical weapons. [Excerpt] [Hamburg DPA in German 0715 GMT 9 Oct 86 LD] /9274

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN EAST--United Nations, 24 Nov (XINHUA)--China proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union substantially reduce their nuclear missiles in the Asian-Pacific Region. Chinese representative to the United Nations Fan Guoxiang told the First Committee of the General Assembly these cuts would be a concrete step to safeguard security in the region. He also urged both to work to ease tensions in the region, with particular attention to the hot spots in Afghanistan and Kampuchea. "The current international situation still remains disturbing," Fan said, but "it has become an irresistible trend in the world today that people everywhere aspire for peace." Fan said if the superpowers take the lead with drastic arms cuts, nuclear and conventional, they would create conditions for a general disarmament. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 0753 GMT 25 Nov 86 OW] /9274

CSO: 5200/4022

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

GDR SCIENTIST URGES CHEMICAL WEAPONS TALKS

LD152252 Hamburg DPA in German 1556 GMT 15 Nov 86

[Text] Bremen, 15 Nov (DPA)—GDR chemical scientist Professor Karlheinz Lohs has suggested talks between the Federal Republic and the GDR at a high political level about the control and ban of chemical weapons in Europe. In an interview with Bremen Radio, Lohs, who is a member of the research department for toxicology of the GDR Academy of Sciences, said that the negotiation offer of GDR Council of State Chairman Erich Honecker is "on the table". The reply from Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl was neither a clear "no", nor a clear "yes". The Federal Government has "evaded the issue".

With reference to the joint draft treaty for a "chemical weapons-free zone in Europe" proposed by the SED and SPD in June 1985, Lohs said "we can continue or deepen this tomorrow at government level or between the parties". The SED is also not afraid of talking about this with the CDU or FDP. "Even within the bourgeois parties" which, in the beginning, had rejected the SED-SPD initiative, "a serious reflection on the sense and non-sense of chemical weapons" has begun. "I believe that even large parts of the CDU/CSU are not excluded from this", he added.

According to Bremen Radio, Lohs is one of the GDR's leading natural scientists and political advisers. He was a member of the SED delegation at the talks with the SPD about a chemical weapons-free zone in Europe.

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CSO: 5200/2455

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

GENSCHER TO MEET SHEVARDNADZE AT CSCE CONFERENCE

Meeting of FRG's Genscher, Shevardnadze at CSCE Conference

LD311526 Hamburg DPA in German 1336 GMT 31 Oct 86

[Text] Bonn, 31 Oct — The third CSCE follow-up conference, which opens in Vienna on Tuesday for probably 8 months, will have to decide on a framework for negotiations on the conventional balance of forces. As was also stressed by German diplomatic sources in Bonn on Friday, the form of disarmament that is most important for Europe — in nonnuclear weapons — will thus be moving to the foreground at the beginning of the European security conference with the participation of 35 states. In view of the reduction to zero of nuclear missiles being sought by the superpowers regarding intermediate-range weapons deployed in Europe, the balance of conventional arms in Europe gains a special quality, sources say.

According to these sources the Federal Government, which concluded its preparations on Friday with consultations in the alliance and, especially, with the two superpowers, intends to meet a particular responsibility for detente and cooperation in central Europe at the conference. Differences of opinion are already looming, since the United States plans to place the main emphasis on the treatment of human rights issues.

German diplomatic circles, on the other hand, stressed the importance of treating all three "baskets" of the Helsinki Final Act — security, economy and culture, and human rights — in a balanced manner and of reaching progress in this way. German circles are thinking of replacing the missing final documents of the CSCE meetings on human rights and culture in Ottawa, Bern, and Budapest with reports from the responsible foreign ministers in Vienna, thus making them binding components of the CSCE process.

Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who will be chairing the first working session on the opening day of the conference is considering a proposal to convoke a European economic conference. A stimulus has been given to this not least by the recent Soviet thoughts with regard to a relaxation of their export business. In this connection, the diplomats in Bonn warned expressly against attempts at political blackmail on technology transfer, which would lead merely to a stiffened attitude on the part of the Soviet Union.

The question of what form the negotiations on the conventional balance of forces — which are overdue, in Bonn's view — will assume, is still completely open. A body on the Stockholm model, comprising all 35 participants, or only the two military blocs, in which there would then be 16 participants facing 7 at the table, could be considered. The successful conclusion of the Stockholm CSCE was no reason not to exhaust this mandate even further and to press for a continuation.

During the whole of the first week of the meeting, Genscher will conduct talks with most of his counterparts, but particularly with numerous foreign ministers from the Warsaw Pact. He will be meeting his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze as early as next Tuesday. An appointment with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, who allegedly plans only to deliver a speech and to confer with Shevardnadze before a quick flight back to Washington, is not yet firmly arranged.

Genscher on CSCE, MBFR

DW311137 Stuttgart Sueddeutscher Rundfunk Network in German 0713 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Interview with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by correspondent Johannsen on the "Journal I" program; date and place not given — recorded]

[Text][Johannsen] After all these years nothing has come of the MBFR negotiations. There is a deadlock. There is now talk of a premature end. Should it really end, or should the conference be continued?

[Genscher] No results were achieved in the negotiations dealing with troop reduction in central Europe, but a number of important rules have been worked out — rules such as how to assess the strength of troops on both sides, how balanced reduction steps can be made. These are the things that have been discussed basically. Some of the things we have worked out in Vienna have been used at the Stockholm disarmament conference, which ended, as we know, on a positive note. Many things that have been worked out in Vienna thus far can be used in next week's third CSCE follow-up conference, where negotiations will resume on troop reductions in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. One can build on experience in the CSCE negotiations.

[Johannsen] Can a new forum be established and the circle of negotiating partners extended to include the French, who have not been present so far?

[Genscher] It has been envisaged in any case to negotiate on the conventional — nonnuclear — balance of forces in Europe. It is necessary, because now the perspective of disarmament in the nuclear field has become more clearly visible, so that it has become important to stabilize the conventional balance of forces. All CSCE states would take part in that, including France. It would take into consideration what you have said. It does not rule out further MBFR talks for central Europe, where negotiations are under way. At any rate they have been useful. In the negotiations we will be able to build on our past experience with the negotiations.

[Johannsen] Let us switch from the Vienna MBFR talks to the state of affairs between the United States and the Soviet Union after the Reykjavik meeting. Despite all the first impressions, some arms control policy rapprochement has been achieved. There is even talk of a zero solution for intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Do you think there will be considerable

rapprochement between the Soviets and the Americans in that field in the near future?

[Genscher] If both sides stick with what has been discussed in Reykjavik, it ought to be possible to have such an agreement ready for signature at the Geneva negotiations. Both sides made serious efforts at Reykjavik to achieve a zero solution for Europe, while simultaneously reducing the number of their intermediate-range warheads to 100 each. Naturally, we are interested in having that which was worked out in Reykjavik reduced to a treaty. Both sides are prepared to negotiate on it. However, it is an open question whether the Soviet Union has spoken the last word in saying: We will sign such a treaty only when other problems have been resolved. I think we ought to proceed on that assumption.

When the treaty is ready for signature, the Soviet Union will have to ask itself again whether it is correct or not to sign something it could sign. At any rate, I am convinced that good headway was made in Reykjavik based on the sincere wish on both sides to negotiate. No one can go back on what was achieved in Reykjavik. What happened there is a fact. There is no way back; There can only be forward movement in the disarmament negotiations.

[Johannsen] If zero solution were achieved, would it automatically mean greater conventional armament?

[Genscher] No. The goal is not to step up conventional armament. It is our goal to prevent wars of all kinds, not just nuclear wars, but also conventional wars that would certainly mean the destruction of the people of Europe, most certainly of central Europe. Therefore, we must achieve stability in that field. It means that superiority must be dismantled, and that reductions must take place on both sides. Both sides — NATO is already doing it — must restrict themselves to what they need for their own defense, a far-reaching issue for negotiations. It is encouraging that the proposal by the Western alliance at the Halifax foreign ministers conference this spring to negotiate on the issue now evoked a quick positive reaction from the Warsaw Pact.

Well, here too both sides are interested in making headway. Disarmament policy and the dialogue between East and West really have gotten going. We Germans have good reason to support such a development and not get in its way.

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CSO: 5200/2455

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

GENSCHER ADDRESSES BUNDESTAG ON STOCKHOLM MEETING

DW021421 Cologne Westdeutscher Rundfunk Network in German 1026 GMT 2 Oct 86

[Statement by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher during Bundestag debate in Bonn — live]

[Text] Mr President, ladies and gentlemen: The Federal Government is satisfied with the successful conclusion of the Stockholm conference and the improvement in East-West relations. It has made significant contributions to those developments and will continue to do so. That also includes the consistent implementation of the Western alliance's Harmel report in all its elements. The Federal Government has not hesitated to do what was necessary for common security. It was certainly not with a light heart that it implemented NATO's two-track decision and decided to extend the period of compulsory military service.

At the same time, by taking part in shaping the West's disarmament policy, the government has acted according to the principle that deterrence and defense, as well as arms control and disarmament, are integral component parts of our security policy. [applause]

The Federal Government is also striving for dialogue and cooperation with the Warsaw Pact countries. It is working to reduce the causes of tension. It is working for real detente. Its policy of reliable membership in the Western alliance and the EC, as well as its persistent efforts for a good-neighbor policy with the East, have been confirmed.

On 22 September 1986, an important step was taken on the road to greater stability in Europe through disarmament verification and disarmament. Following 2 and ½ years of negotiations in Stockholm, the 35 participants in the conference on confidence-building and disarmament adopted a final document. In accordance with the mandate agreed upon at the CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid, a set of new, effective, and concrete measures were drawn up to make progress in confidence, security, and disarmament. The successful conclusion of the conference is the result of common sense, responsibility, and a sound sense of proportion.

Stockholm proves that the time is ripe for cooperative solutions in the arms control field. All participants have rightly paid tribute to the results of the conference as an important step toward arms control and East-West relations. The Stockholm document is a sign of hope.

When the CSCE foreign ministers opened the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in January 1985, people doubted it would be a success. The Federal Government did not allow itself to be discouraged. With the concept of confidence-building measures, we pursued the goal of creating more openness in the military area so as to prevent erroneous assessments of military activities. Actions were to become more predictable, and the risk of surprise attacks and concerns about attempts at intimidation were to be reduced. At the same time, the bases for making headway in arms control were to be improved.

In 1975 an initial decisive step was taken in the scope of the CSCE Final Act to create more confidence in Europe. In the interest of a broad and comprehensive security policy, the military aspects of security were also included in the CSCE process by way of agreement on confidence-building measures. The Stockholm final document constitutes an essential development and substantial improvement on the measures agreed upon in Helsinki. Thus the dynamism of the CSCE process has been confirmed again.

The following decisive progress has been made: inviting observers to military maneuvers is now mandatory. It is no longer left to the states' discretion. All participating countries have to invite observers to military activities involving more than 17,000 troops. Detailed provisions define the observers' rights to allow them to inform themselves unhindered about the purpose of the activities announced. It is also important that military activities beginning at a threshold of 13,000 troops or 300 tanks must be announced to all participants 42 days in advance. Finally, every participant must report on all notifiable activities scheduled to take place during the following year by 15 November each year. Military maneuvers in which more than 75,000 troops participate are only permissible if they are announced 2 years in advance. What is of particular importance for us is the fact that all measures have to be applied in all of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. That means the measures go beyond the 250 km strip of Soviet territory included by Helsinki, covering the whole European territory of the Soviet Union.

The most important aspect is the agreement on on-site inspections on the ground and from the air, without the right of refusal of the country being inspected. Thus public on-site inspections as a central element of effective verification arrangements in arms

control agreements have been recognized. Thus, a breakthrough on principles has been reached that is important for arms control on the whole. Even though not all the Western proposals were fully accepted, progress has been made. That is quite clear.

It allows for additional information about the participants' armed forces. It creates a better gauge to judge the military situation. Deviations from routine are more clearly recognizable. In case of suspicion, an inspection can help clarify the situation. In general, necessary political decisions can be made on a broader basis. The agreements reached in Stockholm will now have to prove their worth in their consistent application in letter and spirit.

As required by the Madrid mandate, those measures make effective and give expression to the states' obligation, which is valid worldwide, not to use force or threaten force. Accordingly, the participants were in a position to corroborate in the final document their obligation to renounce force in international relations.

The policy of doing what is possible in a given situation on a balanced and reciprocal basis has again proved to be more successful than a policy of all or nothing. [applause] In close cooperation with its West European and North American partners, the Federal Government has contributed substantially to that result. The idea to hold such a conference is a German-French initiative. In January this year, when the conference was stagnating, I and my French colleague called for renewed efforts by all for conduct that would be oriented to success. In that respect, our cooperation with France, which is becoming increasingly closer — including in the security policy field — proved useful.

Ladies and gentlemen, let me express the Federal Government's gratitude to our negotiating delegation, headed by Ambassador Citron. [applause]

The close cooperation between the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry has created a basis for successful conduct of the negotiations. The Stockholm result is an important stage. It is now important to make headway in other arms control forum also, and to use every opportunity for substantive results. The breakthrough achieved in Stockholm on the verification issue will in particular have consequences at the Vienna MBFR negotiations and the Vienna disarmament negotiations on an international ban on chemical weapons. If the Soviet Union embarks on the course outlined in the Stockholm document and at the Geneva negotiations, a result should be possible that definitely liberates the international community from the scourge of chemical weapons. [applause]

The progress in confidence-building and verification, which was achieved in a related field — at the second review conference on the agreement banning biological weapons that ended last week — is encouraging. In other areas, too, progress is becoming visible. For us Europeans the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons systems are of utmost importance. We insist that all land-based U.S. and Soviet longer-range intermediate-range missiles must be eliminated worldwide. However, regarding that very goal, we feel bound to take advantage of every opportunity to reach an interim result — an interim result that

leaves as few missiles as possible on both sides and that fixes equal upper limits worldwide and for Europe.

The U.S. proposal that both sides reduce their intermediate-range systems to 200 warheads each, 100 of them in Europe, and that the number of missiles with a range of between 500 and 1,000 km be reduced, is aimed at such an interim solution. In that way, the threat posed by the Soviet SS-20 missiles would be drastically reduced. A result involving far-reaching reductions would constitute an unprecedented step in nuclear disarmament. It would impressively demonstrate to the world that it is possible to turn the weapons spiral back. Ladies and gentlemen, we are realistic enough to know that considerable efforts are necessary by both sides to achieve that goal.

According to the NATO two-track decision, the Federal Government wants to have all intermediate-range missiles covered by the U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations. The goal must also be to reduce the systems with ranges of between 150 and 500 km to a lower level, with equal limits. The Federal Government considers it indispensable immediately to continue the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] negotiations on those systems following the conclusion of an interim agreement. [applause] Therefore, a concrete obligation to continue negotiations must be included in the INF interim agreement. [applause]

This gradual advance follows the NATO two-track decision, which envisages concentration of arms control efforts first on the especially threatening category of land-based longer-range intermediate-range missiles

As to strategic weapons negotiations, the proposals of both sides show important points of contact. The ratio between offensive and defensive weapons must be linked together as agreed on 8 January 1985 in Geneva. A first step would be agreement on a timetable in which clear and predictable limits would be valid for defense. Therefore, the ABM Treaty must remain as long as there is not other cooperative solution. Here, too, rapprochement of American and Soviet positions can be observed.

We also consider it necessary that the stipulations of SALT II are respected so as to preserve the framework for further reductions. The Federal Government supports the goal of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. President Reagan's statement that the United States is prepared — provided there is progress on the verification issue — to implement such a test stop gradually, points in that direction.

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, the results of Stockholm open the way to new, more comprehensive negotiations on conventional stability in all Europe — from the Atlantic to the Urals. Conventional armament in Europe is too great and unbalanced to our disadvantage. In the security field we expect the Vienna CSCE follow-up conference to decide on a mandate to continue and extend negotiations on confidence-building measures and deterrence in Europe. The aim of future arms control negotiations in Europe must be in line with the Halifax statement to establish a situation where the armed forces of both sides will be tailored to the demands of defense only. That is now already valid for the West.

It is and it remains the goal of Western security policy to prevent war, whether nuclear or conventional.

As a whole, the Vienna talks are aimed at a balanced development in all CSCE fields. New movement is involved in the process that is unique in the world. We want to take General Secretary Gorbachev at his word when he speaks of preparedness for a new beginning and new openness. We want to find out what is meant concretely when the Warsaw Pact assumes our demand of many years to overcome the partition of Europe.

In this spirit we want to continue the preparatory work that has been done in the CSCE meetings in Hamburg, Ottawa, Budapest, and Bern, to continue it in Vienna and complete it if possible.

One standard is untouchable for us; every agreement must be in the interest of the people of Europe. We cannot accept that people are persecuted and discriminated against because they quote stipulations of the CSCE Final Act. [applause]

Especially in regard to human rights problems, the credibility of the CSCE process must stand its test.

About a year ago the foreign ministers of all participating states agreed in Helsinki to continue the CSCE process. Those words must be followed by deeds at the third follow-up conference in Vienna. Signs are good for a positive start to the CSCE follow-up conference.

In East-West relations there has been some progress in several fields. Both superpowers are determined to live up to their special responsibility. We welcome the Reykjavik meeting, and we consider the envisaged U.S.-Soviet summit as necessary. We know that we cannot substitute for U.S.-Soviet relations. However, we will make our contribution if both superpowers try to set the right course for the future. As a friend and ally of the United States, we will introduce our concepts in to the U.S. negotiating position. We ask for understanding of Western ideas by the Soviet Union and its allies. The smaller and medium-size states must be responsible about peace and cooperation. Aware of history, we will continue to develop German-Soviet cooperation. It is essential for an improvement of the situation in Europe.

A new Soviet leadership is visibly pursuing modernization in its own country. Speaking of all Europe, and that recognizes realistically what the community of European and North American democracies means to peace, stability, and progress in Europe, it will find the FRG prepared for a constructive dialogue and constructive cooperation. We want to live peacefully together with all of Europe, based on cooperation and confidence. In this connection, both German states must play a decisive role based on the 1972 Basic Treaty.

We must deprive European borders of their terror and divisiveness. First, there must be no more shooting at any of the borders. [applause]

Countries with different social systems should be able to pursue their common and complementary interests and their responsibility for the common future in peaceful competition. We want people to live without fear of each other and we want people to meet. East and West must gradually reduce tensions and, with growing cooperation, achieve new forms of relations. We want to have a European peace order on the basis of equal rights for all and an equal right to security for all.

The Federal Government is determined to contribute what it can so that the newly forming East-West relations will be thoroughly successful. We, the FRG, can do that more effectively the stronger our position is in the community of Western democracies, the Western alliance, and the European community.

The Federal Government, which has now been in office for 4 years, feels very justified in pursuing its clear and predictable course. It will continue unswervingly on that course, encouraged by the people of our country. We know that Europe does not end at the Elbe and the Werra Rivers. Therefore, we do not forget in any one of our decisions that Germans and Europeans live east of us. [applause]

As a people in the center of Europe we consider it our mission to contribute to reducing East-West antagonism. It is a historical responsibility and task of the Germans. We would be poor Germans and poor Europeans if we acted differently. Thank you. [applause]

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CSO: 5200/2455

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIETS MONITOR, CRITICIZE 14 NOVEMBER NEVADA NUCLEAR TEST

Soviet Seismologists Arrive

LD122100 Moscow TASS in English 2002 GMT 12 Nov 86

[Text] New York November 12 TASS -- Under an agreement between the National Resources Defence Council of the USA and the USSR Academy of Sciences, a group of Soviet scientists arrived in the United States.

In the framework of this agreement, American seismologists had earlier started in the Soviet Union an experiment for verification of the non-holding of nuclear tests. Last July they installed special equipment in the area of the Soviet nuclear range in Kazakhstan to register tremour of the surface. Senior staff Scientist of the National Resources Defence Council Thomas Cochran said that seismic instruments installed in the USSR confirm that the Soviet Union honours its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear testing.

After procrastinations the U.S. Department of State issued entrance visas to Soviet scientists, but they have not been allowed to visit areas in Nevada and California where it has been suggested to install seismic equipment. So while American scientists, as the NEW YORK TIMES writes, have been staying near the Soviet nuclear range since last July, scientists from the USSR can only meet their colleagues, study geological maps of the suggested areas and check U.S. seismic equipment.

Speaking at a press conference in La Jolla, California, Thomas Cochran emphasized the importance of the Soviet-U.S. project. He said its aim is to show real possibility for verifying a moratorium on nuclear testing by the sides. This should encourage a world-wide ban on such testing so as to prevent the development of new kinds of nuclear weapons. Cochran said that the council suggested the participation in the experiment to the Reagan administration. But Washington refused, declaring that it is against a moratorium on nuclear testing.

Corresponding member of the Armenian Academy of Sciences, Chief of the Seismology Department of the Institute of the Physics of the Earth of the USSR Academy of Sciences Igor Nersesov, who took part in the press conference, emphasized that the main task of the joint experiment is to show that termination of nuclear testing is possible. He refuted the assertions of representatives of the U.S. Administration that the experiment is of propaganda nature.

Test Conducted

LD141649 Moscow TASS in English 1646 GMT 14 Nov 86

[Text] Washington November 14 TASS -- A new nuclear explosion has been conducted in the Nevada test-range in the USA today. Judging by the fact that the inhabitants of the city of Las Vegas lying at a comparatively large distance from the test-range were advised to seal up their windows, the exploded nuclear device was of a great yield.

In carrying on the programme for the nuclear weapons tests, the United States has again demonstrated its stubborn reluctance to heed the voice of reason and join in the moratorium on all nuclear blasts, which was unilaterally announced by the Soviet Union on August 5, 1985, and is observed by the USSR to this day.

TASS Analyst Criticism

LD141852 Moscow TASS in English 1822 GMT 14 Nov 86

["Unsupportable Stand"--TASS identifier]

[Text] Moscow November 14 TASS -- TASS political news analyst Boris Shabayev writes:

Seismographs recorded another American nuclear weapon test in Nevada, the 23rd in the 15 months since the Soviet Union had introduced its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions.

Seismographs are impartial instruments which only record earth tremors. People are different: They will never look on impassively as irresponsible politicians subvert the foundations of world peace and security. The opinion of hundreds upon hundreds of millions of these people was reflected in a resolution of the first committee of the U.N. General Assembly on the immediate termination and prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

The committee called upon all states to make every effort and to display political will immediately to draw up and conclude a comprehensive treaty to ban nuclear weapon tests and urged the United States to join the repeatedly extended Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions without waiting for the conclusion of the treaty. The delegations of 90 states voted for that draft resolution tabled by socialist countries and only three delegations, the USA, Britain and France, were against it.

Washington argues that the termination of nuclear tests calls for efficient control and at the same time is putting spokes into the wheels of the joint Soviet-American experiment called upon to demonstrate the dependability of a system of verification devised by scientists from the two countries. While American detection instruments were mounted near a Soviet nuclear test site way back in July and American scientists worked there, Soviet specialists were at first kept out of the USA and then granted visas but forbidden to travel to the areas where Soviet instruments were going to be mounted. So it is not verification that is Washington's headache but a pretext to continue nuclear tests.

They on the other side of the ocean keep harping on a U.S. "lag" in nuclear weapons, which should be closed through carrying on nuclear tests. But what "lag" are they

talking about if the USA has carried out more nuclear weapon tests than all the nuclear powers put together, including the USSR? No, it is not to "catch up" with the Soviet Union that Washington is trying but to achieve military superiority and to secure U.S. dominance through strength in the world.

This position is absolutely unsupportable because it is at odds with the realities of our age and with the vital interests of the whole of mankind.

PRAVDA's Kolesnichenko Comments

LD150328 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 14 Nov 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; commentary by Kolesnichenko, member of PRAVDA editorial board]

[Text] Hello, comrades. Among the most urgent problems of international politics, is one that I would call primordial and paramount: it is stopping all nuclear tests. For it is with nuclear tests, the nuclear blasts, that begins that chain which in the end leads to an increase in the arms race. Breaking this chain at its very beginning means halting the arms race, and it may even be possible to turn it back.

This is precisely the significance of the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear tests. Almost 3 months have gone by since we extended it for the fourth time up to January 1987. This bold, and let us say it openly, difficult step by the Soviet Union has evoked wide approval throughout the world, including from many statesmen. Well, let us recall the Delhi Six and their appeal for support for the Soviet moratorium. What is particularly important is that our unilateral moratorium is not just another appeal for peace but a specific action: new thinking embodied in a practical step. This is also how it has been perceived throughout the world.

But a moratorium cannot be endlessly unilateral; one cannot go for unilateral disarmament to the detriment of one's security, and so the Soviet leadership has more than once expressed the hope that the U.S. side would make a correct assessment of the silence on Soviet nuclear test ranges and follow the Soviet Union's example and adopt the stance of reason. These hopes, throughout the world, were bound in particular with the Reykjavik meeting where, among the main proposals put forward by the Soviet side, there was also the proposal on banning nuclear tests, and where, as is known, thanks to the Soviet Union's insistence and its constructive approach in the course of the meeting on Iceland's soil, an accord on starting full-scale negotiations on stopping nuclear tests was almost reached. However, as soon as 16 October -- that is, literally 3 days after the end of the close of the meeting at Reykjavik -- the nuclear test range in the state of Nevada began to speak again. And now another powerful test has been carried out, the 23d since the introduction of the Soviet moratorium.

The Washington revision of Reykjavik and the attempts to reconsider the basic aspects of the mutual understandings reached there manifest themselves, first of all, in my opinion, in the continuation of nuclear tests. I think that this is not by chance: Washington is geared toward continuing the arms race, not eliminating it. We, of course, do not want this; we do not want the arms race like all peoples do not want it. But I, for example, understand those Soviet people who send letters to newspapers and to television stations expressing their anxiety over the fact that the Soviet Union is continuing its unilateral moratorium while the United States carries out more and more nuclear tests. We will never forgo the security of our state and our people. So one cannot delay; for the time being there is still time left. While the Soviet moratorium is in force the United States can join it, be it today or tomorrow. This, after all, is required by common sense: One must not miss a historic chance.

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CSO: 5200/1114

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR'S BORIN DISCUSSES U.S. RATIONALES FOR CONTINUED TESTING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Sep 86 p 3

[Article by Lt Col Yu. Borin: "Washington, Which Is Following A Dangerous Policy, Can Find Itself In A Blind Alley"]

[Text] The realities of the nuclear and space age require from humanity actions that would contribute to halting the arms race on the planet. Not pompous protestations about the desire for a safe world, which are invested with the state power of politicians, but concrete practical steps to insure it are needed. The 18 August 1986 statement by M. S. Gorbachev was such an action. This historic document, which world public opinion calls "peace-making in action" with complete justification, emphasizes that the Soviet Union has quite sufficient justification for renewing its nuclear tests. It is convinced, however, that the halting of nuclear tests by the USSR and the United States would be a real breakthrough in halting the nuclear arms race and an accelerator for eliminating them. That is why, having weighed all the pros and cons and guided by a responsibility for the fate of mankind, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the Soviet government have decided on the Soviet Union continuing its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions until 1 January 1987.

Our country's sincere desire for peace is understandable to all honest people and is in keeping with their hopes -- including those in the United States. According to data from a survey which members of SANE-- an organization of citizens for a wise world -- conducted, 80 percent of the Americans questioned answered "yes" to the question: "Should the United States and the USSR conclude a treaty on halting nuclear tests?". Despite this, however, the French newspaper LE MONDE notes that official Washington "did not lose any time in giving a negative response to M. S. Gorbachev's appeal." Those surrounding the president did not hesitate a second in evaluating this statement of the Soviet leadership as a "propaganda gesture."

Moreover, the U.S. State Department hurried to immediately announce that such a moratorium does not answer the interests of not only the United States but also those of its allies -- or so they say.

What impelled Washington's military and political leadership to take this "quick, negative and rash" step?

There are several reasons for it. As is known, testing occupies an important place in the military technical process of developing new kinds and types of weapons of mass destruction. Regardless of their yield, nuclear explosions are an integral part of creating both new types of nuclear weapons and modernizing already existing ones. That is why nuclear explosions to develop warheads for the strategic weapon systems in the MX, Midgetman and Trident programs have been regularly conducted at the American range in the state of Nevada during the year that the Soviet moratorium has been in effect. Supporting the Soviet moratorium would mean -- for the Washington administration -- "depriving the weapons magnates of profit." A total of 30 enterprises are engaged in the building of nuclear weapons in the United States. By 1995, they must produce another 21,000 nuclear warheads.

Recently-made-public documents, which were prepared by the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives in the U.S. Congress, frankly point out that, despite the administration's protestations about its "serious readiness" to embark on a "substantial reduction in nuclear weapons" the U.S. Department of Defense continues to consider nuclear weapons as one of the main means for conducting military operations on the European continent and in the Asian and Pacific Ocean region. For this reason, it will improve in the future the appropriate elements of the nuclear infrastructure in these areas of the planet and retain and modernize its nuclear magazines that have been "put" here.

The re-equipping of military nuclear installations at U.S. Air Force bases abroad for the so-called "secure simultaneous storage" of both the latest models of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, is being provided for. According to the Pentagon's plan, although such "combined storage depots" do not guarantee "ecological security", they will increase the survivability and combat readiness of aviation units and subunits of the American army. The deployment of these new "safe storage" systems for nuclear weapons to the FRG, Great Britain, Turkey, Italy, Greece, South Korea, and several other countries is being planned.

Official Washington's attitude toward the Soviet moratorium was a verification of the true intentions of the White House. There is no need to point out that the militaristic policy of the White House, which is openly refusing to take any steps to meet the USSR in checking the nuclear arms race, has no prospects since it leads into a blind alley. In order to strengthen peace and strategic stability on the planet and to eliminate the threat of a war originating, what is needed is not nuclear explosions at test ranges and new "modernized" magazines but good will, new state thinking and a constructive foreign policy -- especially on the part of the United States.

The "window of opportunity" for normalizing the international situation, which has been flung open today for the White House thanks to the unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons which is being implemented by the Soviet Union, and to the series of its constructive and large-scale peaceloving proposals,

is "quickly closing" because of the -- to put it mildly -- "inconsistent" foreign policy that is being followed by the American administration, as the LOS ANGELES TIMES writes. The following question arises for official Washington: "Will Reagan's successors inherit the best treaty in the arms control area in all history or the most terrible arms race in history?" This question, which is of vital importance not only for the United States and the USSR but also for all of mankind, demands an answer.

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CSO: 5200/1025

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR'S KORBIN LINKS U.S. TESTING, 1ST STRIKE DOCTRINE

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Sep 86 p 3

[Article by I. Korbin, candidate of historical sciences: "Preparing For A First Strike"]

[Text] Hurrying to refuse in joining the moratorium on nuclear explosions that the Soviet Union has unilaterally extended to 1 January 1987, the U. S. administration did not take the trouble to look in its justification for "arguments" which were noted for their novelty. Yes, it is not in their nature. The genuine reasons for the refusal are well known; they are concealed in the militarization of political thinking which most of all affects the ruling circles of the United States. The ruling militaristic grouping in the United States, which represents the powerful military-industrial complex, has been possessed by the idea of an arms race. This madness is conspicuous for its desire to "maintain the potential for nuclear deterrence", for which nuclear tests are required -- in the words of President R. Reagan.

As M. S. Gorbachev points out in his answers to questions from the editor-in-chief of the RUDE PRAVO newspaper, the United States needs nuclear explosions not for deterrence (to deter whom: no one is planning to attack the United States) but for creating weapons meant for waging nuclear war.

Washington's "nuclear deterrence is nothing more than a cunning camouflage of the extremely dangerous chief element in all American military doctrines that have replaced each other--first use of nuclear weapons. It is this strategic aim that has determined the entire postwar logic of American nuclear planning and development of militaristic programs, which are aimed at acquiring military superiority. The notorious "strengthening of nuclear deterrence" automatically implies a further quantitative and qualitative build-up of the nuclear first-strike capability. The ruling clique of the United States does not conceive of rejecting it.

It cannot be said that they are not aware in the United States of the fatal consequences, with which this policy is fraught. As G. Weisner, a prominent expert on military and political problems and a former scientific advisor to Presidents D. Eisenhower and J. Kennedy, points out, even those Americans,

who participated in or were associated with the development of the Pentagon's plans, admit the pernicious effect of being the first to use nuclear weapons. It is no accident that a group of realistically thinking -- although in no way liberal -- important specialists, who occupied leading posts in previous U. S. administrations, have come out with a proposal to reject the first use of nuclear weapons. M. Bundy, R. MacNamara, G. Smith, G. Kennan, W. Kaufman, who are not obscure figures, and a number of other experts published in the ATLANTIC magazine a detailed plan for a step-by-step repudiation of the first use of nuclear weapons. In doing this, they pointed out in particular that such a policy would assume the "unconditional repudiation" of the "strategic defense initiative" program whose purpose is as much illusory as it is adventuristic as it insures an opportunity to inflict a first nuclear strike with impunity.

When pointing out the positive consequences of such a repudiation, the American specialists declare that it would mean the removal of any basis for deploying first strike weapons that destabilize the strategic situation, for example, the new MX intercontinental ballistic missile, the Trident D-5 missile that is being developed for nuclear submarines, etc. The authors of the article in the ATLANTIC magazine point out that the repudiation of the concept of inflicting the first nuclear strike would weaken the opposition to a complete banning of nuclear tests, which exists in the United States. Thus, the repudiation of the first use of nuclear weapons leads to banning nuclear tests. In turn, the banning of nuclear tests leads to a rejection of the first use of nuclear weapons -- by lowering the level of nuclear opposition.

As is known, the Soviet Union is firmly determined to achieve both. Its decision to extend the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions until 1 January 1987 is not only a proposal of exceptional importance addressed to the United States to make its own contribution to the realization of an historic chance to halt the nuclear arms race. It is also a practical action aimed at achieving progress in the task of reducing nuclear weapons and saving mankind from the threat of nuclear catastrophe that hangs over it. That is why not only wide circles of world public opinion but also the governments of many countries, including Western European ones, have placed a high rating on the Soviet peace initiative. The demands on the United States to follow the example of the USSR, to halt nuclear tests and to enter into discussions about their complete banning, are becoming stronger in the world.

Official Washington, however, remains deaf to the voice of reason. Its obstructionist position is opposed to the interests of strengthening universal security, including the security of the United States itself. It is universally recognized that Washington's negative attitude toward the moratorium is leading to an undermining of the permanent Soviet-American ABM treaty and directly contributes to the repudiation of the SALT-II treaty announced by the administration. As R. MacNamara the former secretary of defense, points out, such a repudiation will "inflict serious damage on the security of the United States."

Even in the United States itself, sober-minded public and political figures-- in attaching the necessary significance to the Soviet moratorium -- are subjecting R. Reagan's administration to sharp criticism for its stubborn unwillingness to join in it. T. Downey, member of the House of Representatives in the U. S. Congress and president of the International Parliamentarians for World Order organization, has stated: "The decision of the Soviet Union to extend the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions is an important step in the necessary direction. The moratorium on nuclear explosions answers the interest of all the world's peoples.... The assertion of the administration that it needs nuclear explosions allegedly for checking the condition of the U. S. nuclear arsenal is a lie of the very first water."

As we see, Washington's official figures will use any unworthy propagandistic measure, including lies, slander and juggling of facts to belittle the significance of the peaceful Soviet initiative and to justify their dangerous policy of whipping up the nuclear arms race in a futile attempt to achieve military superiority.

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CSO: 5200/1025

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: U.S. THIRD GENERATION NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS, SDI HIT

LD181725 Moscow TASS in English 1708 GMT 18 Nov 86

["Soviet Moratorium -- Time of Decisions" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow November 18 TASS -- TASS political news analyst Vladimir Matyash writes:

The Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik has highlighted still more forcefully that the problem of freezing nuclear explosions and reaching an accord on a total ban on nuclear tests became one of those watersheds through which the border between the old and new mentality runs.

The Soviet Union's drive to stop all nuclear blasts draw tremendous response all over the world. The move wins more and more supporters each time the Soviet Union extends its unilateral moratorium.

A year and five months without tests is already a political and military reality. It is the manifestation in practice of new thinking in international affairs.

The socialist countries, the conference of the Non-aligned Movement in Harare, representing over 100 states, the leaders of the "Delhi Six", numerous public organizations and trade unions, authoritative political parties in the West, including the West German Social-Democrats and the British Labourites, and prominent scientists across the world supported the Soviet moratorium and urged the United States to follow the USSR's example. Broad sections of the U.S. public and the considerable part of Congress back up the idea of terminating nuclear tests.

Meanwhile, the land in the Nevada desert continues to be shaken with convulsions. Contrary to common sense and the imperative of the time, the United States has already conducted the 23rd nuclear weapon test there since the movement when the Soviet moratorium was announced. Resistance to a halt to the nuclear arms race on the part of the current U.S. Administration and the powerful military-industrial complex is stout.

The Soviet Union scrupulously complies with the moratorium. Silence reigns at the Soviet test sites. But at this very time the United States goes ahead with nuclear explosions, perfects new types of nuclear armaments. The point at issue is, first and foremost, the development of space strike weapons for offensive, aggressive purposes. There are plans to put third-generation nuclear weapons designed to strike targets in space and to hit ground, maritime and air targets.

It is precisely third-generation nuclear weapons that call the attention of the Pentagon which views them among the crucial ones in the set of space strike weapons to be used in "Star Wars".

On the banks of the Potomac they do not conceal that American specialists currently regard lasers powered by a nuclear explosion and nuclear weapons with an enhanced electromagnetic impulse as the most promising types of such weapons. They are given priority in plans to develop the notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative".

The moment of truth has come now, the truth that the Soviet moratorium is the unique historic chance for all states to do away with the nuclear arms race. History will not pardon those who will fail to make use of this chance.

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CSO: 5200/1114

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: PAPANDREOU IN ROMANIA DISCUSSES BALKAN FREE ZONE

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Sep 86 p 5

[Article by Nikolay Bragin, under the rubric "Commentator's Column": "For a Nuclear Free Balkans"]

[Text] The Balkan peninsula, which for many years was regarded almost as the "powder keg of Europe", has today been transformed into a region of peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation between the peoples inhabiting it. The new trends in the Balkans embrace a wide range of problems and questions. However, there is one problem among them, which exceeds all the others in its importance. This is the problem of saving the Balkans from every type of nuclear weapon. It has become especially urgent in connection with the sharply increasing tension in the Mediterranean region situation, which has been caused by the aggressive intrigues of the United States.

On the initiative of the socialist states, a proposal about converting the Balkan peninsula into a zone, which is free of nuclear and chemical weapons, has been proposed for discussion by the governments and peoples of the Balkan countries. The realization of the proposals of the USSR and the other socialist countries which are aimed at transforming the entire Mediterranean region into an area of stable peace and cooperation -- such as the withdrawal of military vessels with nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean basin and the convening of a general conference on the Mediterranean area-- would contribute to the successful solution of this problem.

The problem of establishing a nuclear-free Balkans has been the subject of a business-like examination during a number of official meetings and negotiations between statesmen. In particular, A. Papandreou, the prime minister of Greece, participated in them recently in Romania and Bulgaria. During the course of his talks with N. Ceausescu, the president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, in Bucharest and with T. Zhivkov, chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, in Sophia, a mutual desire to establish zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons in the Balkans was expressed. The documents of the Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states this year confirmed the urgency of the problem of establishing such zones. The Presidium of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia declared the readiness of Yugoslavia to assist in solving this problem.

The Pentagon and NATO headquarters regard the idea of a nuclear-free Balkans differently. The United States is sparing no efforts in its striving to prevent Greece from freeing itself from American military bases, on which nuclear weapons are stored -- and this at a time when the Athenians have clearly declared that they do not wish to have anything to do with the missile and nuclear ambitions of the present American administration.

The times authoritatively dictate the need for active practical actions to check the arms race, limit and reduce the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, and make the areas of their deployment smaller. The transformation of the Balkans into a zone of stable peace, security and cooperation can and must become an important step on the path to strengthening European and universal security.

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CSO: 5200/1025

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

GERMANS' SPD, SED MEET TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR-FREE AREA PLAN

Agreement Reached on Proposal

LD171532 Hamburg DPA in German 1407 GMT 17 Oct 86

[Text] Bonn, 17 Oct (DPA)— The joint SPD-SED working group has reached agreement on a proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free corridor along the border between the blocs in central Europe. DPA learned this from informed sources today. Following the draft for a treaty on a chemical-weapon-free zone, this is the second concrete disarmament proposal elaborated jointly by the Social Democrats and the SED.

The delegations were headed by Presidium member Egon Bahr for the SPD, and by Politburo member Hermann Axen for the SED. They met for the first time on 6 December 1985. This was preceded by the formulation of the "framework agreement" on a chemical-weapon-free zone, which also gives extensive authority for verification.

Corridor Along FRG's GDR-CSSR Border

LD211042 Hamburg DPA in German 1012 GMT 21 Oct 86

[Text] Bonn, 21 Oct (DPA)— The SPD and SED today proposed setting up a nuclear weapons-free corridor along the FRG's border with the GDR and the CSSR. A joint working group of the two parties has agreed on the basic principles, which were introduced by SPD disarmament expert Egon Bahr and the SED politburo member Herman Axen to journalists in Bonn.

It is the second disarmament initiative after the proposal for a framework agreement on a zone free of chemical weapons in Europe to be devised by the Bonn opposition party in conjunction with the East Berlin government party. The SPD and SED propose the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons systems from a 150 km wide area on either side of the bloc border. Short-range weapons should in particular be included here. The proposal however also stipulates the removal of artillery systems which can be equipped with both conventional and nuclear warheads.

The two parties also support far-reaching control measures. It should be possible not just to take verification measures on grounds of suspicion but also to carry out spotchecks.

Basic Principles Outlined

LD211520 Hamburg DPA in German 1208 GMT 21 Oct 86

[Text] Bonn, 21 Oct (DPA) — The Opposition SPD and the GDR governing party, the SED, put forward on Tuesday basic principles for the establishment of a corridor free of nuclear weapons along the FRG frontier with the GDR and the CSSR. The text was elaborated by a joint working group of the two parties which has met six times in East Berlin and Bonn since the end of last year under the leadership of SPD presidium member Egon Bahr and SED Politburo Member Hermann Axen.

The initiative is based on a proposal by the late Swedish Prime Minister, Olof Palme. The SPD and SED urge the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from a 150km wide area on either side of the bloc frontier. This 300km wide strip would run approximately along Cuxhaven, Bielefeld, Mannheim and Munich in the West, and Stralsund, Berlin, Wittenberg and Dresden in the East. The perimeter in Czechoslovakia would still have to be worked out.

All launcher systems for the use of nuclear ammunition and the munitions themselves would be removed. Moreover the proposal stipulates the withdrawal of all weapons systems equipped both with conventional and nuclear warheads, namely artillery aircraft and rockets. Bahr and Axen explained to journalists in Bonn that this would also be a first step in the conventional sphere.

The "basic principles" proposed by the SPD and SED are based on regular international verification. This should be approved in cases of suspected treaty violation and moreover, spot checks should also be made possible. The two parties also propose permanent control points and the exchange of lists of the weapon systems to be removed.

Axen indicated that in formulating the "basic principles", the SED had consulted with the Soviet Union and the CSSR. In response to questions, he referred to "regular consultations with our allies". He also stressed that the Warsaw pact states have

long supported the idea of nuclear weapons-free zones.

The SED politician recalled that Erich Honecker wrote to Federal Chancellor Kohl immediately after the Palme proposal of 1983, asking him to support this proposal. The reaction so far has "unfortunately been negative". There is no doubt but that the GDR Government would also adopt the current SPD/SED initiative.

Bahr stressed that the SPD/SED initiative fills a gap because so far there have been no negotiations about nuclear battlefield weapons and short-range missiles. These, however, are the nuclear weapons "which would be the first to hit us". He pointed out that before the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Reykjavik, sections of the CDU/CSU had called for the inclusion of short-range systems in the negotiations, but the Federal Government had not wanted to burden the talks with this. The SPD and SED have now provided a response.

The SPD disarmament expert underlined that the Warsaw Pact would be deprived of part of its offensive capability if all artillery with calibres for conventional and nuclear use were removed from the corridor described. The proposal as a whole would have important consequences for the structure of the armed forces of both sides. Here the concept of "structural nonaggression capability" used by the SPD would assume concrete form.

In the view of CDU deputy Juergen Todenhoefer the proposal by the SPD and SED is irresponsible in terms of security policy. Due to the ranges and mobility of Soviet nuclear weapons such a corridor would only guarantee a deceptive and therefore dangerous security.

These plans would moreover strengthen the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority and thus render a conventional war feasible again.

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CSO: 5200/2455

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

FRG'S TODENHOEFER LABELS NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE 'EYEWASH'

LD151402 Hamburg DPA in German 1032 GMT 15 Nov 86

[Text] Bonn, 15 Nov (DPA) — The Soviet proposals for the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Nordic states are, in the view of CDU disarmament expert Juergen Todenhoefer, a "further non-serious propaganda maneuver by the Soviet Union and, unfortunately, once again a great piece of eyewash." Todenhoefer, in a statement on the recent Soviet initiative, said in Bonn today that the Soviet Union is keeping quiet about its most powerful nuclear weapons in the Leningrad and Baltic military districts, which it wants to keep even in the case of the establishment of an allegedly nuclear weapons-free North. This huge potential for mass destruction would remain standing immediately outside the front door of a nuclear weapons-free zone in northern Europe.

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CSO: 5200/2455

RELATED ISSUES

USSR: MARCH-JUNE 1986 TESTING, SDI, CW, SALT, CSCE

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 86 (signed to press 13 Jun 86) pp 83-103

[V. Mashin international survey: "Current Problems of World Politics (8 March-13 June 1986)"]

[Excerpts] 1. In Single Formation Toward the Common Goal

Growing interaction also distinguishes the fraternal states' relations in the foreign policy sphere. In the course of regular meetings their leaders coordinate joint strategy in the international arena. There was a meeting 10-11 June in Budapest of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee. Its participants exchanged opinions on the situation in Europe and the world as a whole and discussed urgent tasks of the struggle for disarmament, a reorganization of international relations, the strengthening of European and general security and the development of cooperation between countries.

Having analyzed the current situation, the top leaders of the Warsaw Pact states concluded: "The world has entered a phase of its development when evading the solution of fundamental questions of the present day means gambling with the fate of all civilization." Under these conditions, the documents adopted at the Political Consultative Conference emphasize, decisive actions and specific measures aimed at halting the arms race, switching to actual disarmament and removing the military threat are needed more than ever.

Having expressed readiness for the broadest interaction with other countries in the achievement of these goals, the Warsaw Pact states called for a pooling of efforts in the following fields:

a halt to nuclear tests, which would be a major and at the same time easily accomplished step toward nuclear disarmament (in this connection the conferees called on the United States to associate itself with the USSR's newly extended unilateral moratorium and proposed that the other states which possess nuclear weapons cease nuclear tests and contribute to the speediest achievement of an agreement on an all-embracing ban thereon);

complete liquidation on a reciprocal basis of Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles in the European zone with the understanding that Britain and

France would not increase the corresponding nuclear arms and the United States transfer its missiles--strategic and intermediate-range--to other countries;

the achievement of specific accords on the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms which would take account of the interests of both sides and all other states;

the liquidation this century even of such weapons of mass destruction as chemical weapons and also the industrial base for their manufacture;

an appreciable reduction in armed forces and conventional arms at the global and regional levels;

exercise of effective supervision in all spheres and at all stages of arms reduction and disarmament with the use of both national technical means and international procedures, as far as on-site inspection.

The participants in the Political Consultative Conference adopted an appeal to the NATO states and all European countries containing a program of a reduction in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe. It contains specific proposals concerning a significant reduction in all components of ground forces, tactical aviation and tactical nuclear arms with a range (effective radius) of up to 1,000 km of the European states and also the United States and Canada deployed on the territory of all of Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals).

The program put forward by the socialist states provides as an initial step for a one-time mutual reduction over a period of 1-2 years in the number troops of the members of the opposed military-political alliances of 100,000-150,000 men per side. Given the readiness of the NATO states, this could be followed by further significant reductions, as a result of which the armies and tactical strike aviation of both alliances in Europe would have been reduced by approximately 25 percent compared with the present level at the start of the 1990's. Such a reduction would constitute over 500,000 men per side. The allied socialist states advocate the process of the reduction of the armed forces and arms of both sides continuing. This would make possible the incorporation of other European countries therein.

The Warsaw Pact states' proposals envisage the need for the formulation of a certain procedure of the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms which would contribute to a lessening of the danger of surprise attack and the consolidation of military-strategic stability on the continent. It is proposed for this purpose reaching agreement on a significant reduction in the concentration of forces along the line of contact of the military-political alliances and also on the implementation of a number of other confidence-building measures. The reductions in armed forces and conventional arms should be carried out under reliable and effective supervision. On-site supervision could, where necessary, be exercised with the enlistment of members of a specially established international consultative commission which would include representatives of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and also interested neutral and nonaligned and other European states.

Relations between the two military-political alliances are largely capable of predetermining the course of world events. And not only in Europe, where they confront one another directly. This applies equally to the Asia-Pacific region also. Important processes are occurring here which cannot fail to affect the interests of the Soviet Union, as a major Asian and Pacific power, and its friends and allies and the interests of international peace and security. Calls have been heard increasingly often from the American side in recent months for the creation of some "Pacific community," which could in the future be transformed into an exclusive regional grouping and one further militarist bloc.

Under these conditions the Soviet Union deemed it necessary to set forth its position--an explanation of certain previous and also new proposals. The corresponding Soviet Government statement was issued on 24 April. "Approaching the potential participants in a 'Pacific community' with the highest degree of selectivity," it says, "its initiators are manifestly not displaying concern for the planned organization to truly be a representative forum for the discussion and solution of the region's long-urgent economic problems and also a change in the current unequal structure of interstate trade-economic relations therein."

The Soviet Union proposed by means of bilateral and multilateral consultations a solution of contentious issues, better mutual understanding and a strengthening of trust between countries of the region. This would contribute to the creation of the prerequisites for an all-Asia forum for the purpose of a joint quest for constructive solutions, as, equally, a separate conference of Pacific countries on questions of security, economic included. A stabilizing role could be performed here by the reduced activeness of the navies in the Pacific. The statement supports the idea of the creation of nuclear-free zones in the region. The USSR also proposed the start of a wide-ranging exchange of opinions among all interested countries of this part of the world on questions of the establishment of equal, mutually profitable and stable trade-economic, technological, scientific and cultural cooperation.

The Soviet Union's comprehensive, gradual approach to a solution of the region's problems is in keeping with the initiatives of other states located here, particularly the idea put forward by the MPR of the conclusion of a convention on mutual nonaggression and nonuse of force in relations between Asian and Pacific countries. The Soviet concept of security in the region also contains the well-known proposals of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia aimed at converting Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, stability and cooperation. Importance is attached to the DPRK's initiative for an improvement of the situation on the Korean peninsula and its conversion into a zone free of nuclear weapons.

The results of the eighth round of Soviet-Chinese political consultations held from 7 through 14 April in Moscow testify to the aspiration of both states to a further improvement and development of relations in the political, economic, S&T, cultural and other spheres. On 14 April Qian Qichen, special Chinese Government representative at the consultations and PRC deputy foreign minister, was received by E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister. As mentioned during the meeting, despite the differences in approach of the USSR and the PRC to certain

international problems and countries, the interests of the two states objectively coincide when it is a question of the struggle for peace and socialism, against the threat of nuclear war and the arms race and, in particular, against its transference to outer space. Both sides expressed the certainty that a considerable contribution to an improvement of political relations between the two countries could be made by the further development of contacts and relations, as far as a high-level meeting.

2. East-West: Justifying the Peoples' Hopes

The Soviet peace initiatives and the socialist countries' joint proposals are of a direct, honest and open nature. And those putting them forward have a right to expect the same unambiguous response. However, in past months the international community has, unfortunately, repeatedly witnessed a truly unambiguous, but, alas, manifestly negative response from the West. At best, Western capitals, primarily Washington, prefer to show political blindness. But more often than not the response has been actions directly contrary to the interests of peace and undermining the very foundations of international security.

As is known, in the summer of 1985 the Soviet Union took a step of extraordinary importance--announced that as of 6 August, the day of the Hiroshima tragedy, it was suspending all nuclear explosions both for military and peaceful purposes and called on the U.S. Government to follow its example. In response the United States carried out a routine nuclear test on 18 August. It was followed by others. The results of the Soviet-American Geneva meeting prompted the USSR to take one further step of good will--a 3-month extension of the unilateral Soviet moratorium was announced on 15 January 1986. There remained about a month to its expiry when the leaders of six countries--Argentina, India, Mexico, Tanzania, Sweden and Greece--appealed to M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan not to approve any nuclear tests prior to the next Soviet-American summit. The response of the USSR to the appeal of the leaders of the "six" was given on 14 March. Our country put forward a new initiative: "The Soviet Union will not carry out nuclear explosions even after 31 March--until the first nuclear explosion in the United States." On 22 March Washington carried out yet another nuclear test, thereby casting a demonstrative challenge not only at the USSR but the entire world community also.

The world observed with growing agitation this duel of sorts between bold initiative and senseless obduracy, the offer of an entry into a better tomorrow and an attempt to escape into the past and new political thinking and the decrepit mentality of the "from a position of strength" policy. After the nuclear explosion carried out by the United States and the announcement of a program of subsequent nuclear tests, hardly any unprejudiced person could reproach the Soviet Union with absence of a constructive approach to international affairs.

With its next "move" the Soviet Union proved for the umpteenth time that it is engaged in the international arena not in a search for propaganda successes but aspires to the achievement of actual results corresponding to the vital interests of peace. Even when this is attended by a certain risk to its security, furthermore. M.S. Gorbachev spoke on 29 March on Soviet television. "As far as our unilateral moratorium is concerned," the CPSU Central Committee general secretary declared, "I may say that it is, as before, in effect

through 31 March 1986. But even after this date, as announced, we will not carry out nuclear explosions if the United States behaves likewise. We once again give the U.S. Administration a chance to adopt the responsible decision--to halt nuclear explosions. Otherwise the Soviet Union will resume testing." The Soviet leader proposed meeting with U.S. President R. Reagan in the very near future to discuss the question of a suspension of nuclear tests.

The response of the U.S. Administration was unequivocal on this occasion also. On 29 March even the White House spurned the Soviet initiative, and nuclear explosions thundered forth in Nevada on 10 and 22 April. Attempting to justify its dangerous and irresponsible policy, Washington is resorting to all kinds of completely fraudulent arguments, the most popular of which are the assertions concerning the United States' "lag" in conducting nuclear tests in recent years and also the proposition concerning the "impossibility" of ensuring "reliable and effective supervision" of a suspension of such tests.

However, the facts testify to the reverse: according to data of the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, by the time of the Soviet Union's announcement of the moratorium the United States had carried out approximately one-third more nuclear explosions than the USSR, and 1.5 times more together with the West's other nuclear powers. In 1985 the United States carried out 18 nuclear explosions, the Soviet Union, on the other hand, only 9.

Nor do Washington's speculations around the problem of supervision withstand criticism. Both powers possess sophisticated national technical means capable of ensuring a high degree of reliability of verification that the other side is not violating its commitments. In addition, the United States and NATO have a tenfold numerical advantage over the USSR in terms of seismic stations. Adoption of the "Delhi Six's" proposal concerning assistance in verifying a suspension of nuclear explosions, including on-site inspections, could make supervision even more effective. The Soviet Union, for its part, expressed a readiness to make use of this proposal.

What, then, are the real reasons for such a negative attitude on the part of the U.S. Administration to the problem of prohibiting nuclear weapon tests? According to Western press reports, the Pentagon is currently implementing approximately 20 programs for the creation of new types of nuclear warheads, for the latest MX, Trident 2 and Midgetman ICBM's included, and aerial bombs for the new B-1B and Stealth strategic bombers. A large part of them is already at the proving ground testing stage. The nuclear tests are also directly connected with work on so-called "third generation" weapons, including X-ray and optical lasers, ultra high-speed nuclear weapons and railguns.

Thus the nuclear tests today are paving the way for an arms race in a qualitatively new sphere and leading to the creation of weapons for so-called "star wars" and will in the future undermine the foundations of the United States' own security. This is also understood in the United States itself. As public opinion polls testify, no less than 60 percent of Americans are in favor of a halt to nuclear tests. Resolutions in support of a moratorium have already been passed by the legislative assemblies of five states. Increasingly new cities are declaring themselves a zone free of nuclear weapons.

The United States' actions have forced the Soviet Union to absolve itself of its voluntarily adopted unilateral undertaking not to carry out any nuclear tests. However, considering the urgent nature of the question of a suspension of nuclear tests, the Soviet Union, as M.S. Gorbachev's response to the message of the leaders of Argentina, India, Mexico, Tanzania, Sweden and Greece issued on 3 May says in this connection, leaves in effect the proposal concerning a meeting in Europe as soon as possible especially on this issue. Such a meeting would not substitute for that on which the parties agreed in Geneva.

Addressing the 11th SED Congress in Berlin, M.S. Gorbachev announced new proposals of the USSR pertaining to a ban on chemical weapons. The corresponding document was submitted by the Soviet delegation at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 22 March. The proposals put forward by our country stipulate that the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles must begin by each state subscribing to the convention no later than 6 months and the destruction or dismantling of the facilities for their production no later than 1 year following the convention taking effect.

The new initiatives of the USSR and its allies facilitate the possibility of agreement being reached at the two important forums where East-West dialogue is being conducted--the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe and the talks on a reduction in armed forces and arms in Central Europe.

The Stockholm Conference has entered the decisive phase of its work. The time is approaching when it will have to submit a report to the participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, whose representatives will gather in Vienna this fall. The date of the completion of the present stage is known also--19 September. Little time remains, but only the range of questions which shapes the contours of possible agreement has been determined as yet. It has been possible to agree on the first versions concerning the nonuse of force, notification of large-scale military exercises, an exchange of annual plans of military activity of which notice has to be given, the invitation of observers and such. But there are still many unsolved questions. And this is explained mainly by the unwillingness of the United States and its closest allies to take reciprocal steps toward the achievement of compromise. Take, for example, the proposal of socialist, neutral and nonaligned states on limiting the scale of military exercises to a level which would not entail the unwarranted fears of other countries. Its realization could play a big part in strengthening trust. However, the NATO countries are opposed to this proposal.

Nor has it been possible to make any kind of perceptible progress at the Vienna talks. It might have seemed that there would have been an improvement in the atmosphere at the talks after the socialist states submitted a new draft agreement on 20 February. But this was not the case, and it is still unclear whether the United States and its NATO allies wish to achieve an agreement. As before, the Western representatives are arbitrarily manipulating the question of verification measures. Simultaneously they are unjustifiably cutting back on the volume of measures pertaining to a real reduction in the level of military confrontation. Thus they have lowered the figures of the

original reductions to 11,500 men for the USSR and 5,000 for the United States. While the socialist countries are proposing a reduction in forces with their arms and military equipment, the West is categorically opposed to this. It is also turning down the proposal that the arms level be frozen together with the numbers of the personnel.

Importance for the development of the all-European process and detente on the continent is attached to the expansion of East-West cooperation in the humanitarian sphere. Whence the interest which the Berne meeting of experts on contacts between people attracted. Its work culminated at the end of May in the formulation of a summary document. This was largely the result of the flexible and constructive approach displayed at the meeting by the USSR and the other socialist countries and their readiness to seek mutually acceptable solutions.

Nonetheless, the final document was still not adopted. The reason was the veto imposed by the U.S. delegation, which had from the very outset attempted to frustrate an understanding being reached. Thus Washington counterposed itself to all the other participants in the meeting representing 33 European states and Canada. This was yet further evidence that the U.S. Administration is openly blocking any possibility of the development of East-West dialogue.

The latest round of the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms opened with a plenary session of the delegations on 8 May in Geneva. Specific Soviet proposals on all three groups of questions under discussion are now on the negotiating table. The American side has been notified also that the U.S. proposals submitted at the start of November 1985 cannot, from the USSR's viewpoint, serve as the basis for agreements.

On the eve of the resumption of the negotiations the White House distributed a statement by President Reagan. It contains no new ideas or proposals. It does not contain a hint of this practical step or the other which might confirm Washington's "adherence" to the cause of curbing the arms race. Moreover, after the negotiations in Geneva had resumed even the U.S. Government took a step which reveals as clearly as can be the essence of the United States' present foreign policy course aimed at an arms race in every possible way.

On 27 May President Reagan announced the United States' actual refusal to subsequently comply with the Soviet-American treaty-legal documents limiting strategic offensive arms--the 1972 Interim Agreement and the 1979 SALT II Treaty. He declared that when adopting future decisions concerning the organizational development of the American strategic forces the United States would not be bound by the limitations provided for by the SALT agreements. Washington's withdrawal from the SALT II Treaty is specifically scheduled for the end of 1986, when in the process of deploying new arms, particularly cruise missile-firing heavy bombers, the United States will exceed the established limit of 1,320 strategic delivery vehicles fitted with separating independently targeted warheads. "The President's decision," the Soviet Government's statement observed, "means that the present American leadership has consented to an exceptionally dangerous measure in the demolition

of the treaty system restraining the nuclear arms race and thereby creating the conditions for the conclusion of new accords." The statement contains the warning that as soon as the United States exceeds the established level of arms or otherwise violates other basic provisions of the said agreements, which the sides have observed hitherto, the Soviet Union will consider itself free of the corresponding commitments in respect of them and will adopt the practical measures necessary to prevent the military-strategic parity being undermined.

The actions exercised on the international scene in the spring months by the U.S. Administration are contrary to the Geneva accords and are directly detrimental to the dialogue between the USSR and the United States. One such--American aircraft's bandit attack on Libya--rendered impossible the meeting of the two states' foreign ministers scheduled for May. Another action--the U.S. President's decision to move in the future beyond the framework of the limitations envisaged by the SALT agreements--is seriously complicating the preparations for the next Soviet-American top-level meeting. The Soviet leadership has set forth its position repeatedly on the kind of meeting this should be. In its opinion the American side's readiness to achieve specific results at the meeting on at least one-two questions in the security sphere and also the presence of the corresponding political atmosphere are essential for it to be held. The provocative step taken by Washington testifies to neither.

Swedish Prime Minister I. Carlsson was in Moscow 14-17 April at the invitation of the Soviet Government. During the visit there was a fruitful exchange of opinions on questions of mutual interests. I. Carlsson's meetings and talks with Soviet leaders showed that the USSR and Sweden view from similar positions such major problems as the need for the elimination of nuclear weapons, a halt to nuclear explosions, prevention of weapons in space, states' cooperation on an equal basis, the right to choice of social development and noninterference in internal affairs.

Having weighed all the facts connected with the security of its people and all mankind, the USSR Government adopted the decision to extend the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests until 6 August of this year--the anniversary of the barbaric bombing of Hiroshima. M.S. Gorbachev confirmed his offer to President Reagan to meet immediately in the capital of any European state or in Hiroshima to negotiate a nuclear test ban.

Simultaneously the USSR put forward an initiative for a considerable strengthening of the international system of the safe development of nuclear power and international cooperation in this sphere. Speaking at a meeting in Budapest on 9 June, M.S. Gorbachev proposed the establishment of a procedure whereby states would assume commitments concerning the granting of free medical assistance, shelter and other material support for casualties. The Soviet Union believes that it might also be possible to ponder organizing within IAEA framework the cooperation of the leading nuclear power countries in the creation of an economical and, what is most important, more reliable new-generation reactor. One further task of exceptional importance is the elaboration of a reliable system of measures to prevent nuclear terrorism in all its manifestations.

3. Economics and Politics in the Capitalis World

Only the FRG Government, perhaps, can rival the British Government for the title of truest ally of the United States. It was among the first to openly support the American "star wars" program. In the wake of London, Bonn associated itself with the SDI plan officially in April. The corresponding agreement was signed in Washington by FRG Economics Minister M. Bangemann.

The ruling coalition shrouded the terms of West German firms' and organizations' participation in realization of the SDI with a heavy curtain of secrecy. And, as it soon transpired, it had something to hide. The information on certain articles of the agreement which appeared in the press caused a resounding political scandal in the country. The documents which have been made public say plainly that the United States reserves the right to decide which results of the research may be passed on to the West German partners. The American side has also acquired the right to determine which technology and commodities the FRG may supply to the USSR and other socialist countries. K. Voigt, chairman of the SPD faction working group in the Bundestag Foreign Policy Commission, described the ruling coalition's position on this question as "Bonn's capitulation to the Pentagon's political and military demands."

After the FRG had officially associated itself with the "star wars" program, Bonn, as if on command, ceased almost completely to mention its "younger" sister--the "European Defense Initiative". The Defense Ministry deemed it necessary to specify even that it is a question merely of "expanded air defenses". Meanwhile realization of both projects is gathering pace. Major state establishments of the FRG have been connected up with the research in the sphere of the creation of space-based weapons. Orders for production of the corresponding components have been received by the country's leading military concerns. MBB, AEG-Telefunken and Siemens are cooperating, for example, in the development of a "laser tank"--a high-energy installation on tracked gear. The "Patriot" air defense system (back in September 1984 the FRG was the first of the United States' West European allies to conclude an agreement with Washington on the purchase of missile complexes), which it is contemplated converting into an essential component of the "EuroSDI," is being modernized.

Not confirming itself to participation in realization of the "star wars" program, Bonn was also the first U.S. ally to support the American plans for an escalation of the chemical arms race. It is a question of a program for the production of a new variety of this barbaric weapon of mass destruction--binary weapons. According to the Pentagon, they are to replace the old CW arsenals located on the European continent.

Washington's intention of converting Europe into a potential theater not only of nuclear but also chemical warfare is giving rise to anger and protests in the countries of the continent. Reservations and objections to the American plans have also been expressed by the governments of a number of members of the North Atlantic alliance (Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway). Nonetheless, under strong pressure from the "senior" partner these plans were approved at a NATO Military Planning

Committee session at the end of May. It is indicative that here also an example of "Atlantic discipline" was set by Bonn. Without waiting for the corresponding NATO decision, Chancellor H. Kohl undertook during his meeting with President Reagan in Tokyo to support a chemical arms buildup program. And although the country's ruling circles are attempting to calm the public with statements that the new-generation war gas will be deployed in the FRG only in a "crisis situation," such statements are being devalued by pronouncements of representatives of the Washington administration. The sense of them is that it will be the United States which will determine when a "crisis situation" has arisen.

Fears are being expressed even in the ranks of the ruling coalition concerning the consequences of the domestic and foreign policy course being pursued by the Kohl cabinet: after all, Bundestag elections are to be held in 6 months. Many aspects of this policy were sharply criticized at the congress of the FDP, which is the CDU/CSU's coalition partner.

The German CP is not alone in the struggle against the present course being pursued by the right-of-center coalition. Largely similar demands are being put forward by other democratic parties also. The decisions of the Green Party congress, in particular, which was held in the latter half of May, testify to this. It discussed and adopted an election program and also resolutions on a number of urgent domestic and foreign policy questions.

The congress confirmed the Greens' demand for a halt to the deployment of new American first-strike missiles in the FRG and for the withdrawal from the country of the Pershings and cruise missiles which had already been deployed. Its delegates unanimously opposed the "star wars" program and the FRG's participation therein. After long and stormy discussion, the congress incorporated in the election program a demand for West German unilateral disarmament and withdrawal from NATO.

Despite the considerable reduction in the level of inflation (from 13.6 percent in 1980 to 4.5 percent at the end of 1985), France is still lagging behind the leading capitalist countries in terms of this indicator. Nor were the ruling circles' hopes that the switch to a policy of "austerity" and modernization of the production machinery at the expense of the working people would strengthen France's positions in the competitive struggle with its main rivals justified: the country's balance of trade deficit in 1985 amounted to Fr25 billion, and the foreign debt to Fr1.2 trillion.

The results of the socialists' foreign policy course were highly contradictory also. The program documents with which the party went into the 1981 elections proclaimed adherence to disarmament, security and independence. On assuming office, however, it made a sharp turn toward "Atlantism"--it supported NATO's "arms catchup" decision and confirmed "allied commitments" within the framework of the North Atlantic alliance. The French nuclear forces are being modernized rapidly. True, as distinct from a number of Washington's other partners, Paris opposed the SDI. But in practice the government declared repeatedly that it would not prevent French firms concluding contracts within the framework of this project.

At the same time observers call attention to the disagreements which have already been displayed between the president and the premier in the foreign policy and military spheres. Thus in one speech Chirac openly supported the SDI project, declaring that France would not remain aloof from research within its framework. In response Mitterrand made it clearly understood that as president and commander in chief he did not intend associating himself with projects in which Paris would not make independent decisions. As the French press writes, Mitterrand thereby confirmed anew his opposition to the "star wars" program.

The events of the spring months confirmed that the centrifugal trends in the capitalist world continue. It is not a question, of course, of the collapse or loosening of the "Atlantic alliance". But Western leaders are having increasingly often to ponder the fact that alignment with Washington is far from always compatible with their states' national interests.

4. In the Sights of the Policy of 'Neoglobalism'

Washington and Tel Aviv took a further step in the past months to expand their "strategic cooperation". On 6 May the two states' defense ministers signed in the American capital an agreement on Israel's participation in the SDI. Thus the United States' Near East ally became the third country to officially subscribe to the "star wars" program. In fact agreement on this was reached earlier--during the visit to Israel of Gen J. Abrahamson, leader of the program. In the course of the visit the American guest familiarized himself with research in the military sphere. The compact laser installations which have been developed here were of particular interest to the Pentagon.

The content of the agreement signed in Washington is being kept secret. However, the two countries' mass media reported that Tel Aviv has already handed over to Washington 30 designs. According to available information, at the first stage alone Israeli firms hope to obtain from the Pentagon contracts to develop components of space-based weapons totaling \$150 million.

Israel's association with the "star wars" program has introduced a dangerous new element to the situation in the region. As cooperation with the transatlantic ally expands, there is a growth in Tel Aviv's self-confidence and recklessness, which is increasing the threat on its part to neighboring countries. This is making all the more urgent the need for a surmounting of the split in the Arab world and the removal of the disagreements and mistrust which exist here, which were manifested particularly clearly, for example, at the time of the United States' bandit attack on Libya. The reaction of the majority of Arab states essentially did not go beyond the framework of political condemnation, although in certain capitals calls for more emphatic measures were heard. Ultimately the Arab leaders were unable even to hold a planned summit meeting in connection with the aggression against Libya.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1986

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CSO: 5200/1113

RELATED ISSUES

USSR RADIO SHOW ON NST, CSCE, SDI, INF

LD141623 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 14 Nov 86

["International Situation -- Questions and Answers" program, presented by Sergey Pravdin, all-union radio international affairs commentator, with Sergey Losev, director general of TASS; Melor Sturua, IZVESTIYA international observer; Boris Levchenko, Moscow radio's Delhi correspondent; radio commentator Nadyezhda Ryasova; Igor Surguchev, international affairs journalist; and Vladimir Pasko, international affairs journalist].

[Excerpts] [Pravdin] Our mailbag contains numerous letters, the authors of which express support for the peace-loving foreign policy course of the CPSU and of the Soviet government, resolutely condemning the carrying out of nuclear tests by the United States, the Washington administration's attempts to attain military superiority over the USSR, its desire to distort the accords reached during the Soviet-American summit meeting, and to replace the Reykjavik package with a new one, the so-called Vienna package. [passage omitted]

Esteemed comrades, at our request, Sergey Andreyevich Losev, director general of TASS, will reply to your letters connected with various aspects of the USSR's campaign to ban nuclear arms and preserve peace on our planet. Our listeners ask, in particular, what characterizes the USSR's position at the latest, sixth round of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms, which ended on 12 November?

[Losev] Our country proceeds from the fact that it must be guided at the Geneva talks by the Reykjavik package in its entirety by the principles on which an accord was reached during the last Soviet-American summit. Any other way is false and leads up a blind alley. During the meeting the capital of Iceland, and on the basis of the bold and forward-looking proposals made by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU General Committee, the sides came to agree that all types of strategic offensive weapons belonging to the USSR and to the United States can and should be completely eliminated by 1996. An accord was also reached concerning complete elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe and on a radical reduction of these missiles in Asia.

In exchange for these major soviet concessions the United States would have had to renounce attempts to attain military superiority with the aid of the Star Wars program; to pledge to observe strictly all the provisions of the ABM Treaty, which has no time-limit, and for at least the next 10 years, to refrain from using the right to abrogate this treaty. The USSR insisted on banning the tests of the space elements of the antimissile defense in space and proposed that mutually acceptable accords be reached to ban antisatellite weapons. However, the U.S. Administration refused to

undertake these obligations and freeze the SDI program. The proposals the Soviet delegation submitted in Geneva on 7 November concerning the entire range of nuclear and space arms are based on Reykjavik and provide an opportunity to return the talks to a sound footing and to attain progress. It is now up to the American side.

The U.S. Administration is currently attempting to break up and dismember the package of Soviet proposals, to take from the negotiating table what is to their greatest convenience, ignoring what is not to its liking, to continue the Star Wars program, and at the same time, to compel the USSR to reduce its strategic arsenal.

However, as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev emphasized, eliminating nuclear weapons as a means of deterring U.S. aggression, only to receive in exchange a threat from space is something that only political simpletons can agree to, and there are no such people within the Soviet leadership. All our proposals put forward in Reykjavik are objectively linked to the central, strategic arms systems. Our concessions are, likewise, a part of the package. If there is going to be no package, neither are there going to be concessions. One cannot wage a nuclear war in the nuclear era; it is impossible to win it. [passage omitted]

[Pravdin] International public opinion is increasingly convinced that following the Soviet-American summit the U.S. Administration is trying to revise Reykjavik's results at any price. How is one to explain this?

[Losev] Indeed, the U.S. Administration's climb-down [spolzaniye] from the positions reached in Reykjavik can now be seen with the naked eye. This conclusion is confirmed by the U.S. delegation's conduct at the Vienna meeting of the CSCE participant states and also at the Geneva talks. In Geneva, the U.S. delegation is hampering the implementation of the goal of a radical reduction of nuclear arms, contrary to the accords reached concerning the elimination, by the end of 1996, of all strategic offensive weapons. But in Reykjavik, President Reagan stated outright: If we agree that all nuclear weapons are to be eliminated by the end of a 10-year period, we can convey this accord to our delegations in Geneva so they can prepare a treaty. At the Geneva talks, with the aim of attaining unilateral military advantages, the U.S. delegation insists on the elimination of only ballistic missiles, which represent the chief element of the Soviet strategic deterrent forces.

After all, Washington would like to exclude strategic bombers, of which the United States possesses almost four times as many as the USSR, as well as long-range cruise missiles, from the range of arms subject to reductions. At the INF session, the Americans are unsuccessfully trying to pull the question of medium-range missiles out of the package. As for the Star Wars program, the U.S. side is striving to continue, unhampered, with the development and testing of space arms and to retain the right to abrogate the ABM Treaty, which bans the development and testing within the field of the ABM system. [passage omitted]

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CSO: 5200/1113

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW 'ROUNDTABLE' ON REYKJAVIK, GENEVA NST, SDI, NFZ

LD161926 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 16 Nov 86

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Rudolf Georgiyevich Kolchanov, deputy editor of TRUD; Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Lebedev, member of the editorial board of NOVOYE VREMYA; Aleksandr Vladimirovich Zholkver, political observer of Central Television and All-Union Radio]

[Excerpts] [Zholkver] Hello, comrades. A major international event of the past week has been the working meeting in Moscow of leaders of the fraternal parties of the socialist member countries of CEMA. As you know, the Politburo of the Central Committee of our party noted that the positions of the CPSU set forth at the meeting are a practical expression of the priority we intend to give to the development of relations with the socialist countries and the strengthening of world socialism.

One should note that socialist states are not only coordinating their economic, but also their foreign policies successfully. Thus at the Moscow meeting all the leaders of the fraternal parties unanimously support the principled position of the Soviet Union in Reykjavik. At the moment this is more than topical--1 month exactly has passed since the Soviet-U.S. meeting in the Icelandic capital. It seems to me personally that when you talk about the month that has passed since Reykjavik one cannot but note that the world over that time has in many respects already become a different place.

I remember that FRG Foreign Minister Genscher has stated in the past few days that it would be impossible to return to pre-Reykjavik times, although such attempts are being made here and there, as is well known, primarily in Washington. But as for our country, at both the Moscow meeting and in speeches by Comrade Gorbachev directly after Reykjavik our striving to go further was stressed. Well, an agreement did not come from Reykjavik. This development has to be continued and it is exactly this aim that the Soviet proposals were pursuing that were submitted after Reykjavik, on 7 November if I am not mistaken, by the Soviet delegation in Geneva.

[Lebedev] Yes, that is quite right, Aleksandr Vladimirovich. Altogether you have, in my opinion, given a fair account of this tendency, or rather the struggle between two tendencies. The one -- this is not making it appear that nothing at all happened, but at least trying to give a quite different tenor to those accords, or the rapprochement in positions that took place there, and, well, the other tendency is to really move

forward, which we are calling for, based, of course, on the closeness in positions which they succeeded in achieving there. And in this connection over the past days I would not, for example, be so bold as to predict which of the two tendencies is winning through. For we know that virtually the same groups of experts, made up of almost the same people that sat over the nights in Reykjavik sat in Vienna.

[Zholkver] You mean the Soviet-U.S. talks?

[Lebedev] The Soviet-U.S. talks that went on in Vienna, taking advantage of the stay there of both the Soviet foreign minister and Secretary of State Shultz. And once again, unfortunately, the result looks fairly discouraging because the U.S. side is once again trying to prove, and moreover prove by very unfitting means, that an agreement was made on something quite different.

[Zholkver] What do you mean?

[Lebedev] Well, for instance, they are making it appear that when the U.S. President talked about America's readiness to achieve a scrapping of nuclear weapons, or at least a cardinal reduction, by 50 percent, of strategic armaments, then it turns out that President Reagan, despite what was recorded at Reykjavik, had in mind not a reduction generally in all strategic offensive armaments, but merely in ballistic missiles.

I'm sorry, but this is an attempt, well, as I said, using unfitting means, because everyone knows that the United States would acquire an overwhelming superiority in heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles for instance, and so on. In Geneva the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space armaments have continued. It is only just now, if I'm not mistaken, that their sixth round has ended. And today I was a little -- well I won't stay in confusion -- but astounded when I read a statement by the head of the U.S. delegation, Kampelman, after the end of this round. Mr. Kampelman is making it appear that everything is, you know, as in the song: Madame la Marquise, tout va tres bien, tres bien. At the same time when you read the statement of the head of the Soviet delegation, Comrade Karpov, then a rather different picture reveals itself, namely that unfortunately the U.S. delegation remains in its position and a constructive response, which presupposes that the United States will embark upon a radical reduction in nuclear armaments, of the whole of the triad, that is to say that both sides are accepting the reduction of all their strategic offensive nuclear weapons without exception -- there is no such understanding. What are they expecting from us, strictly speaking? Maybe that, as appears fleetingly sometimes in the press even in the statements of some Western officials, certain domestic difficulties, as they allege will force the Soviet Union to make some concessions.

In this regard I believe that the reaction to this of Paul Nitze, was very correct. He is a veteran of all these talks, who was in Reykjavik too, by the way, an aide to the U.S. President. He said that, first of all, the Russians would not make any concessions that would subject their security to a threat and, second, that he did not believe in any possibility of concessions of the basis of certain domestic difficulties.

[Kolchanov] I should like to add to what was said by Aleksandr Aleksandrovich what was expressed a few days ago by Comrade Ligachev at a press conference in Helsinki. This also concerned specific, quite specific proposals that are directed at curbing the arms race, and which in the final analysis lead to disarmament, although they concern North Europe as such. Comrade Ligachev named four points very specifically and precisely. The first point: what has the Soviet Union already done to move along this road, to demonstrate its real striving for peace? We have already dismantled launching installations for medium-range missiles on the Kola Peninsula, most of the launch

installations for such missiles on the remaining territory of the Leningrad and Baltic region military districts. We have transferred from these districts seven divisions of operational tactical missiles. These are concrete steps.

Second, in confirming our support for the idea of giving non-nuclear status to the waters of the Baltic Sea within the framework of the implementation of the proposals for a nuclear-free North, we could, Comrade Ligachev said, in the event of the achieving of an accord on this matter between the appropriate states, withdraw from the complement of the Soviet Baltic Fleet submarines equipped with ballistic missiles -- a major step, a constructive step.

Third, in supporting the idea of possible confidence-building measures applying to North Europe and the waters of the seas adjacent to this region the Soviet Union is proposing that a limitation on the intensity of large military maneuvers in this region be started, and fourth, which was talked about at the press conference in Helsinki, we share the thought that in the way of strengthening confidence-building measures in the naval sphere the positive experience should be used of the Soviet-U.S. agreement of 1972 on averting incidents in the open sea and in the air space above it.

Besides the essential content, so to speak, of this fourth point I should like to stress one point. Across the ocean fairly often they kick up a racket about alleged nonobservance by the Soviet Union of accords that were signed previously and this case shows the extent that the Soviet Union approaches all agreements that have been signed previously honestly, and the extent that it follows the letter and spirit of these agreements.

[Zholkver] Well, it's perfectly obvious why they have, let's say, taken up arms so much in that same Washington against the antimissile defense treaty, because it hinders the deployment of space weapons. Now, in fact, everyone accepts that the main -- and, perhaps, the only -- reason why no agreement could be reached at Reykjavik is SDI, the U.S. so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, which the Americans themselves far more accurately call the Star Wars program.

Here are some curious comments from the United States last week. The first comment is by the eminent U.S. scientist Jerome Wiesner. He is the honorary president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and former scientific adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. He has now declared plainly that Reykjavik showed that the two aims -- the so-called space defense and the freeing of the whole world from the nuclear threat -- contradict one another. All the "i"s have been dotted. It is a case of "either, or."

Incidentally, this same Jerome Wiesner acknowledges that, from the purely technical -- and, if you will, technological -- point of view, the SDI program is impracticable. It is dangerous, but it is impracticable. And, incidentally, even such a specialist in fantastic projects that do not always seem to be technically feasible as Arthur Clarke, one of the greatest U.S. writers of science fiction, also states that, in fact, these U.S. projects in space -- he calls them Stars of Death, the title, perhaps, of Arthur Clarke's next novel -- he said they are not practicable from the point of view of the creation of a defensive umbrella, but they may, unfortunately, become a highly effective offensive weapon for the purpose of, as he puts it, overseeing the whole world.

[Labedev] And, in general, it may generate very dangerous, new kinds of weapons, little known at the moment and even scarcely conceivable by the human imagination. And that, of course, destabilizes the situation. That, in my view, constitutes the main danger

of the SDI program. It undermines the main foundation for any possible future accord on strategic offensive weapons and on the whole complex of nuclear weapons -- specifically, the principle of equality and equal security.

[Kolchanov] SDI is, in general, like a many-headed dragon. There are very many really harmful aspects to the program, and we were just talking about the political, military-technical ones, and so forth, but here is another, highly important kind of harm -- the harm that is, as it were, socioeconomic. All these programs, incidentally, inflict damage primarily not on those against whom SDI is being prepared, but on those whom SDI is being prepared to defend -- the Americans themselves. We had visitors at our newspaper from the U.S. PEOPLE'S DAILY WORLD, and our colleagues concentrated mainly on the socioeconomic aspects of the program. I shall quote just a few excerpts from the remarks made by our U.S. colleagues. Here's what is written, for example: Every \$1 billion of capital investment taken out of civilian production in order to develop Star Wars or other weapons systems means the loss of at least 14,000 jobs. The 2-3.5 trillion handed over to the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex will mean the loss over the next 15-20 years of 28-49 million jobs. Iron and steel, engineering and, in general, all kinds of manufacturing industry will suffer most. That's what is written by our colleagues from the U.S. PEOPLE'S DAILY WORLD.

[Zholkver] But, you know, it seems to me that, when we talk in this way about just the problems of nuclear and space weapons, the thought may well occur to one: but are the so-called conventional weapons any less dangerous nowadays? After all, it doesn't make much difference to anyone whatever kind of weapons they've died from. And so I must say that the Soviet Union is campaigning just as actively for a reduction in conventional weapons. I was recently in Vienna, where a meeting is being held between the representatives of states taking part in the all-European Conference. Our delegation also submitted proposals about the military aspects of security on the continent of Europe and recalled that, in Budapest, the Warsaw Pact states had tabled absolutely concrete proposals on the subject: in the course of 1-2 years, the numbers of troops in the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries would be cut by 100-150,000 on each side, and then, in the early nineties, it is intended to carry out a further reduction in land-based troops and tactical air forces by 25 percent. That is a reduction of half a million men on each side. In other words, there would be 1 million fewer soldiers in Europe.

[Kolchanov] What's more, we are ready to discuss it, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, at various forums -- both at the Vienna meeting, at the Vienna talks on reducing armed forces and weapons in Central Europe; and within the framework of the mandate, as it were, for Stockholm-2, as it's already being called now, which the Vienna meeting now in progress has to draw up; and within the framework of consultations between Warsaw Pact and NATO representatives; and at all forums with the participation both of neutral and of nonaligned countries. It is important to set things in motion.

[Zholkver] I must say that such a position is supported, in general, by states that are by no means just in the European region. I have seen the statement made in Parliament by Rajiv Gandhi, the prime minister of India. It is now taking on particular significance, since, as you know, an announcement has been made about the forthcoming visit to India by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. And, when speaking in Parliament, the Indian prime minister declared that the positive point about the Reykjavik meeting is that both sides came very close to reaching an agreement, even though no solution was actually achieved. And now, Rajiv Gandhi stated, the leadership of the two great powers is required to display wise statesmanship and he plainly declared that the main thing is to guarantee that the Star Wars program does not stand in the way of disarmament.

I remember that speech by the Indian prime minister when I was preparing television material about the sessions of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. It's now time for decisions there too. Resolutions considered at the session of the General Assembly are being adopted. The vast majority of the resolutions are aimed primarily at curbing the race for nuclear weapons, since they are the most dangerous. I saw some curious statistics here. Twenty-eight resolutions have already been adopted, mainly about these issues: halting nuclear tests, nondeployment of nuclear weapons, reductions in them and the prospects for their total elimination. So, 28 resolutions have been adopted. Only in three cases did the United States find it possible to vote in favor -- on secondary issues, by the way. In four cases, it abstained. Twenty-one times, it voted against, voting seven times in complete isolation, against drafts that had been prepared jointly by both socialist and nonaligned states, including with the participation of a number of capitalist countries. It seems to me that these statistics reflect very vividly the balance of forces in the modern world: the consistent peace-loving policy of the socialist community, and this United States policy of neoglobalism, which manifests itself both in relation to the arms race and in a whole series of regional conflicts.

We will end our roundtable conversation at that point. Thank you, colleagues, for taking part in it. Thank you, comrade listeners, for your attention.

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RELATED ISSUES

FRG'S GENSCHER COMMENTS ON TALKS WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT

DW280747 Hamburg ARD Television Network in German 2130 GMT 27 Oct 86

[Interview with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by correspondent Wilhelm von Sternburg on 27 October in Frankfurt on the "Tagesthemen" program — recorded]

[Text] [Von Sternburg] Mr Genscher: The Reykjavik summit and its aftermath was assessed quite similarly by both France and the FRG today here in Frankfurt. Is that also true for the zero solution on medium-range missiles advocated by the FRG?

[Genscher] The zero-solution is a position of the whole alliance, and we agree that the great goal of preventing any kind of war must be maintained, be it a nuclear war or a conventional one. Therefore, it is very important that we strive to conduct negotiations on the conventional proportion of strength in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. For that reason, the preparations for the third CSCE follow-up conference to begin next week in Vienna has played a very important role.

[Von Sternburg] Mr Genscher, is it true that the French are stressing the short- and long-range missiles, and the FRG the medium-range missiles?

[Genscher] The French are a nuclear power with their own strategic weapons, which are not the subject of U.S.-USSR negotiations. For that reason they did not play a role in that context today. The subject we dealt with was the Soviet medium-range missiles and the U.S. medium-range missiles deployed in Europe.

[Von Sternburg] In Frankfurt there was also agreement that closer coordination between Bonn and Paris over disarmament issues should be accomplished in the future. Can you give us details, considering that there are differing interests — France is a nuclear power and the FRG is not.

[Genscher] There is a series of common interests. I mentioned conventional arms. And the security of France and the FRG cannot be separated from each other. There is agreement on that. By the way, the 1963 Elysee Treaty provides for consultations on security policy issues — consultations that we have been conducting since 1983. That shows how close FRG-French cooperation really is, and that there is a high degree of concurrent interests in all fields.

[Von Sternburg] It was decided here in Frankfurt today that Bonn would participate in the preparatory phase for the FRG-French space shuttle. Is that a decision by Bonn that it actually will take part in that project, which will cost billions?

[Genscher] There was a preliminary decision by the Federal Government last week on its participation in the definition phase. A definitive decision is necessary, but it is very clear that the FRG and France are aware of the importance of autonomous European manned space travel, which will facilitate our cooperation as a partner with equal rights. Such questions involve the EC member-states having the top technology. No country will be able to achieve it individually; we can only do so jointly.

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RELATED ISSUES

FRG: CDU'S RUEHE ON REDUCING CONVENTIONAL, NUCLEAR ARMS

LD141225 Hamburg DPA in German 0917 GMT 14 Nov '86

[Text] Bonn, 14 Nov (DPA) — In a joint position, at least of the most important NATO partners, future conventional arms control should be linked with a reduction in nuclear weapons. Volker Ruehe, disarmament expert and CDU/CSU deputy parliamentary party chairman intends to utilize chances for this closer coordination in the coming months.

At a news conference today Ruehe expressed his party's new line of thinking to the effect that even a total elimination of intermediate-range missiles and a 50-percent reduction in strategic missiles cannot be seen as a problem for the NATO doctrine of flexible response. The same applies to the Defense Ministry. Ruehe clearly defined this position against the conservative voices in his party who fear the collapse of the NATO doctrine in the absence of intermediate-range missiles. He warned against a kind of "hostage-taking" of the United States in regard to the nuclear umbrella by retaining some intermediate-range missiles and against actually publicizing such ideas.

According to Ruehe, the title of conventional arms control should cover traditional ground forces. The decisive thing here is to reduce the Warsaw Pact's "invasion capability". Not decisive, on the other hand, is numerical superiority in some areas, such as tanks and artillery, as long as this superiority does not contribute to the invasion capability. Equally important is interlocking with the nuclear disarmament talks, which will probably be conducted in quite a different forum, in order to maintain the incentive to reduce.

NATO will later, inevitably, face a debate on strategy. Ruehe already sees signs in the United States that even the question of the first use of nuclear weapons, which NATO has hitherto kept as a last means of defense against a surprise attack, will be discussed by the alliance. At the same time, Ruehe does not want to rule out common ground with SPD experts. He referred to comments by SPD disarmament expert Egon Bahr, who also agrees with the thesis that a denuclearization of Europe is not acceptable without the prior elimination of the Eastern invasion capability.

According to Ruehe — who often coordinates his statements with the Federal Chancellor's Office and, with regard to the facts, is often in agreement with Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) — it is particularly important for the Germans to prevent any silent change in strategy.

During the next 3 weeks Ruehe will travel to London and Paris to discuss with the foreign ministers and also with parliamentarians practical possibilities toward the new disarmament positions of these two capitals. But before this, Ruehe also plans a journey to Moscow, the preparations for which were evidently progressing unhindered today. On the basis of an invitation issued several months ago, Ruehe intends to travel to the Soviet Union on 23 November at the head of a small delegation of parliamentarians, and to hold talks with, among others, Anatoliy Dobrynin, the Central Committee chief of foreign policy.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRC TIES DISARMAMENT TO CONVENTIONAL, CHEMICAL WEAPONS

OW121328 Beijing XINHUA in English 1320 GMT 12 Nov 86

["China Opposes Militarization of Space, Foreign Minister Says" -- XINHUA Headline]

[Text] Beijing, November 12 (XINHUA) -- China "opposes deployment by any country of weapons in outer space," Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian said today.

According to remarks released by the Foreign Ministry, Wu called for a balanced reduction of medium-range missiles in Asia and Europe.

At a meeting with his Swiss counterpart here this morning, Wu praised the United States and the Soviet Union for proposing substantial cuts in nuclear arms.

Wu also praised the two countries for continuing to meet frequently on arms reductions.

"After all," he said, "dialogue is better than confrontation."

But, said Wu, "disarmament is not only a matter for the superpowers to deal with." He said the United States and the Soviet Union should "listen earnestly to the opinions of smaller countries."

At the meeting, Pierre Aubert, vice-president of Switzerland's Federal Council and head of its Federal Foreign Affairs Department, said Switzerland favors cuts in both nuclear and conventional weapons.

"It is not real disarmament if nuclear weapons are reduced while the number of conventional and chemical weapons remains the same," he said.

Wu said he agreed on that score.

The two foreign ministers also exchanged views on other international issues. Aubert said that the two saw eye to eye on all the questions discussed.

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RELATED ISSUES

BRIEFS

KOHL, MITTERRAND ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES--The FRG and France today agreed to harmonize their attitudes on arms control issues: The discussions between Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Francois Mitterrand resulted in an agreement for close cooperation. On East-West issues, a strong convergence of views emerged on the defense and security of Europe. This has just been reported by a presidency spokesman. [Text] [Hamburg DPA in German 1600 GMT 27 Oct 86 LD] /9274

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